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With the growth in number of international schools from the 50 identified in 1964 to the current 
5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated teaching staff of 250,000 predicted to 
grow to 10,000 and 500,000 respectively by 2020, the international school is an increasingly 
prominent sector of education. Yet despite this standing what is known about how international 
schools discipline and silence their dissenting teachers is negligible. Metaphorically speaking, 
the problem is that the “black box” of teacher control and correction remains firmly closed in the 
international school domain. The aim of this study is to open up the “black box” as it were, to 
use my experiences as an educator to shed some light on how organisational structures and the 
people working within them can disempower, silence and discipline a dissenting teacher.  
 
Although I have used autoethnography as methodology the study is not purely autoethnographic 
but rather a bricolage of methods that through conceptual enquiries of a philosophical nature (on 
the emotions, ethics etc.) deepen not only my narrative research but also my understanding of the 
issues. Engaging with these diverse philosophical analyses has taken me from questions of 
essence that focused on a Cartesian understanding of difference and conflict (us/them; 
cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) to a posthumanist stance on both and questions of 
how conflict can be understood as emergent from intra-actions between apparatuses of material-
discursive practices, conditions both social and material. For conflicts are collisions head on, to 
the accompaniment of squealing brakes and breaking glass. And it is important to understand not 




As such I hope that this study contributes to studies on conflict by showing how discourses, 
material conditions, affect, and power can converge to produce situations with serious 
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FOREWORD: DISAPPEARANCE AND DYS-APPEARANCE 
 
The philosopher and medical sociologist Drew Leder (1990, p. 96) explains that “social dys-
appearance” is the point at which the self becomes conscious of itself as an “alien thing” through 
the ethical distance and/or condemnation of the “Other” and is in turn shunned, rendered 
invisible, seen as a type rather than an individual. The dys-appeared, in turn, seek to disappear 
from the “highly distanced, antagonistic or objectifying” stare of the Other (Leder, 1990, p. 96) 
and so become complicit in their own dys-appearance to make it complete.  
 
In my own case so rattled was I by the experience of being rendered invisible by administrators 
and colleagues that over the course of my final year at one particular international school I dys-
appeared. I have since withdrawn from the world of international education, stunned into silence 
to inhabit the twilight zone of the teaching profession: tutoring and substitute teaching at various 
schools. At times seemingly erased by present experiences layered over faded pasts, the 
experience has become the scriptio inferior of my life, resurfacing at critical junctures and 
destabilising the text of my life. The story will not be told if not in the retelling. Telling and 
retelling; death and resurrection; my story and I, like Prometheus on his rock, hope to eventually 
be released from the cycle. My story and this study provide a chronicle of my own dys-
appearance. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION – RESPONDING TO AUTHORITY’S DEMAND 
 
1. 1 Background to the Story 
I present the background to the story about my experience of conflict at one particular 
international school as: (a) the first act of “a surrealist drama about a surreal, yet real” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 296) international school and (b) an equally surreal response to authority‟s 
demands. Richardson (1997) explains that the surreal can seem equally “isomorphic to the real” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 298), appropriately equal if not identical in form and relations. In other 
words, the words and setting might differ from what actually occurred but the contexts and 
meanings are inherently the same. The two examples I provide use school “politics as [a] context 
for [the] writing and as a site [for] discipline” (Richardson, 1997, p. 296). 
 
ACT 1 
[Scene 1: It is a hot and humid August afternoon at the start of the academic year at the 
Tepapawai International Secondary School (TISS)1 yet the principal‟s office is chilly bordering 
on cold. The sound of the air conditioner whirrs in the background. The room is clinical: there 
are no plants, no personal photos or pictures and the sea view from the sole window has been 
blocked out with a heavy blind. At a coffee table sits the principal who motions to the head of 
department as she enters to close the door and take a seat opposite him] 
 
Principal: Listen, I‟ve made a decision that I‟m not going to offer you another contract 
after this year I‟m afraid to say. I think that is the best way of solving the problem 
between you and the team. 
 
Head of Department: Okay. 
 
Principal: I think we need to move the situation on.   
 
Head of Department: [Silence] 
 
                                                        
1All names used are fictitious. 
2 “English to Speakers of Other Languages” (ESOL) is commonly used in lieu of “English as a Second Language” 
(ESL). 
3Personal communication from the chairs of teachers‟ associations at three different international schools. 
4 Although Kleinman‟s work addresses nosology (the classification of diseases), the medical profession and illness 
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Principal: I‟ve written you a letter for you to take away that has been counter signed by 
the HR Director [Principal hands letter to Head of Department]. 
 
Head of Department: Wow!  
 
Principal: I am sorry to be the bearer of bad news but I think that‟s how we need to move 
forward.  That‟s how it is. So you obviously need to go away and think about that.  
 
Head of Department: Well there is not much to think about, is there?  
 
Principal: No, not a lot. 
 
[Scene 2: In the drab and dingy staff room the Vice Chair of the Teachers Association and the 
Head of Department are seated having a cup of tea. Their cups remain untouched.] 
 
Vice Chair: Well, there‟s no point in your filing grievances against your principal and 
deputy principal, not now that you‟ve been given a non renewal. No, no point at all. I 
hope you can see that. 
 
Head of Department: [Silence] 
 
[Scene 3: It is a cold and miserable day at the Labour Tribunal court. The last case of the 
morning session is being heard. The court room is empty save for the lady judge, the plaintiff (a 
head of department at the Tepapawai International Secondary School (TISS) and the HR 
Director of the TISS]. 
 




Judge: Then case dismissed. 
 
Plaintiff: But your Honour they can‟t just get around the difficulty of a disciplinary and 
grievance procedure by giving me a non renewal. 
 
Judge: Yes they can. 
 
 
A CONTRAPUNTAL RESPONSE: 
 
Dear Deputy Principal  
 Further to our discussions yesterday and today I wish to clarify the problem. 
1. A member of staff in my department has approached you to say that she feels 
uncomfortable with my leadership and therefore has asked for you to line manage 
her. She refused to meet earlier today as arranged by you to discuss the „issues‟ 
with me present. 
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2. You have been line managing Yvonne at my request as of this year due to the fact 
that on more than one occasion she has physically threatened and intimidated 
members of the department. This was well documented by three members of the 
department as well as myself however no action was taken by you to resolve this 
issue. 
3. I cannot allow that you resume your previous backdoor policy with members of 
my department as this makes my position as Head of Department [HoD] 
untenable.  
4. The areas of dissatisfaction and tension were well aired at the meeting of the 
whole department in March following which a number of actions were agreed and 
apparently the situation improved until last week since when it appears your 
policy of allowing members of the department to approach you directly rather 
than directing them to air their concerns with me first (as you had agreed to do) 
caused a serious deterioration in communication. 
5. I can only conclude that this situation continues to be an issue because of your 
current line management strategies.  
 
When I return from medical tests in Australia we need to take some action to rectify this 
current situation of insubordination and your backdoor management policy before the 
situation becomes irrecoverable. If we cannot find a way to do so I cannot see how you 
can continue to line manage the ESOL2  team. 
 
 
1.2 The Research Problem 
In this study, the issue that needs exploring and understanding is how power and the emotions 
are used in international schools to silence, control and correct teachers and the effect that this 
has on teachers‟ lives. Reflecting on and interrogating emotions can help sustain and perpetuate 
historical and local school practices; it can also disrupt them. With the growth in the number of 
international schools from the 50 identified in 1964 (Bereday & Lauwerys, 1964) to the current 
estimate of 5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated teaching staff of 250,000 
predicted to grow to 10,000 and 500,000 respectively by 2020 (Brummitt, 2007, 2009a, 2009b), 
the international school is an increasingly prominent sector of education. Yet despite this 
standing what is known about how international schools discipline and silence their dissenting 
teachers is negligible. Metaphorically speaking, the problem is that the “black box” of teacher 
                                                        




control and correction remains firmly closed in the international school domain. By reflecting on 
and interrogating the emotions that caused and sustained conflict in one particular international 
school with one particular teacher, myself, I hope to reveal and explore the silenced voices of 
those concerned. My intent is to give a “voice to the voiceless”, make visible the invisible for 
“invisibility, in the end, is intolerable” (Short, Turner & Grant, 2013, p. xi). 
 
Consequently if as Bateson (1972/1987) contends justice requires the acceptance of the “other” 
in all her/his guises then injustice requires that we “listen to the silences” (Fricker, 2012, p. 289) 
of those silenced. If we are to understand “a human practice” (Fricker, 2007, p. 3) we need to 
bear witness to those whose credibility (as perceived by the “hearer” through his/her worldview) 
is such that “others do not, cannot, or will not” listen (Fricker, 2012, p. 290) We need to 
understand the practice from the standpoint of “those on the losing end” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288) 
 
Feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker argues that it is the social identity and social power of the 
“loser” as it relates to others that can constitute epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 91); Fricker 
(2007, p. 1) contends that it is these two elements that inform “two of our most basic epistemic 
everyday practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling them, and making sense of our 
own social experiences”. And so as speakers and givers of knowledge we can be perceived as not 
trustworthy due to “identity prejudice” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4) – prejudice based on for example 
race, gender and class (Fricker, 2007), “accent” (Fricker, 2007, p. 17), age (Murris, 2013) - and 
thus remain unheard.  In hierarchical institutions, such as schools, unequal power structures 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 7), based on a shared social construction (Fricker, 2007, p. 14) of teacher 
identity, can act “passively” (Fricker, 2007, p. 9) to control and silence teachers, our power as 
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“social agents to influence how things go in the social world” (Fricker, 2007, p. 9) of schools 
marginalised.   
 
Such “epistemic injustice” which Fricker (2007, p. 145) describes as the act of “wrongfully” 
denying someone access to “the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in a co-operative 
practice of pooling information” and hence from participating in the very practice that “defines 
the core of the very concept of knowledge” can and does lead to systemic and systematic 
silencing of teachers and administrators alike. 
 
1.3 The Research Aim 
The aim of this study, emerging from the research problem, is to open up the “black box” as it 
were, to use my experiences as an educator to shed some light on how organisational structures 
and the people working within them can disempower, silence and discipline a dissenting teacher. 
By scrutinising a phenomenon that has been paid little attention, this study hopes to provide 
insights into international school teacher control comprising as it does: “a clear vision of the 
[teacher‟s] social world and the way we think, feel and conduct ourselves in it” (Spector-Mersel. 
2010,  p. 209) – a paradigm, no less. I hope it can do much more; I hope it can “take you as the 
reader into the intimacies of my world. . . . in such a way that you are stimulated to reflect upon 
your own life in relation to mine” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 467). As my own grasp of the events 
influences my actions so too should you find that your own understanding of the events leads to 





1.4 The Research Questions 
Four questions form the framework for this study grounded as they are in the critical incidents 
that I experienced and which were touched upon in the opening sections of this study: the 
Foreword and the Background to the Story. These are questions that go to the heart of what it 
means to be a democratic society, be that within a school or within the wider community. For 
democracy, to quote Kelly (1995, p. 33) is “a moral concept”; it has in all its forms “firm moral 
roots, and [is] based on, and justified by, clear moral principles. . . . [with] a concern for the 
protection of human rights, for the equality of all citizens, for the maximization of individual 
liberty and the maintenance of proper sovereignty” (Kelly, 1995, p. 48) – that of the people. As 
such a school that purports to be a democratic institution cannot “ride roughshod” (Kelly, 1995, 
p. 33) over any of its “citizens” and must be predicated on a belief in and practice of “political 
freedom” (Kelly, 1995, p. 26; see also Fricker, 2012), a freedom that allows any of its “citizens” 
to contest any behaviour that appears to be unjust. As such the overarching question looks to 
render visible the cluster of ethico-political and epistemic practices that were enacted at one 
particular international school, in one particular case of conflict and on one particular teacher, 
me.  As such it asks: 
1. How can conflict in an international school be understood as a case of epistemic 
injustice? 
 
This leads to three subordinate questions that focus on the ethical aspects of a school, its culture, 
and staff with respect to conflict and read as follows: 
2.  How do emotions express the moral dimensions of a school‟s culture? 
3. What does it mean to be an ethical educator and what is an ethical school? 
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4. What are the changes necessary for international schools to become more ethical? 
 
1.5 Leadership and Management in the International School Context 
1.5.1 Introduction 
International schools differ from national schools in three major respects: diversity both at the 
micro and macro level; transience of students, staff, administrators and boards; and lack of 
accountability to a higher authority such as a local and/or other government office (Hayden, 
2006). There are no government inspections undertaken of international schools except at the 
specific request of a school and teachers have no higher authority to turn to that is not part of the 
administration or governing body when conflict occurs. Some international schools allow 
teachers to form a teachers‟ association which can mistakenly be seen by some teachers as 
having the power of a teachers‟ union3. This is far from the case as teachers‟ association officers 
are volunteers drawn from the teaching body and consequently employed by the very 
administration and governing body they are expected by staff to challenge and negotiate with. 
The conflict of interest these officers face is very real with the struggle between “what it is right 
to do rather than . . . what it is good to be” (Taylor, 1989, p. 3), a focus on “obligation” as 
opposed to “the nature of the [morally] good life” (Taylor, 1989, p. 3), an ongoing obstacle to 
their being ethical in practice. For with the focus on what is in their own best self-interest to be, 
the teachers‟ association becomes an apparatus that in its rules and practices precludes ethical 
behaviour. 
 
Despite the fact that the number of international schools has grown significantly over the past 
half a decade, from the 50 identified in 1964 (Bereday & Lauwerys, 1964) to the current estimate 
                                                        
3Personal communication from the chairs of teachers‟ associations at three different international schools. 
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of 5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated teaching staff of 250,000 predicted 
to grow to 10,000 and 500,000 by 2020 as mentioned earlier there is still unfortunately a 
“paucity of documentary evidence concerning leadership of international schools” (Blandford & 
Shaw, 2001b, p. 9) and the consequences of such leadership for teachers at these schools. 
 
1.5.2 Diversity 
Diversity in international schools has been well researched (Cambridge, 1998, 2000; Hayden, 
Levy & Thompson, 2007; Hayden & Thompson, 1995a, 2000a, 2000b; Hill, 2000; Matthews, 
1989a). Diversity occurs at both the micro level and macro level (Hayden & Thompson, 2000b) 
in international schools. At the macro level it can be said that no two schools are ever the same, 
ever share exactly the precise same characteristics (Hayden & Thompson, 2000b). However it is 
diversity at the micro level, that which “characterises so many individual international schools in 
terms of the large numbers of different nationalities, different cultural backgrounds, different 
languages spoken and different religious beliefs to be found amongst the student, and perhaps 
teaching, body” (Hayden & Thompson, 2000b, pp. 2-3), that defines an international school per 
se. 
 
This diversity of backgrounds - of students, parents, teachers and administrators - gives rise to a 
multitude of different experiences, knowledge, academic and professional skills as well as 
educational backgrounds and traditions, values, attitudes and expectations which in their 
entanglement with one another can and do give rise to complex situations and challenges within 
these schools: these can and do result in conflict when difference is understood as Other, the 
“not-I” side of an us/them binary, with “a clear dividing line . . .  between us here and them over 
9 
 
there” (Trinh, 1988, para. 1): a dualist hierarchical “vision” of difference rather than an 
affirmation of it. It is however how conflict is managed that determines the outcome of 
potentially difficult situations. Stout (2005, pp. 16-17) rightly comments: 
Conflict can have positive as well as negative effects, but which state predominates 
largely depends upon the way in which it is managed. . . . In many cases the initial cause 
of governance/management conflict begins with a tiny issue. This escalates into a 
personal agenda, and then all too often becomes a cause célèbre.  
 
Unless managed well small incidents can escalate into crises with grave consequences. 
 
Compounding the issue of diversity is that of transience. The transient nature of the international 
school acts as a powerful force in the phenomenon of conflict making an already complex issue 
even more complex. For as staff, students, parents, governing body members, and administrators 
leave on a regular basis they are replaced by others who bring different experiences to bear on 
the conflict as was the case in my own international school and my own experience with conflict 
within that school. I discuss transience more fully in the section that follows. 
 
1.5.3 Transience 
Transience is a distinct feature of the international school (Hayden, 2006) and international 
school life. Mathews (1989b) points to an annual student turnover of 30% or higher in any given 
international school, with students averaging less than three years in any one school. Similarly 
both locally hired expatriate teachers and those recruited from overseas also have a high turnover 
rate with few remaining more that the two or three year initial contracts they take up (Hayden, 
2006). A 1994 study by Hawley into the longevity of international school principals points to the 
fact that 50% of those sampled remained on the job for just less than three years with 15% 
leaving after only one year and only 26% remaining for more than six years, figures which seem 
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to have changed little over the last 15 years (Benson, 2011). Littleford and his 1999 study found 
that 80% of international school heads were “fired” (Littleford, 1999, p. 23). It is therefore not 
surprising that the governing bodies of international schools also demonstrate high volatility in 
terms of length of service with some board members and chairs leaving before the end of their 
term (Hayden, 2006). As Hayden (2006, p. 104) puts it: “the composition of [international 
school] boards can change both like and with the seasons” which can contribute to the focus 
being on the effective management of conflict rather than on an ethical consideration of the 
particular situation. In other words, the transient nature of an international school community 
fosters the notion that investing time into finding ethical solutions to issues that arise is not a 
worthwhile endeavour or use of limited time. 
 
The third feature of an international school that adds to those of diversity and transience in 
further complicating the issue of conflict within such a school is that of governance. For the 
governing body of an international school is a complex web of interactions in and of itself given 
the ongoing diversity and transience of its members. As such in the section that follows I explore 
the issue of governance as it pertains to conflict within an international school. 
 
1.5.4 Governance 
Blandford and Shaw (2001a, p. 2) write that: “The governance and management of 
[international] schools might be determined by the school, the owner, the Board, the senior 
management team or Head of school or a managing agency” (Blandford & Shaw, 2001a, p. 2), 
positions that might be encompassed by just one person, for in international schools one person 
may wear many “hats”, or by many. The board of an international school may have as its 
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members “the founder/owner, parents, interested members of the community, specialists from 
local business, headteacher, teacher representative and others” (Blandford & Shaw, 2001b, p. 
23). At one particular international school the owner stated: “I am the Chair and the rest of the 
Board consists of my daughter and my son-in-law” (Blandford & Shaw, 2001b, p. 23). What is 
evident, however, is that whatever its constitution, the “Board” (be it one person or many, be 
they called governors, trustees, directors or members of a school management committee) is, 
according to Mattern (1994, p. 4): “the employer, the maker of policies to be administered, the 
arbiter of performance. It must be satisfied that the leadership the Head is providing is suitable 
for the school.” It is the board that appoints the principal and approves new contracts and 
renewals of contracts. “Sadly” as pointed out by Hodgson (2005, p. 7): “international schools 
frequently lurch from Boards that micro-manage, to those that purely rubber stamp senior 
administrators‟ recommendations,” with Carver (2006, p. xiii) suggesting that  “boards [tend]  to 
be incompetent groups of competent people” selected either for their affluence, allegiance to a 
particular group within the school community, or the prestigious position they might hold within 
the local and/or expatriate community rather than their ability to be accountable that the 
organisation functions ethically (Carver & Carver, 2015; see also Carver, 2006). 
 
In her book Introduction to International Education, the leading expert on international schools 
Mary Hayden (2006, p. 107) aptly notes that: 
If it is true that relatively little has been written about teachers in international schools, 
then it is certainly the case that there is a dearth of material to be found about 
administrators, including the heads of such schools. So far as support is concerned, while 
the need is arguably at least as great for heads as it is for their more junior colleagues, it 




Critically assessing and addressing the complexities of leadership and management in 
international education is a daunting task, especially in the areas of politics, cultural friction and 
power, given that international schools are by their very nature heterogeneous entities not only in 
“type” but also “origin” (Welton, 2001, p. 96) and constituting as they do “a spectrum, with the 
ideological at one end and the market-driven at the other” (Hayden, 2006, p.17). That heads have 
to lead and manage such complex institutions with minimal support and guidance is alarming. 
She continues: 
Schools such as the United World Colleges may be placed as close to the ideologically-
driven end of the spectrum as it is possible to be, while at the other end of the same 
spectrum could be those schools that are entirely market-driven in their approach (and 
possibly exist principally as businesses). The majority of international schools, 
meanwhile, would be likely to fall somewhere in between the two extremes, 
demonstrating in different proportions according to their mission statement and context 
the influence of both ends of the spectrum. (Hayden, 2006, p. 17) 
 
Yet, irrespective of where any given international school positions itself on this spectrum, the 
importance of understanding the role of leadership and management when conflict arises is 
crucial in international schools where diversity of staff perceptions based on what Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) call “culturally constructed metaphors” and previous reinforcing experiences can 
be the cause of conflict and struggle for control (Pearce, 2003; Robertson, 2003). International 
schools are complex organisations; as Caffyn (2011, p. 66) so poignantly puts it, they are: 
artificial structures placed in complex environments with a diverse populace. They cannot 
create consensus because they are too diverse. The idea of creating a school culture and 
meaning is at odds with a profession that thrives on diversity. Therefore it must be a 
structure that is imposed, no matter how beneficently, and this gives rise to the strong 
possibility of power struggles, conflict and political manoeuvring. (Caffyn, 2011, p. 66) 
 
The complexity of demographic, perceptions, aspirations and power in international schools is   
under-rated by administrators and boards (Littleford, 1999) and can result in a leadership and 
management style which values expediency over ethics, where short-term goals and managerial 
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band-aiding become the default operating procedure of a transient and upwardly mobile 
leadership and management (Caffyn, 2011; Littleford, 1999, 2011), a leadership/management 
that already has its sights on the next overseas assignment or position (Benson, 2011; Hawley, 
1994, 1995; Littleford, 2011). Under such conditions “negotiation and discussion may take 
second place to [the] pragmatic managerial control and goal-oriented outcomes” of a school 
leader‟s “vision” and his strategic plans with teaching staff identified as “components to be 
governed rather than to be engaged with” (Caffyn & Cambridge, 2006, p. 48), seen as sources of 
information rather than individuals. 
 
1.6 Conceptual Framework 
What is conflict? Conflict can best be understood as an unresolved serious disagreement or 
“dispute” (Stout, 2005, p. 19), which, whatever the cause of the particular conflict, is more often 
than not protracted. It can have dire consequences for the loser and should the conflict escalate 
into “war” whoever loses loses more. As such conflict can be viewed through an emotional, 
moral and legal lens among many. However the lens chosen can constrain or liberate the conflict 
story being told. This is what makes writing about conflict challenging. 
 
1.6.1 The Emotional 
Despite the importance of being in touch, so to speak, with our emotions, using them as “forms 
of cognition” (Murris, 2009, p. 18), there is often very little in either international (or national 
(Campbell, 2003)) school management or leadership manuals or programmes that gives concrete 
advice on how “to deal” with emotions (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69) or indeed how to educate them. 
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Emotions are a “species of judgment” (Solomon, 1986, p. 44). As the philosopher Solomon 
(1986, p. 44) puts it, they are “a way of constructing the world.” Solomon continues: 
To enter into an emotion is not to „enter into somebody else‟s brain.‟ It is to participate in 
a way of being in the world, a way in which things matter, a way charged with shared 
understandings and obsessions. (Solomon, 1986, pp. 44-45) 
 
By educating the emotions we learn how to use them, express them as well as discover what to 
expect from them (Solomon, 1986).  
 
The emotions that permeate and encompass the international school are without doubt a product 
of how “history, location, power, control and fear” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69) intersect and interact; as 
a social construct the international school‟s history, location, purpose, and “actors” are “inter-
related to it and each other”, entwined as they are with feelings of “[v]ulnerability and 
insecurity” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 69), emotions common to both the transient and permanent groups 
of the school community that struggle for control over the “focal point” that is the school 
(Caffyn, 2011, p. 73; see also Caffyn, 2007, p. 343). The “emotional geographies” of school staff 
(Hargreaves, 1999, 2001), such as the personal and professional, the moral and cultural, the 
physical and political (Caffyn, 2007), directly impact relationships with colleagues which can 
also promote powerful emotional ties within groups in international schools (Pearce, 2003). 
Caffyn also points out that emotions are often veiled behind a façade of professionalism in 
international schools, presenting a unified front as public image, and gives outsiders a false sense 
of security and reality: “suggesting that [international] schools are places of order, control and 




My own experiences exemplify the opposite; emotions can be used within the school context to 
also create political reactions through the practice of “splitting and projection” with unconscious 
feelings and fears becoming evident as views, reactions and beliefs: a “flow of mental forces 
within and between individuals and groups . . . [that] can have substantial and significant effects” 
(Dunning, James & Jones, 2005, p. 245). Individual or group opinions can be a consequence of 
powerful emotions, feelings and fears about “identity, worth and vulnerability” (Dunning et al., 
2005, p. 245) and lead to “organisational politics” (Dunning et al., 2005, p. 245). Organisational 
members who refuse to accept their emotions, behaviours and feelings (especially contradictory 
ones that can result in painful or threatening internal conflicts) can project these problematic 
emotions onto others often in an accusing manner and accompanied by behaviours meant to 
reinforce the projection (James, Connolly, Dunning & Elliot, 2006). In other words we can 
project onto others that which we hate most in ourselves: the bully accuses the victim of being 
the bully, the perfectionist accuses the line manager of demanding perfection, repeatedly, 
deliberately and in a disrespectful manner. As such: “The emotional experience, mental forces 
and the defences against emotional experience are fundamental to organising in schools and are 
highly influential in organisational micro-politics in educational institutions” (James et al., 2006, 
p. 48), constituting as they do the critical “concepts of human agency and emotion” (Caffyn, 
2011, p. 69). Unfortunately individuals and groups can unknowingly act as “lightning rods” 
(Dunning et al., 2005, p. 244) for these projected feelings and become the scapegoats: 
demonised, bullied, marginalised and silenced (Dunning et al., 2005). Dunning et al., (2005) 
argue that: 
The ability of those involved to transform projected feelings, that is, to accept them, 
contain them, change them into benign and acceptable forms, and then return them in that 
different form, is crucial to minimising the impact of splitting and projection and to 
ensuring that it does not grow into more dangerous organisational phenomena. This 
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transformation-and-return process is a key educational leadership task. (Dunning et al., 
2005, p. 244) 
 
As Rose (1999, p. 97) suggests, drawing on Foucault, freedom may be more about the “capacity 
to judge, accept or transform the practices that subjectify” you. Without this capacity the 
leadership will find it difficult to prevent splitting and projection from occurring and can create 
situations where it actually thrives (Dunning et al., 2005). 
 
Weak and/or transient management and systems, imposed and/or weak corporate cultures, and 
disparate staff situations (Ball, 2000; Caffyn, 2007; Hargreaves, 1995) can fuel this process and 
cause schools to “fragment into subcultures, departments and interest groups” (Caffyn, 2007, p. 
339). This is especially true if those involved have diverse and divergent reasons for being there. 
An international school can fragment further into “individual interests” with “small-scale 
alliances built up on the basis of interest, goals, subcultures and power structures” (Caffyn, 2007, 
p. 339; see also Hargreaves, 1994) which can result in administrative “short-term solutions to 
complex organisational problems” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 72; see also Caffyn & Cambridge, 2006) 
such as conflict. 
 
1.6.2 The Moral 
Emotions are expressions of the moral; indeed, emotion, according to Fineman (2004, p. 721): 
penetrates and defines many of the processes and consequences of organizing. These 
include the subjective meanings of work, leadership, decision making, negotiation, 
motivation, ethical conduct, communication, gender and ethnic relationships. More 
sharply, emotion draws attention to the psychological injuries of working, such as 





Emotions can thus signal the “truth” of a situation more accurately than can logical reasoning 
(Solomon, 1986). They can signal the fair and unfair, the just and unjust action or words. 
However, to act “justly requires, evidently, an understanding of the intrinsic value of . . . justice” 
(Nussbaum, 1992, p. 59). To do the right thing for the wrong reason is not good enough: “to 
sacrifice in the wrong words with the wrong tone of voice at the wrong time would be worse, 
perhaps, than not sacrificing at all. . . . Obtuseness is a moral failing: its opposite can be 
cultivated” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 156). To ensure that emotions are displayed and acted upon 
appropriately whenever the situation calls for it requires an education of the emotions. Righteous 
indignation for example is in fact nothing other than the result of a moral education (Solomon, 
1986). Yet knowing by reason of the emotions contains no inherent promise of action: knowing 
is not yet acting. By viewing conflict through the emotions, the emotional and moral truth of the 
story is revealed with “what the bad, mad or childish person prefers count[ing] little or nothing” 
(Nussbaum, 1992, p. 62).   
 
1.6.3 The Legal 
Policies and procedures are meant to be unequivocal. They are the professional “checks and 
balances” used to ensure that teachers are treated fairly and justly. They are there to ensure that 
when morality and ethics fail then justice can still prevail. However this assumes that there is an 
impartial authority in place to oversee the process and ensure that policies and procedures are 
followed. Fear of disclosure is often at the heart of non-compliance, and a non-renewal of 
contract allows for an efficient and effective way of solving a “problem” and making it “go 
away”. Unlike national schools, in the international teaching context policies and procedures that 
deal with non-renewal of contracts as well as the grievance procedures available to staff are often 
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not made known to teaching staff when they do exist. Alternatively they are made difficult to 
access by teachers even if they are aware that said policies and procedures exist. The teachers are 
thus uninformed and hence unaware that a “strategic bricolage”, a “mixed economy of power 
and knowledge” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. xvi), is being used to disempower them. 
 
As such the use of a legal narrative as a lens with which to view a story of conflict and ethics 
within the international school context would be to reconfigure the story as a set of narrow 
technical concerns to be solved and to interpret them “within a particular nomenclature”, a 
particular “taxonomy”, to create something new – a new “entity, an „it‟4” (Kleinman, 1988, p. 5): 
the storyteller would be rendered invisible. It would be to view the particular as though 
generalisable. Reliance on legality assumes that general rules and laws can indeed cover all 
concrete actions and events and that individual judgment is not required. The legal narrative 
ignores the fact that conflict is polysemic, intimately entwined with emotions and feelings; by its 
very nature conflict requires that multiple voices be acknowledged if the conflict is to be 
understood. It is these emotional issues, the feelings involved, that the legal narrative fails to 
expose. The legal narrative results in voices being side-lined, silenced and marginalised; they 
thus remain unheard. 
 
1.7 The Research Method: Why Autoethnography? 
Teachers‟ narratives are a way of writing about teaching that liberates the insider‟s voice without 
the need for mediation by others. Kennedy (2001, p. 124) upholds the notion that “testimony” 
narratives circumvent the need for an “expert” to mediate the experiences of the “other” as the 
                                                        
4 Although Kleinman‟s work addresses nosology (the classification of diseases), the medical profession and illness 




narrator not only tells her story, but also interprets the meaning of her experiences, and reflects 
on their “broader significance”.  It is this mediation by the narrator that empowers her with the 
agency to interpret her own experiences. It allows for an in depth look at how the participants in 
the events narrated understand their own predicament and how this understanding leads to their 
particular responses. Young (1988) explains that as the participant‟s grasp of the events 
influences her actions so too should the readers find that their own understanding of the events 
leads to their own responses to the world around them. It is a narrative of self that “critiques the 
situatedness of self with others in social contexts” (Spry, 2001, p. 710). Ellis, Bochner and 
Tillmann-Healy aptly call this form of narrative an “evocative narrative” (Ellis, Bochner, & 
Tillmann-Healy, 2000, p. 13) with the “reader as a co-participant in dialogue” (Ellis & Bochner, 
2000, p. 744; see also Richardson, 1994, p. 521). 
 
These teachers‟ narratives, though few and far between (Day & Leitch, 2001; Pelias, 2003; 
Richardson, 1997; Winograd, 2003), can take different forms but they all share one common 
feature: they are told by people who are themselves teachers and experienced the very stories 
they write about. These are stories that act as journeys of discovery as well as journeys about 
discovery: explorations of self as subject, subject as self and the act of doing both 
simultaneously. In this way they act as both text and metatext at one and the same time. They can 
act as a form of embodied testimony and as a form of advocacy too. They can also do much 
more.  
 
Teachers‟ narratives can help the storytellers make sense of their own situation, their conflicted 
and fragmented identity; they can be a way of forging a new identity (Spector-Mersel, 2011, p. 
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173), a ”practice of freedom” (Foucault, 1984/1997), a means of moving from an old identity to 
a new one. We all have multiple identities, plural affiliations and memberships that span cultural 
as well as other boundaries. As the economist and writer Amartya Sen (2006, p. 19) puts it: “I 
can be at the same time, an Asian, an Indian citizen, a Bengali with Bangladeshi ancestry, an 
American or British resident, an economist, a dabbler in philosophy, an author in Sanskrit”. In a 
way we are all “cosmopolitan” (Bhabha, 2000, p. 139); we all cross multiple boundaries at any 
point in our lives; however, at critical “disjunctions” (Muncey, 2005, p. 2) certain affiliations and 
memberships can be compromised by the crisis of self. Thus it is that through the process of 
storytelling the storyteller can come to understand that although there may be no return to the 
land of the former narrative self, of former affiliations and memberships, the new narrative self, 
created through the storytelling process, can be equally valid (Frank, 2002).  
 
These stories are not in the business of proving or disproving anything; they do not offer advice 
for professionals (Brody, 1997, pp. 26-27; see also Day & Leitch, 2001). They are told to 
“remind those who share their form of life what it is they share” (Frank, 2000, p. 361). They are 
told to allow for a different way of “knowing”, a way of knowing differently that can “trouble 
the received meaning of data” (St Pierre, 1997, p. 177) as we commonly know it. They are told 
to allow the reader to know what it is like - psychologically, spiritually as well as physically - to 
be involved in the storyteller‟s world (Frank, 2000; Goodall, 2008; Polkinghorne, 1988; Said, 
1983; St Pierre, 1997) and the conflicts that can occur there. Storytellers tell stories because “the 
texture of any form of life is so dense that no one can describe this form of life; the storyteller 
can only invite someone to come inside for the duration of the story” (Frank, 2000, p. 361).  
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My story is used to explore the experience and understanding of the participant/observer as well 
as the tactics and strategies (Foucault, 1980a; Rabinow & Rose, 2003) employed by all involved 
in the conflict, administration and teachers alike. The story itself comprises contextualised 
artifacts, “verbal snapshots5” (Richards, 2012) interwoven with commentary and metareflections 
on the use of the method itself, and raises the questions: how does the past inform the present 
and how does the present inform the past story; how does this interplay change the past‟s current 
meaning and how does the story‟s meaning change as my current understanding of events and 
people changes? A “history of the present” (Foucault, 1977, p. 31) is embedded in and embodied 
by the past. Bochner (2007, p. 203) would have it that  I have gathered “knowledge from the 
past” to tell a story of “knowledge about the past” but I have come to support Polkinghorne‟s 
view that one comes to understand and give meaning to experiences and events only 
retrospectively, by taking a metaphorical step back (Polkinghorne, 1995) in time and space. This 
is not to “reconstruct some narrative of the way it was, but to respond, to be responsible, to take 
responsibility for that which we inherit . . . [and for what] „we‟ are” (Barad, 2010, p. 264). 
Clough (2002) reminds us that concerns both ethical and embodied are woven into the story and 
that “how I write [the] story will not be a matter of method as such, but a personal, moral and 
ethical response to research experiences. . . . an [experience] to be reflected upon” (Clough, 
2002, p. 6).  
 
Sparkes (1996)  describes his personal journey through inflammatory back disease, a disease that 
not only curtailed a promising sporting career but also permanently disrupted his narrative self 
leading to what he describes as an “interrupted body project” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 463). With this 
                                                        
5Richards (2012, p. 96) introduces and uses the notion of a “verbal snapshot”, a “metaphorical snapshot” that is “all 
in writing”, with which to convey her story of kidney transplant. 
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narrative Sparkes (1996) blurs the genres of academic and personal writing: “to take you as the 
reader into the intimacies of my world. . . . in such a way that you are stimulated to reflect upon 
your own life in relation to mine” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 467). Sparkes (2000) later speaks about 
what it means to produce “proper” academic work and how this notion initially influenced his 
writing. He admits he “felt the need to add something to the story to signal it as scholarship” 
(Sparkes, 2000, p. 28) so that in his first attempts to write the paper there were sections of theory 
to frame his personal experience. But this changed as his focus shifted from the theoretical to the 
narrative writing required to “tell” his story so that theory in the final publication weaved itself 
into the telling as and when needed. This allowed for an interplay between the academic and 
personal voices, an interplay between the various theoretical texts and narrative to allow for a 
very specific type of meaning to emerge. His epilogue which initially went into “a review of the 
lit and suggestions for further research” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 486) was replaced by an ending that 
“trafficked in human possibilities rather than settled certainties” (Sparkes, 1996, p.484). Sparkes 
(1996) produced a story that reads as personal and emotional borne of - using Hudak‟s phrase – 
“systemic sociological introspection” (Hudak, 2007, p. 59); it is a story that resonates deeply 
with its readers. His atypical use of other data sources (apart from his own personal story), the 
reconstructed conversations and medical reports, all add to the richness of the telling and reveal 
the possibilities this must have afforded him with for “reliving, reshaping, and realigning past 
events and experiences in order to give them new meaning in relation to the present” (Sparkes, 






To maintain confidentiality of the school and participants, all names have been disguised by 
pseudonyms including the school name which has been replaced by Tepapawai International 
Secondary School (TISS). Any details or features, such as physical descriptors, qualifications, 
nationality, and/or exact locations, that might identify the people or institutions involved in this 
case study will not be included. In the case of administrators involved in the case study they are 
referred to by their position only. This is not research “on” or “with” others but rather I write 
about my own life in one particular teaching context. This is not to dismiss empirical research 
within the educational field but rather to offer the field my autobiographical and 
personal/professional narrative as a means to explore the ethics of international schools as 
organisations. It is to explore what we might learn from “our „data‟ if we stage them in different 
writing formats” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298).  
 
Strict anonymity cannot be guaranteed (as is the case in most cases of educational research). 
With knowledge of the identity of the author, it might be possible to trace the identity of the 
school in question. However, the large majority of the people in the case-study are no longer 
working at that school. Moreover, as this is an autoethnographic study there are no conventional 
claims to truth, but instead the episodes referred to are theorised and are used to interrogate the 
literature. All effort has been made to make sure that no one can be identified in the descriptions 
of critical incidents referred to with details such as specific dates and places omitted in the 
reconstructed conversations I use as “verbal snapshots” - conversations that disrupted and 
destabilised me and that were written down immediately after the fact as I recalled them. That 
said, given that the methodological and ethical dimensions are interwoven in a study of this type, 
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ethics clearance from the School of Education at the University of Cape Town has been obtained. 
And I remained vigilant throughout the writing of this study to ensure that the ethical rights of 
others are not infringed or violated.  
 
1.9 Overview of the Chapters 
The study is divided into nine chapters: 
Chapter 1 includes the background to the study, the aim and the research questions that form the 
focus of this research study together with an outline of the research approach. It also discusses 
the distinguishing features of the international school context revealing that little is known about 
how dissenting teachers are dealt with in this fast-growing sector of education. 
Chapter 2 discusses the methodology used and contrasts different ways of using narratives for 
teachers‟ stories and illuminates how such narratives of self include the emotions as sources of 
knowledge and moral injustice as well as expressions of epistemic injustice. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I discuss the emotions in general and anger, shame, fear, and anxiety in 
particular as they relate to women in general and women teachers in particular and how they can 
influence how conflict arises, is managed and the outcome arrived at within a particular 
international school.  
Chapter 5 explores what it means to be an ethical educator, an ethical administrator and an 
ethical school and locates this stance within different ethical theories. 
Chapter 6 examines the apparatuses involved in a particular conflict at a particular international 
school on one particular teacher, me. It discusses how the context from whence administrators 
come as well as the context of the particular international school – of  “views from somewhere” 
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(Haraway, 1988, p. 590) - can influence how conflict arises, is managed and the outcome arrived 
at.  
In Chapters 7 and 8 I tell “my” story of teacher conflict within the international school context 
and one particular international school, interweaving a commentary on the reflection, a meta-
reflection so to speak. The fact that no one had listened to me, “heard” “my” story, means that 
the desire for epistemic justice, which is all about being listened to, acknowledged as worthy of 
being listened to, ran deep within me. This study, this piece of work, fulfills this function, hence 
the length and detail of several of the “verbal snapshots” I provide; they act as testimonies of a 
sort as well as events and experiences to be problematised and theorised, used to explore the 
literature as it pertains to conflict. However, that said, I let go of any pretence that there is only 
one truth, “my” truth, and that I am in the right. As such the study became philosophical 
therapy/transformation, so to speak, a way of enacting epistemic justice for myself. 
Chapter 9, the final chapter, is a meta-analytical discussion of the four research questions and 
forms the basis of my conclusions on “conflict” within an international school. Each question 
sheds light on the “black box” of teacher control and correction within the international school 
context that are illuminated by the narrative. 
 
A narrative thread runs through the thesis providing the autoethnographic link required between 





CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY OR MOVEMENT IN THOUGHT 
 
2.1 Introduction: Autoethnography as Methodology 
I suffer from migraine attacks. During an attack I lose central vision; it becomes a pixilated view 
of the world and it is only by using my peripheral vision that I can see. The detail revealed in a 
peripheral view of my surroundings is amazingly detailed and vivid. I am much more aware of 
my context, the events unfolding around me, the minutest of movements and sounds. The 
peripheral view, a place “where edges meet” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x), can sometimes give a much 
clearer image than that which is formed at the centre. It is usually where “the action most worth 
watching is”: a place of “interesting frictions and incongruities” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x). A 
sideways “glance” can often be illuminating. 
 
An autoethnography allows for and welcomes the peripheral view, setting the scene for the 
“telling [of the] story, weaving intricate connections among life and art, experience and theory, 
evocation and explanation” (Holman Jones, 2005, p. 765). It allows for what Gilbert Ryle calls 
“thick description” (Ryle, 1968, para. 5), an intrepid way to investigate relationships over time 
without it resulting in a shallow, “superficial” study (Holman Jones, 2004, para. 30). It allows for 
a re-enactment, a re-“imagin[ing] and re-liv[ing]” (Lenz Taguchi, 2010, p. 171) of an experience 
which allows people to find new meaning and through this find a closure of sorts, a renewal 
(Frank, 2002). It also allows for an investigation not only into how we structure stories, and how 
they function, but also into “who produces them and by what means” (Andrews, Squire & 
Tamboukou, 2008, p. 2). More importantly it allows us to investigate “how narratives are 




Richardson makes a powerful link between writing, knowing and understanding, observing that: 
writing [is] a method of inquiry, a way of finding out about yourself and your topic. 
Although we usually think about writing as a mode of „telling‟ about the social world . . . 
Writing is also a way of „knowing‟ - a method of discovery and analysis. By writing in 
different ways, we discover new aspects of our topic and our relationship to it. Form and 
content are inseparable. (Richardson, 1994, p. 516) 
 
It is this aspect, what Spector-Mersel (2010, p. 208) and Brown (2012, p. 50) call the 
“interpretive-qualitative paradigm” of narratives, that allows for a “subjective and multifaceted 
social reality” (Brown, 2012, p. 50; see also Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 209; Muncey, 2005) to 
emerge as opposed to the single objective reality posited by the positivist paradigm. Tamboukou 
(2008a, p. 107) interestingly identifies narratives as “technologies of power” and “technologies 
of the self”, positing that we should focus not on what stories are but on what they do: their 
impact or lack thereof rather than their structure as fixed, unchanging artifact. That we should, in 
fact, focus on how their meaning can be ceaselessly deferred, marginalised to become silenced 
“nomadic narratives” (Tamboukou, 2008b, p. 1) in search of a home. Stories allow “the said” to 
be challenged, the silenced to speak, “the unsaid” to be spoken, the “technologies of the self” to 
become “technologies of resistance” as the marginalised create “new forms of subjectivity” 
(Tamboukou, 2008a, p. 107), These are forms of subjectivity that contest the way power can 
mediate to create “conditions of possibility for particular narratives to emerge as dominant and 
for others to be marginalized” (Tamboukou, 2008a, p. 104). 
 
Muncey (2005) describes four approaches to autoethnographic “data”: “snapshots, artifacts, 
metaphor, and journey” which, when used in combination, illuminate the “disjunctions” 
(Muncey, 2005, p. 2) that mark people‟s lives and “demonstrate that although memories are 
28 
 
fragmentary, elusive, and, sometimes „altered‟ by experience, the timing and sequencing of them 
is more powerfully presented in this juxtaposition of themes than if they were presented 
sequentially or alone” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11). Disjunctions serve to engage “personal history” in 
such as way as to demonstrate how it is “implicated in larger social formations and historical 
processes” (Muncey, 2005, p. 2). They allow us to see the trees for the woods as well as the 
woods for the trees. 
 
Autoethnographic writing attempts to write “across the line of fault that separates lived 
experiences . . .  from academic and professional analyses of these experiences” (Frank, 2000, p. 
357). As such it requires what  Lévi-Strauss calls an  “intellectual bricolage” (Lévi-Strauss, 
1966, p. 17): a “gathering [of] concepts and ideas” as and when needed to tell the story or make a 
particular point (Frank, 2000, p. 358), a narrative “métissage” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 8) so to speak. 
Moving in and out of the artifacts and “snapshots”, rereading, reviewing as well as re viewing6, a 
going back to look at again, all the documents gathered to provide the physical details, events, 
thoughts, emotions and dialogue acts as a kind of aide memoir in the process of “emotional 
recall” (Ellis & Bochner, 2000, p. 739; Frank, 2000; Sparkes, 2002, p. 210) that the 
autoethnographic study requires. Categories, themes and patterns emerge as “emotional textures” 
(Fineman, 2000, pp. 15, 25) as the researcher/researchee rereads, recalls and re calls7, writes and 
rewrites rather than being “imposed prior to data collection” (Janesick, 1994, p. 215) or at the 
start of the writing process (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). For as Muncey (2005, p. 3) rightly 
points out autoetnographic writing is a “messy iteration looking backward and forward, 
examining images and memories through a lens that has been influenced by experience and 
                                                        
6 “Review” is generally understood to mean to assess or evaluate. However, in the autoethnographic context I use it 
as “re view” meaning “to go back to look at again”. 
7„I use the term “re call” as in “going back to take back possession”. 
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reflection on the interaction” of teaching and researching, my stories and the stories of others. 
For the peripheral view can inform the centre (Pratt, 2002): working through others stories can 
be a postmodern act (Richards, 2012): a way of empowering the disempowered, giving a voice to 
the voiceless, providing no new answers but hopefully offering some new questions. Where 
“[t]he way of saying is the what of saying” (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 68). 
 
2.2 Glass Palaces or Glass Cages? 
Darwin in his Origins of Species (1859/1968, p. 170) talks about diversity and plurality in an 
ecosystem: variety and heterogeneity are vital if the species and that particular environment are 
to survive. Likewise Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (2002, p. 6; see also Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000) points 
out the intrinsic value of “plurilingualism”, paralleling linguistic diversity with bio-diversity and 
“the importance of preserving the latter [as] comparable to preserving the diversity of languages 
around us.” For with the start of the “information age”: “two of the world's great stores of 
information, the diversity of biological organisms and of human languages, are imperiled” 
(Brush, 2001, p. 517). As the repositories “of historically developed knowledges” linguistic and 
cultural diversity are intrinsically connected to and entwined with biodiversity (Skutnabb-
Kangas, 2002, p. 13). Lose one and we lose the other. Lionnet (1991, p.18) further extends the 
metaphor aptly suggesting that discourse can operate according to “Darwinian divergence: that a 
given space (text) will support more life (generate more meanings) if occupied by diverse forms 
of life (languages).” For as Lionnet (1991, p. 18) points out, it is by “privileging . . . the 
intermediary spaces [that] boundaries become effaced”, binary systems are subverted and more 
forms of “life” supported. However, this fundamental truth about “difference”, what Lionnet 
calls a “principle of divergence”, is all too often “excluded by a politics of knowledge” (Lionnet, 
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1991, p. 18). Lionnet (1991) calls this intermediary space “métissage” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 8; 
Glissant, 2002), Garber (1997, p. 223) a “third space”, Richards (2012, p. 4) the “littoral”, a 
place that “thrives on ambiguity and multiplicity, on affirmation of differences, not on polarized 
or polarizing notions of identity, culture, race, or gender” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 16).  
 
The primary meaning of “métis” was cloth made of two different types of thread: “cotton for the 
warp and flax for the woof” (Lionnet, 1991, p. 16). In Polkinghorne‟s view individuals construct 
“private and personal stories linking diverse events of their lives into unified and understandable 
wholes. These are stories about the self” (Polkinghorne, 1991, p. 136) and as such narrative 
constructs of our identities and worlds (MacIntyre, 1984): our warp and woof. To experience life 
as “a meaningful whole”, one must maintain coherence of the narrative text (Polkinghorne, 1991, 
p. 145). “Epiphanies”, “watersheds” (Clandinin, 1986), “critical incidents” (Measor, 1985; Tripp, 
1993) or what Muncey (2005) calls “disjunctions” can interrupt these “projects of the self” 
(Sparkes, 1996, p. 464) and precipitate a “dissolution into . . . parts” (Polkinghorne, 1991, p. 
145): a loss of tension between the warp and woof in the “cloth” that is our identity. By placing 
my narrative of self as the warp of the text and the conflict as the woof, I hope to create a new 
tension, a “third space”, a “littoral”, a “métissage” by which “those truths, which cannot 
otherwise be told, are uncovered” (Sparkes, 2003, p. 416). 
 
Métis as a proper noun is also the name of the Titan goddess of good counsel (Lionnet, 1991), 
advise, cunning, craftiness, transformation and wisdom who as the wife of Zeus was devoured by 
him when about to give birth to Athena (goddess of weaving), thus appropriating her and her 
powers both physically and metaphorically, “thereby guaranteeing his paternal authority for 
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eternity” (Klein, 1986, p. 5). The term is synonymous with transformation, transmutation and 
translation (both mathematical and linguistic), its permeable and polysemic nature making it an 
appropriate metaphor for the approach I hope to take in this study. 
 
2.2.1 Why Not Autoethnography? 
In discussing why I choose autoethnography as my research method it is as important to 
understand and respond to the arguments made against the method as it is for its use, arguments 
that view narrative accounts of teachers‟ experiences as purely subjective with nothing to offer to 
the pool of knowledge in a particular field. As such autoethnography stands accused primarily of 
being “self-indulgent” (Brooker & Macpherson, 1999, p. 208; Sparkes, 2002, p. 214), of being a 
“blind alley” (Atkinson, 1997, p. 325) rather than a “narrative turn” unable to satisfy the criteria 
of truth as corresponding theory. I believe that nothing could be further from the truth yet in 
order to respond to such criticisms we must move beyond the stories themselves (Frank, 2000)  
to questions of “deliberation and critique” (Brooker & Macpherson, 1999, p. 219), questions 
such as those of “standpoint” (Frank, 2000, p. 356), of whether the story being told is a 
“principled” and ethical investigation, providing an “advocacy” of sorts (Frank, 2000, p. 357), an 
alignment by the storyteller with the stories she tells, by speaking as though “imbued with the 
[voices] of others” (Frank, 2000, p. 358; Bakhtin,1981; see also Taylor, 1992, pp. 32-33). 
 
In making the distinction between rigor and imagination, Bateson (1972/1987) (as cited in 
Holman Jones, 2004, para. 31) states that “quantitative social science was high on rigor but low 
on imagination”. However those who criticise the rigour of personal narrative might be missing 
the point: “Maybe the point is not to engage it systematically but to engage it personally” (Frank, 
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2000, p. 355); maybe the point is to judge it on whether it “meet[s] literary criteria of coherence, 
verisimilitude, and interest” (Richardson, 2000, p. 11), believability and the ability to evoke a 
response “on the basis of our own experiences” (Garratt & Hodkinson,1998, p. 526) rather than 
satisfying the criteria of truth as corresponding theory (Caduri, 2013). Lionnet (1991) 
appropriately dismisses the criticisms saying: 
criticisms leveled against poststructuralist epistemologies have very disturbing parallels 
in the nineteenth-century polygenists‟ discourse of racial purity. In both cases, 
indeterminacy, hybridization, and fragmentation are feared because of the risks of 
„degeneration‟ of the human species, of the race, and of „traditional‟ literary culture. If 
métissage and indeterminacy are indeed synonymous metaphors for our postmodern 
condition, then the fundamental conservatism of those who fight against both should be 
obvious. (Lionnet, 1991, p. 17) 
 
For a view of knowledge based on diversity, that sees it as an asset rather than a threat, sees it as 
an effacing of boundaries and subversion of “binary modes” (Lionnet, 1991, p, 18) rather than a 
“slowly unfolding pattern of eternal and unchallengeable „truths‟, or as derived from some kind 
of objective, scientific inquiry” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74) is one that will survive and thrive capable as 
it is of supporting a continuum of divergent views (Code, 2008a; Kelly, 1995; Lionnet, 1991; 
Skutnabb-Kangas, 2002) and evolving “truths”. 
 
It would thus seem to me that Aristotle‟s distinction between sophia (theory) and phronesis 
(practical wisdom) is what lies at the heart of the debate as to whether narrative inquiry is a valid 
method: whether it should satisfy the criteria of truth as corresponding theory, demonstrating a 
causal connection between a “teacher‟s life story and [their] teaching practice” (Caduri, 2013, p. 
38), or should be judged as to the ultimate purpose or end (telos) of a teacher‟s actions based on 
their life story (Caduri, 2013).  If the goal of narrative inquiry were to justify teacher practice as 
the “predictable consequences” of “defined events” then “empirical evidence” (Caduri, 2013, p. 
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45) would be necessary. However, as we strive to understand teacher knowledge, their behaviour 
as it relates to a teacher‟s past experiences within the context of a current story (Clandinin & 
Connelly, 1995; Xu & Connelly, 2009), then the link must as such be teleological rather than 
causal and the need for empirical evidence nullified. Teachers possess “practical knowledge” 
which according to Aristotle (as cited in Caduri, 2013, p. 40) “entails the virtues one has to 
possess in order to achieve eudemonia, that is, wellbeing”: the ultimate purpose or telos of 
teaching.   
 
However, this brings us to the question of whether we are “justified” or “entitled” (Caduri, 2013, 
p. 38) to accept the knowledge claims of narrative inquiry research. The use of the term 
“justified” implies a causal link, with “causal explanations” (Caduri, 2013, p. 38) needed to 
verify conclusions reached: a notion of truth based on correspondence theory. Entitlement 
requires no such conception of truth as correspondence, based as it is on the interpretive as well 
as practical and ethical nature of “teleological explanations” (Caduri, 2013, p. 38). Rather 
entitlement relies on our accepting the knowledge claims of the research unless given compelling 
reason to believe otherwise (Fricker, 1994). For, reproducible empirical evidence as to a causal 
relationship between norms, values, culture – a teacher‟s past life and experiences – and a 
teacher‟s current working practice within a given context is difficult if not impossible to acquire. 
As such we are entitled to accept such knowledge claims as revealed by narrative inquiry but not 
justified, reserving this term for the results of mechanical events where change in an independent 




For if as Bateson (1972/1987) argues human communication and behaviours are “not the stuff of 
quantities” (Bateson as cited in Holman Jones, 2004, para. 31) and cannot be understood by 
quantitative means, then I believe that the criteria of truth as corresponding theory has no place 
in the evaluation of narrative evidence. Rather narrative inquiry should satisfy criteria such as 
plausibility, adequacy and verisimilitude whilst at the same time providing viable and visible 
ethical ends that link a teacher‟s life story, her norms, values and cultures, with her current 
teaching practice. We “need meaning as well as facts; [for] what is the use of any amount of 
facts if they have no meaning for us?” (Eyres, 2014, p. 24). It is the narrative turn that I believe 
restores meaning, what Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 9) calls “a poetry of human relations”, to the 
world of academic research for “any wholly objective account of the world will fail to 
accommodate the essentially subjective quality of mental states” (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 355) of 
teachers and others. As Nagel (1974, p. 436) states: “there is something that it is like to be [an] 
organism” that resists capture by any “reductive, physicalist view of the mind” (Eyres, 2014, p. 
24), whether that organism be a bat (as in the case of Nagel‟s thought experiment) or a teacher 
(as in the case of this study). That is not to negate other types of enquiry, other methods of 
enquiry but it is to understand that this different way of “knowing” allows for ways of knowing 
differently that can “trouble the received meaning of [objective] data” (St Pierre, 1997, p. 177). 
 
In this age of “glass” (Gabriel, 2003), a substance that “generates changing images . . . whose 
mere presence leaves us in no doubt that what it encases is worthy of attention” (Gabriel, 2003, 
p. 167), as opposed to metal, man is no longer imprisoned in what Weber (1958, p. 181) called 
his “iron cage”, one of “subjugation and containment” (Gabriel, 2003, p. 169) imposed by 
rational modernity. Rather s/he is exposed to the stare of the “Other” in every aspect of life, so 
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too with methodology. The iron cage of quantitative studies is in the process of being displaced 
(in the social sciences at least) by the “glittering [glass] palace” (Gabriel, 2003, p.168) of 
qualitative work. However, with the glass palace comes exposure to all of all with the incumbent 
risk of it becoming nothing more than another cage albeit of glass, a self-indulgent fantasy. I 
believe not. I believe, as Gabriel aptly argues, that in this postmodern age where people “may be 
managed, prodded, seduced and controlled” (Gabriel, 2003, p. 174) the likelihood of their 
succumbing is no longer guaranteed as it was in the age of modernity. Today‟s wo/man is 
“unpredictable, inconsistent and contrary” (Gabriel & Lang, 2008, p. 334). Gabriel continues: 
in spite of the forces intent on silencing them, individuals and groups in today‟s 
organizations strive and eventually discover voices of their own. . . . Voice, then, is . . . a 
means for expressing and working through ambivalence, and for instigating some social 
and organizational change. (Gabriel, 2003, p. 175) 
 
A voice that despite its fears and insecurities allows for the construction of different identities 
that can be “experimented with, developed, modified, rejected and reconstructed” (Gabriel, 2003, 
p. 175). The glass cage allows for greater ambiguity as its very visibility and transparency 
severely limits the “overt control” (Gabriel, 2003, p.176) of management and managers. It allows 
for the outsider to look in as the insider looks out and as such is symbolic of the 
autoethnographic turn in postmodern qualitative studies. 
 
As such autoethnography should be viewed not solely as methodology but also as a way of 
knowing, a way of being, both epistemology and ontology, with ethics the ties that bind them 
(Fricker, 2007). For autoethnography constitutes “a clear vision of the social world and the way 





2.3 Teachers’ Stories 
Of the many terms assigned to narrative research - a methodology (Clandinin, 2007), a method 
of data collection and analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), or just another qualitative approach 
(Creswell, 2007) - I believe that the notion of narrative as paradigm, as defined by Spector-
Mersel (2010), captures more fully the essence of narrative inquiry and especially of 
autoethnography offering as it does unique insights into human practices and socially constituted 
and constructed phenomenon unmediated by the other. As such the focus of this section will be 
autoethnographical stories. That is not to dismiss the work of researchers such as Clandinin 
(1986), Clandinin and  Connelly (1988, 1989, 1991), Connelly and Clandinin (1990, 1995a, 
1995b), Day (1998), Day and Leitch (2001), Dunning, James and Jones (2005), Hargreaves 
(1994, 1995, 1998, 2000), Hargreaves and Hopkins (1991), Landau (2004), Galton and 
MacBeath (2008), MacLure (1993, 2003), Measor (1985), Nias (1989), Woods and Carlyle 
(2002), Woods and Jeffrey (2002). It is however to say that although, as with any narrative 
inquiry, “the reality being studied is often created only during the inquiry” (Spector-Mersel, 
2010, p. 216), when it is “created” for a researcher, it is a reality that did not exist before: these 
are stories that “were not previously there” (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 216). As such these are 
stories that no longer retain the integrity of the sole narrator‟s voice, no longer “clean” (Spector-
Mersel, 2010, p. 216), contaminated by the researcher‟s presence, her own worldview, her 
epistemology, to become a “co-construction” (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p. 216) of researcher and 
researchee, though given the unequal power structures at play in the researcher/researchee 
relationship an equal say by both in what is said and how would be unlikely (Pillow, 2003; 
Stenhouse, 1979). For teachers‟ stories have for the most part been told to researchers for 
research purposes rather than told by teachers to and for other teachers; this is narrative used as 
37 
 
data selected for its ability to “fit in” with other stories in the “canon” of research literature that 
portrays a “particular conception of teaching” (Carter, 1993, p. 10). As a result in the sections 
that follow I will be exploring autoethnographic stories/studies by Laurel Richardson, Ken 
Winograd and Edward Said that present a different conception of teaching and knowing. These 
“stories” are what Foucault (1980d, p. 82) would call “disqualified knowledges”: those 
knowledges “disqualified from the hierarchy of knowledges and sciences” yet which provide “a 
particular, local, regional knowledge, a differential knowledge” through which “criticism 
performs its work.” It is a knowledge that owes “its force only to the harshness with which it is 
opposed by everything surrounding it” (Foucault, 1980d, p. 82). For I would not want others to 
colonise my stories, nor would I want to colonise those of others. 
 
2.3.1 The Stories 
There seems, for me at least, a strange affinity between Laurel Richardson and Edward Said, 
beyond the fact that both use writing to contest the established ways of knowing and those who 
have vested interests in perpetuating these ways. Their stories speak to me in ways others‟ stories 
do not and can not. Their stories speak to me of injustice, ethical and epistemic as well as 
ontological for to claim to know the other, speak for the other, to propose one reality while 
erasing others is to harm the very fibre of one‟s being: “the nature of [one‟s] „world,‟ the 
individual‟s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts” (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1994, p. 107). 
 
However, Winograd, his story, speaks to my shame, my anger, my frustration: “outlaw 
emotions” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166), “conventionally unacceptable” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166) which 
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can become powerful change agents when they are the expressions of the collective, “politically 
because epistemologically subversive” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 166). Yet when experienced alone and 
in private, as shameful secrets, these same emotions can become “a site of social control” (Zorn 
& Boler, 2007, p. 143; see also Boler, 1999) and domination, used to maintain the status quo. 
 
As such these are stories that tug at the threads of my own woven identity, linking my story with 
theirs, weaving a greater collective story or text, for the English word “text” derives from texere, 
the Latin word for weaving and as such has much to do with feeling, appearance, and/or 
consistency: subjective realities, and little to do with single objective truths. They are stories that 
have provided me with “a platform for seeing what might be called our 'actual worlds‟ more 
clearly” (Eisner, 1997, p. 264) and to reflect upon them “from different vantage points” (Sparkes, 
1998, para. 5). For the ability to see from different vantage points, to see different worlds, 
belongs, according to Said (1978, p. 1), to the outsider, “the Other” who from a position of 
marginality of being (Said, 1996), a “critical positioning” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586) with a 
“critical vision” (Haraway, 1988, p. 589), is able to both conflate and separate, both work with 
and work against for “identity . . . is difficult to maintain in exile” (Said, 1986, p. 16). As such 
“the exile” sees things not only in terms of the “here and now” but also in terms of what has been 
lost, “left behind”: “there is a double perspective that never sees things in isolation” (Said, 1996, 
p. 60) and it is this “plurality of [self and] vision” that allows for “originality of vision” (Said, 
1984, p. 55) and the ability to become critically aware of the multidimensional aspects of 
subjectivity, its interpretive-qualitative qualities. “Exile” appears to be a prerequisite for true 
critical “worldliness” (Said, 1975, p. 2; Said, 1998, p. 7), the ability to juxtapose “an idea or 
experience . . . with another”, thereby creating a paradigmatic shift in how both are viewed (Said, 
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1996, p. 60; see also Lionnet, 1991, pp. 15-168). As such the stories that follow are outsiders‟ 
stories told by an outsider who “refuses to sit on the sidelines nursing a wound, [for] there are 
things to be learned: he or she must cultivate a scrupulous (not indulgent or sulky) subjectivity” 
(Said, 2000, p. 184). 
 
2.3.1.1 Edward Said: Between Worlds: Edward Said Makes Sense of His Life (1998) 
As Edward Said (1998) found in Conrad‟s work so too do I find in his that “aura of dislocation, 
instability and strangeness” (Said, 1998, p. 3): the unmistakable sense of loss which has acted as 
a “steady ground bass” (Said, 1998, p. 3) to much of his life and work. In this brief  “memoir” 
Said draws on Conrad to reflect back, to mirror, his own experiences, as well as reflect upon 
them, using writing as a metaphorical pause, an ontological meditation, with which “to put the 
whole jumble together” (Said, 1998, p. 3). 
 
He starts his own chronicle with a depiction of his earlier days. Edward Said was, by his own 
admission, the anomalous schoolboy par excellence: born in Jerusalem, Palestinian by birth and 
a US national by (his father‟s) design, on being exiled with his family to Egypt, he continued an 
elite colonial education at Victoria College, Cairo until he was expelled and “exiled” a second 
time to a boarding school in Massachusetts, USA where he was the only student “not a native-
born American, who did not speak with the required accent, and had not grown up with baseball, 
basketball and football” (Said, 1998, p. 5). Despite the fact that he was “born, baptised and 
confirmed in the Anglican Church” he remained “an alien, a Non-European Other, educated by 
                                                        
8Lionnet‟s discussion of Nancy Morejón‟s concept of “[t]ransculturation” is relevant here: “the constant 
interaction, the transmutation between two or more cultural components with the unconscious goal of creating a 
third cultural identity  . . . that is new and independent . . . one changes into the other so that both can be transformed 
into a third. Nothing seems immutable” (Morejón as cited in Lionnet, 1991, pp. 15-16). 
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my betters to know my station and not to aspire to being British” (Said, 1998, p. 5). Said himself 
would describe this state of being at once “aggressor and aggressed against. . . . a Wog and an 
Anglican” an ontological “state of standing civil war” (Said, 1998, p. 5).  
 
However as Said explains it was that state of standing civil war that finally led him to link the 
diverse facts of his own background and life to a detailed and cogent explication of identity as 
“Other”, as social discursive “manipulation” (Said, 1998, p. 6) with the associated epistemic, 
ontological and ethical injustices that this could and would perpetrate and perpetuate at the 
individual and group, local and regional level. His own experiences of injustices figure 
frequently in his writing, as part of the “worldliness” (Said, 1998, p. 7) of his text, text as identity 
and identity as text with all its “vast web of affiliations” (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 7; see 
also Said, 1983). Yet one event he speaks of suffered at his States-side boarding school embodies 
many of the rest; for it was there that he was deemed “morally wanting” (Said, 1998, p. 5) and 
denied the title of valedictorian or salutatorian on graduation. The memory of this epistemic, 
ontological, and ethical injustice was to remain with him for the rest of his life: “– a moral 
judgment which I have ever since found difficult either to understand or to forgive” (Said, 1998, 
p. 5) - the depth of the hurt caused palpable even decades later. 
 
On graduating from a US college, he promptly went off to teach the canon of English literature at 
an American university, finally settling at Colombia, New York where he was known as an 
Alexandrian Jew, “a term that offended no one” (Said, 1998, p. 5). However, the Arab-Israeli 
war of 1967 finally acted as the catalyst needed to urge Said not only to seek out the voice of his 
own culture, its language and literature (Said, 1998, p. 5), but also to speak out on what was the 
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“annulment” of a people through “occlusions, misrepresentations and denial” and their history of 
“loss and dispossession” (Said, 1998, p. 6). It was though for him not only a “political” need but 
also an “existential” (Said, 1998, p. 5) one: to bring harmony between an identity that had been 
acquired and the one he had been born into but from which he had been exiled. As such it 
revealed: 
how a subject was constituted, how a language could be formed – writing as a 
construction of realities that served one or another purpose instrumentally. This was the 
world of power and representations, a world that came into being as a series of decisions 
made by writers, politicians, philosophers to suggest or adumbrate one reality and at the 
same time efface others. (Said, 1998, p. 6) 
 
As such he saw his work as that of the “intellectual without mandate”(Said, 1998, p. 7), a 
cultural go-between, standing exquisitely balanced between the two camps of Americans and 
Palestinians; “think[ing] and writ[ing]contrapuntally”(Said, 1998, p. 6), using the distinct yet 
asymmetrical facets of his life experience to work for and against each other: to make visible 
“the non-existence, the non-history” (Said, 1998, p. 6) of a people that had not only been denied 
but also erased. Said‟s simple assertions throughout the story remain:  
that power determines which representations may be accepted as „true‟, that Orientalist 
texts owe their alleged „truthfulness‟ to their location in the discourse, and that this 
situation is one that emerges out of, and confirms, a global structure of imperial 
domination. (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 75) 
 
Thus it is that by “know[ing] something” is “to have power over it” and by “hav[ing] power is to 
be able to know the world”' on and “in your own terms” (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2001, p. 83). 
The power and genius of Said‟s writing lies in the simplicity with which he tells his itinerant and 
recursive tale, a tale that conveys “a definite, almost palpable discomfort” with his position 
affiliated as he was with “an extremely unpopular cause” and an American university at one and 
the same time, and most poignantly given the “irreconcilability of the two constituencies, and the 
two lives they have required” (Said, 1998, p. 7). He remains unapologetic about his stance, as a 
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critic of either camp, with a foot in each camp metaphorically as well as literally, “speaking truth 
to power” (Said, 1996, p. 85) as and when needed. For he unequivocally believes that: “We have 
to defend peoples and identities threatened with extinction or subordinated because they are 
considered inferior, but that is very different from aggrandising a past invented for present 
reasons” (Said, 1998, p. 7).  And it is this belief that resonates with the reader, interacts 
dialogically with her due in large part to the modesty of the language he uses and the lack of 
“aggrandising” as to the not-insignificant role he played in revealing the “true” nature of the 
“Orient” and the “Oriental” to the West. 
 
Accordingly Said ends his chronicle by bringing us back to the beginning, describing new 
experiences of life as the “Other” (the Boston psychologist who “only came to see how [he] 
lived,” and is amazed that he actually owns and plays a piano and the publisher who  “refused to 
sign my contract until I had lunch with him. . . . [as] the great man wanted to see how I handled 
myself at the table” (Said, 1998, p. 7))  and his enduring fascination with Conrad: 
Conrad says in Nostromo that a desire lurks in every heart to write down once and for all 
a true account of what happened, and this certainly is what moved me to write my 
memoir, just as I had found myself writing a letter to my dead mother out of a desire once 
again to communicate something terribly important to a primordial presence in my life. 
(Said, 1998, p. 7) 
 
However, as Said himself so rightly observes: “One achieves at most a provisional satisfaction, 
which is quickly ambushed by doubt, and a need to rewrite and redo that renders the text 
uninhabitable” (Said, 1998, p. 7). Any story, including my own within this study, is dynamic: a 
moving target, so to speak, that defies being pinned down metaphorically and literally to one 




2.3.1.2 Laurel Richardson: Skirting a Pleated Text: De-Disciplining an Academic Life (1997) 
In this narrative Laurel Richardson focuses on the vicissitudes of life in academia as a feminist 
enacting “feminist-poststructuralist writing practices” (Richardson, 1997, p. 295) in the context 
of “entrenched authority” and “the ethics and politics of social scientific enquiry and 
presentation” (Richardson, 1997, p. 295) as well as the epistemic injustices embodied by and 
enacted on students and faculty alike. As such, this is my story too (Richardson, 1997, p. 295). 
 
Richardson tasks herself and her reader to explore the issues and practices of academic writing 
and how these can promote “a care for the self, despite conflict and marginalization” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 295) as well as integrate interests both academic and social, needs both 
emotional and spiritual thus illuminating the intertwining connections between them 
(Richardson, 1997). Most importantly she questions the subordinate position of the ethical 
subject to research‟s practices. Thus it is that in exploring these issues, Richardson discusses how 
she came to construct Fields of Play and the marked impact writing the book had on her. 
 
As in the book so too in the paper, Richardson “skirts a pleated text” of both traditional and 
experimental text, interwoven with “writing-stories” that detail the contexts of the writing and 
explain how the “specific” context “in which we write” determines “what” and how “we write” 
(Richardson, 1997, pp. 295-296). As such the “writing-stories” frame the academic work, 
effacing the boundaries between writing genres, subverting the politics of knowledge and 
“privileging . . . the intermediary spaces” (Lionnet, 1991, p.18) creating a “métissage” (Lionnet, 




The particular “pleat” that Richardson enters in this narrative is “departmental politics . . . as a 
site of discipline” (Richardson, 1997, p. 296), elegantly delineating three different examples of 
departmental politics at work. Richardson contends that the story line touted by the disciplines of 
the social sciences comprises “telling writers” not only “to suppress their own voices” but also 
“to adopt the all-knowing, all-powerful voice of the academy; and keep their mouths shut about 
academic in-house politics” (Richardson, 1997, p. 296). However, as Richardson (1997, p. 296) 
so rightly points out: “We are always present in our texts” – we cannot write ourselves out – 
“Power relations are always present”.  
 
The first story (in both the paper and the book Fields of Play) is written at a time of severe 
marginalisation for Richardson within her department, when the newly appointed department 
chair: “Like a medieval warlord who executes or banishes all who might pose a threat to his 
absolute authority . . . deposed the three other contenders for the position, all men, from their 
„fiefdoms,‟ their committee chairships” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). On relieving Richardson of 
one her own “fiefdoms” and limiting the scope of another to render it almost powerless, she 
publicly makes known her dissent and at an awards evening in honour of her work: “my face 
making a face, repulsed, I shrugged his arm off from around my shoulder” (Richardson, 1997, p. 
297). This very public display of emotion and very public slight does not go unpunished. 
 
The new chair hires a consultant who in his appraisal of Richardson, already a full professor of 
some standing, judges her to be “promising” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) and makes the insult 
deep and complete by advising her to return to the study and teaching of medical sociology (an 
area she worked in for a year as part of her postdoctorate); he declares she should abandon the 
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past ten years of research, and pronounces her area of research and expertise, gender research, “a 
fad” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). She dissents, publicly, vehemently. 
 
The consequences of not “yield[ing] to authority” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) are swift and 
ruthless: the assignment of an extra undergraduate course to teach with less than a week to 
prepare. Richardson‟s “stomach cramped in severe pain” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) on getting 
the news; so did mine on reading same, for I had been down that same road myself and knew 
what was coming: I know the feeling well. However with Richardson‟s refusal to acquiesce, the 
new dean, a woman, advises her to: “roll over” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). When Richardson 
refuses to, the new dean rolls over for her, teaching the course herself rather than “pull rank” on 
a man (Richardson, 1997, p. 297): gender is still a powerful site of domination, of unethical and 
unjust practices in the academic worlds. And with this one act the dean “legitimated the chair‟s 
right to do anything he wanted” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297). The irony that the course is on the 
sociology of women is not lost on Richardson or the reader. More punitive action follows with 
regards salary, which courses she could teach and when. With Richardson “in virtual exile to 
Coventry” (Richardson, 1997, p, 297), colleagues realising that she was now dangerous to be 
seen with or even know, abandon her (Richardson, 1997, p.298). And Richardson‟s dys-
appearance is complete. 
 
It is with questions of ethics and principled behaviour at the forefront of her mind that 
Richardson turns to herself, rather than others, and writes about her own life, no longer 
comfortable with the act of doing research “on” others. Her experiments with “textual form”, 
“content”, “frame” and “voice” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298) in turn cause her to seek out 
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communities other than the academic for support. Her intent, then as now, to “examine [the 
field]. . . . enlarge [it] through other representational forms” (Richardson, 1997, p. 298). 
 
Yet despite her dys-appearance the “assault [is] warming up in [her] home department” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 298) and Richardson decides to embody the issues in the form of a drama. 
This is presented as the next “story” in the paper. This is a drama that captures the essence of 
what it means to dys-appear, acting as a mirror for others to see themselves, know themselves 
“through another‟s life story, revisioning their own, arriving where they started and knowing „the 
place for the first time‟ ” (Richardson, 1997, p. 299). It is a drama that acts as “collective story” 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 300) for the many who think themselves alone; it affords us with a much-
needed view from the loser‟s standpoint (Fricker, 2007, 2012). 
 
Richardson completes the paper with the penultimate story in Fields of Play, a “collective” story 
that joins her voice with those of graduate students in different sociology departments. For 
academia, Richardson states, has become “inhospitable” not only to those that “would change it 
[but also] to those who are most vulnerable – graduate students” (Richardson, 1997, p. 300). In 
so doing she acknowledges the voices of graduate students, frees them “to be heard”, to do most 
of the “talking” so to speak, with sections taken from students‟ emails, letters, papers as well as 
an open letter to the department that states clearly the epistemic injustices based on race endured 
by students of colour, excused in the name of efficiency (80 per cent of the undergraduate 
students are white (Richardson, 1997, p.301)), and condoned by administrators which leave the 




In her concluding paragraphs we learn that Richardson has taken “early retirement from [her] 
„home‟ sociology department” (Richardson, 1997, p. 302), no doubt having learnt not to water 
the rocks (MacBeath, 2000). She has left the department both physically and emotionally:  
As a shaman might say, I have called my spirit back; the place no longer has power over 
me. I go into the building and do not feel alienated. Sometimes I sing while I am there. 
(Richardson, 1997, p. 302) 
 
She has learnt to water the green shoots instead (MacBeath, 2000), teaching at another university 
and working on numerous projects that speak to her soul as well as her heart. 
 
2.3.1.3 Ken Winograd: The Functions of Teacher Emotions: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly 
(2003) 
Ken Winograd‟s self-study explores “the emotional dimensions of teaching from feminist and 
sociological perspectives” (Winograd, 2003, p.1642) and as such sheds light on the potential to 
use the emotions as sites of contestation (Boler, 1999): alerting teachers to unjust practices and 
the need to collectively challenge the unequal power structures (Fricker, 2007, 2012) at play in 
schools. 
 
Winograd chooses to situate the theoretical underpinnings to the study in three separate sections 
that precede the study rather than within the study itself. Rather than detract from the story, these 
sections serve to sharpen the focus of the reading, tracing as they do essential ways of viewing 
the emotions from somatic and cognitive responses to our environment to emotion as social 
construct “with one‟s experience and display of emotions reflect[ing] the totality of a person‟s 
experience, which includes organizational culture, gender, race, class, education, and 
personality” (Winograd, 2003, pp. 1643-1644). Together with the final discussion, these sections 
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serve to frame the story and provide a socio-historical educational context to the study itself, 
elucidating how certain emotions are “outlawed” in schools historically in order to control a 
predominantly female teaching staff and thus maintain the dominant hierarchical and patriarchal 
status quo (Winograd, 2003, p. 1644). However these same emotions, Winograd (2003, pp. 
1644-1645) argues, citing Jaggar (1989) and Barrows (1996), can be liberated, and liberating, 
when shared with others to bring “to consciousness our „gut level‟ awareness that we are in a 
situation of coercion, cruelty, injustice or danger” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 167). Fully realised as a 
collective response, the emotions, Winograd (2003), citing Barrows (1996), contends, can guide 
us to and promote social change. 
 
The methods section that follows the theory, although presented in the style of a quantitative 
study, belies by its content this very fact and acts more as an introduction to the story, detailing 
the context and background as well as situating it and the author within a specific local domain 
and providing, in the results section, the actual story. Winograd admits to as much in stating that 
“the purpose of this enquiry is not the creation of any new claims to knowledge but, rather, a 
representation of my experience so others may imagine their own uses and application” 
(Winograd, 2003, p. 1649). 
 
In what was supposed to be a sabbatical year from 13 years as an education professor taken with 
a mandate to study “students‟ learning of mathematics as they wrote mathematics stories” 
(Winograd. 2003, p. 1650), Winograd‟s year quickly turned into what he would call his 
“antisabbatical” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1641) year, a year where “the struggle for survival and the 
concomitant search for [his] identity as a teacher became the research focus” (Winograd, 2003, 
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p. 1650). It was the journal he would keep during this year and its record of the “dark” emotions 
he experienced that would form the heart of the study that speaks to me of Winograd‟s 
vulnerabilities as a reconstituted “novice teacher” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1651) with the status of 
an expert – a burden he finds hard at times to bear. His journal entries, which he uses to support 
his analysis, read at times as raw emotion, and capture the uncertainties and contradictions of 
teaching, especially for the novice teacher who might question whether they have: 
the dispositional „knowledge‟ to be a teacher. When people see me in the school or 
around town, they often ask me something like, „Are you just loving it?‟ or „Don‟t you 
just love being with the kids?‟ Right now, I am not „loving it,‟ nor do I want to go to 
work. It‟s just too hard right now. (Winograd. 2003, p, 1656) 
 
Using these entries he elaborates “feeling rules” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642) for himself as a 
teacher, rules such as “[t]eachers love their work” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1652) and “[t[eachers 
avoid overt displays of extreme emotions, especially anger or other dark emotions. They stay 
calm and tend to avoid displays of joy or sadness” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1652). These are rules he 
tries to teach by, with the extent to which he manages to do so becoming the context and content 
of subsequent journal entries: a dialogical conversation with himself and the reader on the 
strategies he applies. It is in this respect that Winograd uses writing as “a way of knowing” 
(Richardson, 1994, p. 523), as a way of coming to understand himself as a teacher and the 
complexities of classroom life, and it is this writing that affects who he becomes (Richardson, 
1997, p. 295) allowing him to fashion a professional identity that is not only flexible but 
subjective and multifaceted. By the end of the study he comes to personally understand the 
emotional and professional cost to teachers of their tendency: 
to avoid explicit discussion and examination, collectively, of the emotional experience of 
teaching. . . . [and] teachers‟ tendency to avoid explicit and organized expression of anger 
and subsequent action directed towards structures or individuals who are in positions of 




That said, I question whether it is Winograd‟s need to signal this study as “proper research” 
(Holt, 2003, p. 24) that triggers his use of words such as “validity problems . . . clear description 
of data collection and analysis” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1650), words that I feel detract from the 
author‟s invitation “to „relive‟ the events emotionally with the writer” (Richardson, 1994, p. 
521), or a need to distance himself, remove himself at least by one level from the very 
transparent and honest accounts of emotion he is living? Whatever his intent, with the 
introduction of such words however he succeeds not only in distancing himself from the 
researchee in these textual spaces but also in distancing me as reader, as a certain dissonance is 
created by his use of quantitative terminology within an qualitative study. 
 
Winograd ends his paper with a discussion that rightly concludes that: “teaching is profoundly 
emotional work” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1667), an aspect widely underestimated by schools and 
teacher education (Winograd, 2003, p. 1667), with schools reflecting “modern masculinist 
organizational culture, [that] tends to privilege dispassionate, emotionally flat and rational 
discourse” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1668; see also Boler, 1999) to the detriment of the teaching 
profession as a whole and the student bodies concerned. Teacher anger, he states, directed 
towards controlling powers is “restrained and guarded” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669) even when in 
response to perceived injustice, fearful that they be perceived and “dismissed” as “incompetent 
or as incapable of self-control” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669; see also Campbell, 1994).  Thus the 
emotion rules as they pertain to teachers reflecting as they do the socio-historical “patterns of 
patriarchy and bureaucracy” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1669) have succeeded in deterring teachers 
from using emotions, their own and others‟, “as a vehicle for action and social justice” 
(Winograd, 2003, p. 1669), as a site of contestation, for the emotions can disrupt local and 
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historical practices as well as sustain and perpetuate them. People in positions of little or no 
“social power” (Fricker, 2012, p. 287), such as teachers, “do know their problems. After all they 
are their problems. If they do not express their views openly, it is only because they do not have 
the power of an organisation behind them” (James S., personal communication, 1996). It will, 
Barrows (1996) suggests, require collective outrage, “political/emotional consciousness” 
(Winograd, 2003, p. 1669), to address the many injustices in teachers‟ working lives and to free 
teachers from the margins of institutional life (Boler, 1999). 
 
2.4 The Verbal Snapshot - What It Reveals, What It Conceals, and Why I Use It 
Muncey (2005) suggests that what a photograph conceals can be as illuminating as what it 
reveals. Taking the notion of snapshot as “data” one step further, as it applies to narratives and 
autoethnography, what the “photo” cannot reveal, what lies beyond the edges, the omissions 
(what the writer considers to be irrelevant information (Spector-Mersel, 2011)) and the silences 
(what the writer does not wish to reveal), can be as telling as what lies at the focal point of the 
“photo”, and is central to the story - the subject (Barthes, 1981; Foucault, 1977; Muncey, 2005). 
Appearances can be deceptive: “where edges meet” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x), the “periphery” (Pratt, 
2002) can often illuminate the story in nuanced and remarkable ways. As such the writers 
discussed in the prior sections try to signal where those silences and omissions occur and offer 
explanations as to why they lie beyond their current “field of vision” and inclusion in the text: a 
way of deconstructing the text (Derrida, 1978). I will try and do the same in my own study, 




Muncey‟s (2005) story of teenage pregnancy provides us with a fitting example of how method 
can be as important if not more important than the story itself: that if one is to tell a “complex 
story in which the disjunctions dictate that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, the 
method requires some portrayal of this disjunction” (Muncey, 2005, p. 2). Such a story requires 
using “[w]riting tactics” (Muncey, 2005, p. 2), techniques with which to make a “deviant [‟s] 
case” (Muncey, 2005, p. 3) to the academic world. The four writing techniques favoured by 
Muncey are the “snapshot” - actual photographs; “artifacts” – Muncey‟s school reports, a letter 
published in a newspaper and her nurse‟s belts; “metaphor” - her garden; and the “journey” - 
actual journeys she has taken. However it is the notion of a “snapshot”, a photograph that 
captures one brief moment in time at once representative and symbolic of the moment (Muncey, 
2005) and the story being told, that to me seems to encapsulate the short verbal encounters that 
acted as critical incidents in my own story. However I do not possess any actual snapshots or 
artifacts with which to tell my story. And the notion of metaphor and journey appear as one 
subsumed in the story I have to tell as it acts as both a journey of and to meaning and 
understanding, which is itself the metaphor. As such I turn to the verbal snapshots of certain 
critical incidents, “Momente der Wahrheit . . . tauchen unerwartet auf, wie Oasen in die Wüste 
[moments of truth . . . [that] arise unexpectedly, like oases in the desert]” (Arendt, 1989, p. 135; 
see also Steyerl, 2003), that when considered as a whole, viewed from afar so to speak, delineate 
a consistent and reinforcing pattern of epistemic injustice, both testimonial and hermeneutical, in 
the making. Such epistemic injustice based on gender “identity prejudice” and the entrenched 
structural practices that view teachers (and women teachers in particular) as compliant and 
subordinate, prevent us from understanding our own experience; for the power relations they 
engender “constrain women‟s ability to understand their own experience” (Fricker, 2007, p. 
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147). As such each verbal snapshot provides a piece in the jigsaw puzzle of what is one 
particular apparatus: that is an educational institution lacking the “virtue of testimonial justice” 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 97) and which in its interaction with other apparatuses of bodily production, 
“at the level of processes, practices, and peculiarities” (Code, 2008a, p. 33), produces a 
constrained distribution of epistemic agency for its female teachers within the phenomenon that 
is conflict. With the institution‟s widespread use of “preemptive” testimonial injustice, neither 
inquiring nor requesting of a teacher‟s knowledge when pertinent, a teacher is “silenced by the 
identity prejudice that undermines her credibility in advance” (Fricker, 2007, p. 130). 
 
With this study and story I hope to reposition myself and my story and hopefully introduce, as 
does Muncey, a new and different narrative to add to “the received wisdom” (Muncey, 2005, 
p.11) on international schools and the “deployment” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 49) of 
apparatuses such as power and emotions within them that intersect to produce power 
relationships that position female teachers as Other. For if as Richardson (1990, p. 26) contests 
you can only make sense of your life through the cultural and collective narratives available to 
you then new narratives, those deviant collective stories such as Muncey‟s and my own, allow 
the “textually disenfranchised” (Richardson, 1990, p. 26) to legitimately replot their own lives, 
offering as they do “patterns for new lives” (Richardson, 1990, p. 26), patterns that view 
difference as constituted by sameness, “a critical difference within” (Haraway, 1992, p. 299; see 
also Trinh, 1987-87, 1988, 1989), rather than its binary opposite. As such they can become a part 
of the cultural and collective legacy “affecting future stories, future lives” (Richardson, 1990, p. 
26). For in schools hierarchical structures of power that lead to unequal power relations: 
can skew shared hermeneutical resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate 
understandings of their experiences ready to draw on . . . whereas the powerless are more 
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likely to find themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly, with at 
best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render [their experiences] intelligible. 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 148) 
 
It would be to offer the powerless different resources within the “collective social 
understandings” (Fricker, 2007, p. 147) with which to understand their own situation, their own 
experiences within the international school terrain. 
 
Muncey (2005) describes her own positioning as a “deviant” (Muncey, 2005, p.3) and how this 
positioning outside the mainstream stereotypical image of teenage pregnancy and motherhood 
led to what Fricker (2007) would call “testimonial injustice”: her story not heard and her voice 
silenced.  Because Muncey‟s story does not fit the norm, of “educational failure and poverty” 
(Muncey, 2005, p. 11), it cannot be used as a cautionary tale, a “cultural narrative” about 
morality, with which to “instruct the young, control the adult” (Richardson, 1990, p. 25) and as 
such it must not be told embodying as it does a metaphor for “success and enlightenment” rather 
than “a society out of control” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11). Cultural tales, what Spector-Mersel (2010, 
p. 208) calls “[o]ur culture‟s grand stories”, act as apparatuses that are told not only to caution 
and control but also to maintain the status quo and if that happens to be a patriarchal one, as in 
Muncey‟s situation and my own, then her story fails on a second count as being “acceptable” for 
it is the incest she endures as a teenager at the hands of a familial male that leads to her 
pregnancy. The fault, if there be one, is placed firmly on the adult male who should have been 
there to protect rather than abuse her; as such the character roles of the “cultural narrative” are 
subverted both in their positioning as central or minor, and morality or lack thereof. Muncey‟s 
story by subverting the status quo cannot be acknowledged and must be challenged as 
representing a truth. With accusations ranging from “self-indulgence to outright lying” (Muncey, 
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2005, p. 2) Muncey‟s “credibility” (Murris, 2013, p. 248), as a giver of knowledge on teenage 
pregnancies is Murris (2013, p. 248) would say “deflated”, making it hard if not virtually 
impossible for the hearer to believe or accept what is being said (Fricker, 2007, p. 17). In her 
2005 retelling however Muncey provides us with an analysis that uses actual snapshots of herself 
(from infant child through to being doctored) and other material-semiotic (Haraway, 1988) 
artifacts to deconstruct the cultural narrative of teenage pregnancy as one of poverty and 
perpetuating the “cycle of teenage parenting” (Muncey, 2005, p. 2) to move from a position of 
victimhood to one of survivor (Muncey, 2005). Muncey‟s story inspired me to use my own 
verbal snapshots to do something similar. For as Muncey (2005), so too do I feel that visceral 
need to have our stories “heard”, to keep on telling them until we are heard. As such the detailed 
verbal snapshots that follow in Chapters 7 and 8 endeavour to fulfill that need: to be heard with 
“an openness to who [we] are and what [we] have to say” (Fricker, 2012, p. 287). For as Fricker 
so aptly comments: “contesting wrongful treatment crucially requires that one be properly heard 




It was Rabinow and Rose (2003, p. xv) who coined the phrase a “practice of criticism” to 
describe the methodology of Foucault and as such define it as an “antimethodology” (Frank, 
2010, p. 73). In their introduction to The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential Works 
of Foucault, 1954-1984 (2003) their unique description of this “antimethodology” captures the 
essence of autoethnography as:  
a movement of thought that invents, makes use of, and modifies conceptual tools as they 
are set into a relation with specific practices and problems that they themselves help to 
form in new ways. When they have done this work, without regret, they can be recycled 




In applying this definition to stories, Frank (2010, p. 73) extends the notion of what stories can 
be and do: to act as “bridges” between the social sciences and literary criticism. What defines 
“critical” thought, Frank (2010, p. 73) suggests, is “a refusal to accept immediate, commonsense 
understanding[s]” while paradoxically having the utmost respect and interest in them. Critical 
thought can acknowledge the fact that people “know” their own problems, after all they are their 
problems, yet at the same time study the ways in which their “self-awareness is limited” (Frank, 
2010, p. 73). Interpretation, according to Frank (2010), thus lies finally balanced between 
appreciation and examination. As such: “We must learn to know what we see rather than seeing 
what we already know” (Heschel, 1969, p. 3). 
 
The notion that method could and should be viewed as a movement of thought would seem to 
imply that methods prevent thought from actually moving (Frank, 2010). In other words, critical, 
“interpretive thought” (Frank, 2010, p. 73) that is moving is more liable to allow for a movement 
in thought to be interpreted. Dialogue moves thought; and thought moves dialogue (Frank, 
2010). As a chronicle of a dys-appearance, this study implies movement, a constant state of flux 
and hopefully a dialogical commitment between researcher and researchee, writer and text, text 
and metatext, writer and reader as well as reader and text. For by embodying both the 
“conceptual tools” of the researcher with the “practices and problems” of the researchee, the 
autoethnographer engages in living her life while at the same time analysing the considerable and 
wide-ranging “effects of living that way” (Frank, 2010, p. 73): one interacts with the other, 
affects and shapes the other, with the researcher becoming the effects of her performed research 
while at the same time positing a self (the researchee) as the cause of the research but which the 
research has served to reconfigure (Hofstadter, 1979). Conceptual tools help us to form “new 
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ways” (Rabinow & Rose, 20003, p. xv) of making sense of our own problems, and can inform 
the ways we deal with those problems. As Frank (2010, p. 74) aptly notes: “Any analysis is 
always already interactive with what is being analyzed; that interaction is part of what is 
dialogical”. 
 
With their last sentence: “When they have done this work, without regret, they can be recycled or 
even discarded” (2003, p. xv, cited earlier), Rabinow and Rose encapsulate the work of stories: 
to be told within a certain time and space of telling/writing, hopefully to be “recycled . . . as part 
of a larger movement of thought” (Frank, 2010, p. 74). Consequently autoethnography refuses to 
say, as Frank (2010 p. 74), following King (2003), so succinctly puts it: “these are the rules; 
here are the steps to implement these rules; follow my direction or suffer rejection.” Rather it 
demands that those we use are the right tools for the right job, modifying as and when necessary 
so as the “better to understand the people you listen to, to make sense to people you hope will 
listen to you, and to be responsible” (Frank, 2010, p. 74) and thus ethical in your undertaking. As 
such, although I have used autoethnography as methodology the study is not purely 
autoethnographic but rather a bricolage of methods (the right tools) that through conceptual 
enquiries of a philosophical nature (on the emotions, ethics etc.) deepen not only my narrative 
research but also my understanding of the issues. Engaging with these diverse philosophical 
analyses has taken me from questions of essence that focused on a Cartesian understanding of 
difference and conflict (us/them; cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) to a posthumanist 
stance on both, and questions of how conflict can be understood as emergent from “intra-
actions” between apparatuses of material-discursive practices, conditions both social and 
material: discourses of gender and professional status, political and economic forces, the details 
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of the personal as well as the professional life, struggles and failures, and the emotions. For 
conflicts are collisions: “head on, to the accompaniment of squealing brakes and breaking glass” 
(Fadiman, 1997, p. x). They are messy affairs. For we inhabit a tangled yet dynamic web of 
material-discursive power relationships upon which the production and outcome of any conflict 
depends. As such it is important to understand not why but how such collisions occur if we are to 
avoid, prevent, or resolve them ethically.   
 
The methodology used in this study is validated by Pratt (1995, p. 22) when she states: “We 
cannot move theory into action unless we can find it in the eccentric and wandering ways of our 
daily life.” For “[s]tories give theory flesh and breath” (Pratt, 1995, p. 22); they restore meaning 
to the world of academic research. As with culture which we construct “but not as a craftsman 
constructs an object, but more in the way that a traffic jam is constructed – it is simply emergent 
out of surrounding conditions” (Taborsky, 2010, p. 2) so too with the narratives we tell. For 
teachers‟ stories capture the richness and ambiguity of teachers‟ lives, the complexity of 
knowledge that although based on past experience is both flexible, pragmatic and subject to 
change. This is knowledge that evades generalisation, cannot be captured by numbers or 





CHAPTER 3: THE EMOTIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
What is an emotion? The question appears at first glance “a quest for a definition, a conceptual 
analysis” (Solomon, 2008, p. 10). However, in Western philosophical and epistemological 
traditions the question has assumed the larger proportions of a different quest that of 
“orientation” (Solomon, 2008, p. 10) compelling us to ask questions such as: Is emotion 
subservient to reason? Is emotion dominated by reason rather than controlled by it or vice versa? 
Or can emotions be seen as an essential part of our rationality, in reasoning and making sense of 
as well as judging an event, a person, a state of affairs? What is it about emotion, its aspects, that 
should be seen as fundamental to our understanding of emotions and how can our assumptions 
(and that of others) about our emotions, what Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics9 (II, 2 
[1104a6]; IV, 5 [1126a4 ff]) calls their appropriateness and inappropriateness, be seen as 
intimately entwined with and complicit in our social, moral and political lives (Spelman, 1989). I 
address these questions as they pertain to schools and conflict in the sections that follow. I will 
be focusing on four emotions: fear, anxiety, anger, and shame as these are emotions that played a 
significant role in my own conflict which is the subject of this study. In the process I will touch 
upon theories of emotion more generally speaking. 
 
3.1.2 Prologue 
It was January, 1996. I had flown from Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania (where I was working at the 
time) to Hong Kong to be interviewed for the position of Head of ESOL with the TISS, a 
position that had been advertised on overseas terms – terms which in addition to a salary 
                                                        
9 I will use NE to cite this work in the text for subsequent references. 
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included housing, airfares to and from country of origin as well as comprehensive medical and 
dental coverage, benefits which were commensurate to the salary per se. We were approaching 
the end of the panel (2 male and 1 female) interview when the chairman suddenly asked: “If we 
were to offer you the position on local terms [a salary only] would you accept?” Without a 
moment‟s hesitation, I responded in what I can only describe as a short burst of righteous 
indignation: “Do I look local?” The man to my left, a principal at one of the TIS schools, 
struggled to control the huge grin that was threatening to upset his composure. The interview 
came to an abrupt end shortly thereafter. I was thanked for my time and seen out the door. I did 
not regret answering as I had believing the question to have been unethical, unfair. As such you 
can imagine my surprise when several months later I received a call offering me the job - on 
overseas terms no less. On arriving in Hong Kong to take up the position, I discovered, quite by 
chance, that women who had applied for TIS positions advertised on overseas terms had 
invariably been asked the same question and those that had replied in the affirmative had been 
offered the jobs on local terms. However, the same had not been true of the men applying for 
similar positions also advertised on overseas terms: not a single one of them had been posed that 
same question. 
 
What I had believed to be an unethical action on the part of one individual (the chairman of my 
interview panel) was clearly structural, part of their everyday practice with overseas female 
candidates. What my short outburst of anger had signaled as the unjust and unethical disposition 
of an individual acting on his own initiative (unethical due to the fact that the offer of a local as 
opposed to an overseas contract depended on an arbitrary fact – my being a woman rather than a 
man) now appeared to be a normal occurrence in the everyday running of a sexist institution 
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despite the CEO being a woman, she no doubt having internalised those practices used to 
subjectify her, under the gaze, the “inspecting gaze” (Foucault, 1980c, p. 155), of the Chair of 
the TIS Board of Governors, a wealthy and exceptionally powerfully positioned man in Hong 
Kong. Yet if we are to understand how the emotions were used in the preceding story (and in the 
conflict itself) then I will need to delve a little more deeply into what the emotions are. 
 
3.2 Emotion- An Intellectual and Moral Activity 
3.2.1 Introduction – Philosophy‟s Attempts to Understand the Emotions 
The ambivalence of Western philosophers, from Plato onwards, towards the emotions and their 
role in our lives stems it would seem from the belief that emotions muddy the intellectual waters 
of rational thinking: they are and continue to been seen “as interfering with the smooth and 
successful functioning of reason” (Spelman, 1989, pp. 263-264). Yet Plato sees emotion not as 
separate to but rather as permeating all three parts of the soul, a soul he views as being made up 
of spirit, appetite and reason as defined in Plato‟s the Republic (360 BCE/1994b, Book 4). 
Reason judges what is true from what is false making wise decisions in accordance with its love 
of goodness. In the just soul the spirit aligns with reason, resisting the desires of appetite, and has 
the courage to be good. Even appetite can display emotion, according to Plato, with a love of 
money, though Plato sees this type of emotion as solely a means of gratifying other 
appetites/bodily desires. Yet notwithstanding his deliberations on the emotions, Plato eschews 
the issue of what an emotion actually is, other than urges, leaving it to Aristotle to define the 
“[e]motions as all those feelings that so affect men as to change their judgments, and that are also 
attended by pleasure and pain” (Rhetoric, II, Part 1). Emotion, according to Aristotle, has 
cognition – a belief and a judgement – at its core; in the case of anger, for example, this is a 
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perceived unjustified “slight” (the cause of the anger) to oneself or friends and as such context-
specific; it is intentional in that there is an object to one‟s anger, psychological as it is a state of 
mind and motivational/behavioural with its associated desire for revenge, a desire accompanied 
by a feeling of pleasure that turns the initial pain (of being unjustly treated) to “sweetness” 
(Rhetoric, II, Part 2). And it is Aristotle‟s notion of an unjustified “slight” that lends moral 
weight and meaning to his definition of anger as a natural response, a response that can be 
educated as well as incited by appropriate rhetoric and reasoning (Rhetoric, II, Part 1). 
 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle returns to the notion of emotions; here he discusses how 
they can be appropriately expressed, morally justified, considered virtues (virtuous character 
traits no less) necessary if one is to live a morally good life and so achieve well-being and 
happiness, eudemonia: a state impossible to attain without being “morally good” (Orchard, 2011, 
p. 6). Even though “moral goodness” does not naturally guarantee attaining eudamonia for as 
Aristotle suggests we may be beset by “great misfortunes” (NE, I, 9 [1100a11]) that blemish our 
moral goodness and prevent us from achieving it. As individual character traits, Aristotle 
considers each emotion as a combination of a belief and a desire: in the case of anger there is a 
belief in having been unjustly slighted and a desire for revenge. In addition the emotion must, 
according to Aristotle, be expressed “in the right way”, “to the right” degree, “at the right time”, 
“towards the right” person and with “the right” intent (NE, IV, 5 [1126a4 ff]). In other words it 
requires that our actions be predicated on the paradoxically tentative moral principles of practical 
wisdom (phronesis) resulting in firm moral practice (praxis). That the emotion is justified and its 
expression falls between the extremes of moral excess or deficiency in and of itself determines 
whether an emotional virtue has been achieved. As such according to Aristotle there are no 
63 
 
negative emotions per se other than those seen as in excess or in deficiency of an emotion. 
Indeed, when it comes to anger for example: “Increased moral understanding may even make 
you angrier than before, because it renders you more sensitive to how you or someone close to 
your heart has been insulted” (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 48). Likewise Aristotle (NE, IV, 5 [1126a5 
ff]) makes it abundantly clear that those “who are not angry at things they should be angry at are 
thought to be fools” further adding that “since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to 
defend himself, and to endure being insulted and put up with insult to one‟s friends is slavish.” 
 
The ancient Stoics‟ approach to the emotions although different to that of Aristotle also conjoins 
ethics with the emotions and posits a cognitive theory of the emotions as judgements. Their view 
of the emotions however is not just of judgements but of evaluative judgments “about the world 
and one‟s place in it” (Solomon, 2008, p. 5), propositional affirmations which due to their 
inability to think the Stoics denied to nonhuman animals and human babies (Deigh, 2006). Yet 
such was the Roman Stoics view of their world (as one of chaos and confusion) that they came to 
believe that emotions arose from false judgements predicated on false beliefs, as unattainable 
expectations imposed on the world and not to be entertained by any wise man (Solomon, 2008). 
It would however be the Stoics‟ notion of evaluative judgements, inclusive though of nonhuman 
animals and human babies alike, that the neo-Aristotelian Martha Nussbaum would use as the 
core principle on which to base her cognitive theory of emotions (Deigh, 2006) in her seminal 
work Upheavals of Thought (2003).  
 
The Middle Ages with the Christian concern (if not obsession) with sin saw the emotions again 
linked to ethical concerns with certain emotions, such as greed, envy, and anger, deemed to be 
64 
 
vices and as such sins (Hyman & Walsh, 1973). Yet the emotion anger was not considered as 
just one sin among the many but proscribed by the Church as a deadly sin; it was typically 
singled out and used as an example in Christian medieval sources of the need to “uproot vicious 
dispositions in ourselves” (Kristjánsson, 2007, p. 73) by exercising our own freewill and self 
control. The fact that psychologists today claim to be consulted over anger and anger 
management strategies far more than over any other emotion (Brooks, 2009) is testament to the 
enduring medieval stigma attached to anger and its excesses (Kristjánsson, 2007). For emotions 
in the Middle Ages were seen as linked inextricably to desires, most notably those desires that 
were thought to be self-absorbing and most destructive to the self and others. This enduring 
Christian preoccupation with sin and its link to the emotions would lead to numerous studies of 
the emotions that resulted in a curious reclassifying of what the medieval Church considered 
certain of the highest virtues to be (Solomon, 2008). As such emotions/virtues such as love, faith 
and hope, no longer considered as part of the pantheon of emotions/sins, were elevated to a 
higher standing and as such one with reason (Aquinas, 1274/1892). This has resulted in an 
enduring bond between ethics and the emotions, the emotions and sin, and the notion that 
emotions can be considered good or bad rather than neither per se, dependent for their valence on 
the way in which the emotion is felt and expressed. And it is this notion of emotions as either 
good or bad that continues to exert a considerable hold over the social imagination of the 
Western world particularly in the domains of teaching and education with the emotion anger as 





As such, although reason would continue to dominate the ethical, theological and 
epistemological arena, with emotion a poor second cousin, the ancient Greeks and medieval 
philosophers saw the emotions, though in need of guidance, as providing invaluable motivational 
power when the situation called for it: for only a fool would ignore emotion‟s plea to flee in a 
genuinely dangerous situation. Indeed, it would take the Age of Reason in the 17th century to 
sound emotion‟s death knell. For it was at this juncture that Descartes pronounced the emotions 
passions as distinct from “clear cognition” that rendered judgement “confused and obscure” 
(Descartes as cited in Solomon, 2008, p. 6), while seemingly at the same time aligning himself 
with Aristotle in declaring passions as “all good” (Descartes, 1649/1650, art. 211) yet requiring 
mastery (Descartes, 1649/1650, art. 50) by the “charioteer of reason”, as described in Plato‟s the 
Phaedrus (360 BCE/1994a), who not only controls the horse of irrational urges (emotions) but 
also that of bodily desires (appetites). 
 
With the subsequent rise of science and empiricism, nature came to be seen as being  
intrinsically of no import with values considered as inherently part and parcel of a human being‟s 
emotional responses and proclivities (Jaggar, 1989) and as such irrelevant to and in the 
epistemological domain. Reason was conceptually repackaged as the sole means of objectivity, 
uncontaminated as it was seen to be by personal proclivities (Jaggar, 1989; Solomon, 2008), with 
the emotions dismissed as “inessential to morals at best and intrusive and disruptive at worst” 
(Kant as cited in Solomon, 2008, p. 8), and repackaged as external, uncontrolled, irrational or 
arational “passions” that befell one, much as an accident might. With this clear division between 
reason and the emotions, the emotions, together with the sensory perceptions, became 
scientifically and hence epistemically untrustworthy, relegated to relative obscurity until the mid 
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20th century when a philosophical reawakening of interest in the emotions and what they were 
occurred. This was a reawakening brought about by feminists whose concern with and work on 
the links between the female and the emotions, the body and the irrational shed light on woman‟s 
position within society as a subordinate and subordinated group. As such in the sections that 
follow both in this chapter and the next I address the issues as they pertain to women and the 
emotions and the integral part the emotions play in the way conflict as it concerns women 
teachers is handled within a patriarchal school system. 
 
3.2.2 The Emotions and Philosophy in the 20th Century 
At the start of the 20th century with the emotions consigned by Darwin and Freud to our biology 
or psychology, they were viewed as independent of our social situations, with social and/or 
environmental factors triggering biological responses that caused emotional reactions. As such 
the emotions were largely ignored in Britain and North America as the hold of logic and science 
continued to dominate with only European philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger and Ricoeur 
developing philosophies where the emotions took centre stage (Solomon, 2008). It was not until 
the 1960s that interest in the emotions was fully reawakened with the poststructuralist argument 
that emotions are historically, culturally and socially dependent and as such a social construct. 
According to this view different cultures, different societies construct emotion according to the 
“conceptual and linguistic resources” available to them as noted by Jaggar (1989, p. 157). 
Accordingly Western notions as to which emotion is experienced, why and how it is experienced 
(consciously or not), expressed, communicated (to oneself and to others) and perceived 
(Shweder, 2004) would differ across cultures and societies. Rosaldo (1984) for example posits 
that the Western notion of emotion as a personal and private experience is perceived in other 
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cultures as socially constructed with no separation between the public and private domain. The 
notion that emotion is socially constructed and therefore concept dependent implies that 
emotions identified as apparently universal such as anger, grief, shame and fear may indeed vary 
significantly across cultures and societies from the way we describe any particular emotion. For 
poststructuralists such as Shweder (2004, p. 91) the mental states and mental lives of Others 
“who by virtue of lifelong membership in that group ascribe meaning to their lives in the light of 
wants, feelings, values, and beliefs . . . are not necessarily the same as one‟s own.” 
 
However the neo-Aristotelian perspective on emotions challenges this poststructuralist view as it 
considers them a type of intelligence rather than solely a social construct, “forms of cognition” 
(Murris, 2009, p. 18) that allow us to understand the truth of a situation in ways otherwise not 
available (Nussbaum, 1992); as such they can capture a truth in one‟s experience inaccessible by 
other means. It is in this way that the “particular” as it pertains to your context, your specific 
experience takes priority when it comes to ethical reasoning (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 68). And it is 
by viewing human practice (such as conflict) through the emotions that the emotional and moral 
truth of a practice is revealed. 
 
It is these cognitivist theories of emotions (of the 1960s with their revival in the 1980s onwards) 
that provide us with a different lens through which to understand how it is that social, political 
and even theological issues become so easily associated with what is seemingly a simple 
metaphysical question (Spelman, 1989): what is an emotion? These are theories of emotion that 
maintain that it is beliefs or judgements that constitute emotions as such: for to be angry requires 
a belief or judgement that some wrong has been done. As Nussbaum (2004a, p. 188) states:  
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In order to have anger, I must have . . . [a] complex set of beliefs: that there has been 
some damage to me or to something or someone close to me; that the damage is not 
trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; that it was done willingly; that it 
would be right for the perpetrator of the damage to be punished. It is plausible to assume 
that each element of this set of beliefs is necessary in order for anger to be present. 
 
Building on the cognitivist theories of emotions put forward by Aristotle and the Stoics, neo-
Aristotelian feminist philosopher Nussbaum (2003, 2004a) posits that every emotion has 
cognitive content, the content being the judgement attributed to that particular emotion and 
which as such identifies the emotion. And it is this cognitive content that constitutes the thought 
processes by which people conduct their daily lives (Deigh, 2006). Yet Nussbaum‟s (2003) 
cognitive theory diverges from that of the ancient Stoics in two important aspects: firstly she 
broadens the conception of judgement to include the emotions of nonhuman animals and human 
babies. And secondly she then renders salient the developmental nature of our emotions from 
infancy through to adulthood, their “narrative structure” by reason of these “developmental 
histories” (Deigh, 2006, p. 386). This was an aspect largely ignored by the Stoics which resulted 
in emotion‟s cognitive content being treated as ahistoric, independent of its core foundations 
(Deigh, 2006). Nussbaum however grounds her theory on the notion of humans whose initial 
needs at birth explains their primary interests in the objects that surround them. As such these 
initial desires lead to the first emotions we experience in life such as happiness, sadness, fear and 
anger which grow and transform as we come to understand that the objects of our love can also 
be the objects of our anger (Deigh, 2006). These are objects, forces of desire, we subsequently 
learn to compromise over while at the same time learning a basic sense of fairness and a capacity 
for emotions that are noticeably moral (Nussbaum, 2003). It is Nussbaum‟s inclusion and 
development of this aspect that adds “explanatory depth” (Deigh, 2006, p. 386) lacking in the 
Stoics‟ theory. As such Nussbaum‟s theory allows one not only to understand how emotions help 
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shape institutional as well as social customs but also allows for a critical understanding of how 
the entrenched practices of social institutions are shaped by them (Deigh, 2006; Nussbaum, 
2003). 
 
This theory is in stark contrast not only to the poststructuralist view but also to the positivist‟s 
“Dumb View” (Spelman, 1989, p. 265) of emotions which holds that emotion is nothing more 
than feelings devoid of any cognitive component or content. As such it is the cognitivist theories 
of emotion, those theories that have as their focus the conceptual aspects of emotion: the web of 
“concepts, beliefs, attitudes, and desires, virtually all of which are context-bound, historically 
developed, and culture-specific” (Solomon, 2003, p. 87), which have again come to the fore with 
philosophy‟s current preoccupation with epistemological concerns (Solomon, 2008). For these 
are theories that hold that whether one is sad or angry, happy or afraid, one is sad, angry, happy 
or afraid “about or at someone or something” (Spelman, 1989, p. 265). And in recalling 
Aristotle, this sadness, anger, happiness or fear can be deemed appropriate or inappropriate, 
justified or not, rational or irrational, not only by others but by oneself. As such, emotions are 
publicly constituted and construed as well as privately held and have much to do with “power, 
persuasion, manipulation, and intimidation” (Solomon, 2003, p. 153). Most importantly, what the 
cognitivist theories of emotion render salient is that in requiring an object to our emotions by 
default requires that we make a value judgement about that object. In the case of the emotion 
anger, it means that the judgement is a moral one for to say that I am angry with someone is to 
say that s/he has done something I consider bad, immoral, unfair or unjust (Nussbaum, 2003, 
2004a; Spelman, 1989). And if the object of my anger is my boss (or potential boss as in the 
anecdote told in the prologue), then such a judgement becomes an act of insubordination 
70 
 
(Spelman, 1989) and as such deemed wholly “inappropriate” by those in power, a threat to the 
status quo (Zorn & Boler, 2007). Yet this act of anger is at one and the same time an act of self-
respect for Aristotle (NE, IV, 5 [1126a5]) is clear that to never be angry is to lack respect not 
only for Others but also yourself. As such the “emotional types”, the disenfranchised, are denied 
the one emotion that those in positions of power can use with impunity: anger. 
 
3.3 Women and the Emotions 
3.3.1 Introduction 
There has been a long tradition in the West (and the teaching world) of associating the rational 
form of reasoning and thinking with those who dominate the political and hence social worlds 
we inhabit, and the emotions with subordinate groups, thereby establishing the accepted norm 
that “rational types ought to [and do] dominate emotional types” (Spelman, 1989, p. 264) and the 
notion that reason is somehow superior to emotion: the metaphorical rational master of the 
emotional slave. From Plato onwards up until the present, with the notable exception of 
poststructuralist, neo-Aristotelian and feminist philosophies, emotion has been seen as having 
nothing to offer in the construction of knowledge or even of knowing.  Reason however has been 
seen as inextricably linked to “the mental, the cultural, the universal, the public and the male” 
(Jaggar, 1989, p. 151), with the male mode of moral reasoning – “rules, rights, universality, and 
impartiality” (Tong & Williams, 2014, para. 1) – favoured.  As such the relationship between the 
“irrational, the physical, the natural, the particular” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 151) and emotion remains 
firmly entrenched in the female camp (Bartky, 1996; Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994; Weiler, 
1988; Zorn & Boler, 2007), a notion that feminist ethicists justly believe does a profound 
disservice to women subjecting us as it does to “a powerful disciplinary pedagogy which teaches 
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us that we are Other. . . . [and] our destiny . . . is to serve and please” (Bartky, 1996, p. 225)10. 
That women teachers are expected to maintain control of children “without expressing anger or 
aggression” (Grumet, 1988, p. 52) and at the same time be submissive to principals and 
supervisors alike is indicative of this notion in the teaching world (Weiler, 1988). 
 
Yet are women‟s and men‟s diverging character traits, their virtues and vices, social 
manipulation or biological imperative, a case of male versus female or masculine versus 
feminine? Aristotle would have it that character can be educated; as such females can be 
“educated” to internalise masculine practices, their virtues and vices, a view endorsed by 
Wollstonecraft (1792/1988, p. 105). The opposite would also pertain. Yet feminist thinkers of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as Wollstonecraft, Stanton and Gilman although divided 
in their answers to the question, challenged by their very discussions the epistemological 
supposition that “the more universal, abstract, impartial, and rational knowledge” is the “more 
closely” it resembles “reality” (Tong & Williams, 2014, para. 17). In so doing they also 
challenged the accompanying ontological notion that the more divorced we are from one another 
the more developed the self is. In lieu feminist ethicists offered the notion that the “more 
particular, concrete, partial, and emotional knowledge is, the more likely it represents the way in 
which people actually experience the world” and that the more connected we are with each other 
the more developed the self will be (Tong & Williams, 2014, para. 17).Yet these ethical as well 
as epistemological and ontological presumptions have as yet to cause a significant paradigm shift 
in the ways traditional philosophy views the female and feminine world of the emotions. As such 
                                                        
10That this same notion also does a disservice to men is aptly captured by the aphorism that “big boys don‟t cry”. 




in the sections that follow I discuss the emotions of anger, shame, fear and anxiety as they relate 
to women, schools and conflict within schools. 
 
3.3.2 Women and Anger 
The feminist ethicist Elizabeth Spelman (1989, p. 263) interprets Aristotle as saying that 
“[anyone] who does not get angry when he has reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the 
right way at the right time and with the right people is a dolt”. Yet Aristotle in fact uses the word 
“man” rather than “anyone” making it abundantly clear that “subordinates” such as woman, 
child, slave have no right to experience or express the emotion anger. As such anger in a woman 
makes a man anxious, angry himself that a “subordinate” would dare judge him and find him 
morally wanting, and is thus apt to dismiss the woman as “bitter” (Campbell, 1994, p. 51), “cute” 
(Spelman, 1989, p. 267) or “a crazy bitch” (Zorn & Boler, 2007, p. 148), at times ascribing to her 
person the behavioural aspects of anger as rage: an excess of emotion in Aristotelian terms and 
as such a judgement of inappropriacy. To the extent that the dominant refuses to acknowledge 
the Other‟s anger, to take it up (Frye, 1983) so to speak, to accept that the subordinate has a right 
to their anger, the dominant manipulates and controls and so retains power (Campbell, 1994; 
Spelman, 1989; Zorn & Boler, 2003). As such to return to the anecdote I recounted in the 
prologue at the start of this chapter, my anger, justified at the slight of being offered a local as 
opposed to the overseas contract initially advertised, was “dismissed” (LaRoque, 1990, xvii) as 
was the comment I made and as was I.  For, rather than being fearful and accepting the possible 
offer of a local contract (rather than the implied no job at all), my remark rendered visible to 
those present the unethical nature of the chairman‟s proposal, identified it a site of contestation 
and of social control (Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994; Jaggar, 1989; Spelman, 1989) and as such 
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was considered by him inappropriate, the look on his face and his tone of voice said it all, and an 
act of insubordination. That the interview finished shortly after ensured that what had been 
rendered visible was once more rendered invisible. But what are the moral consequences of such 
a dismissal for the people concerned? For the emoter it means that there is no need for her to be 
taken seriously (Campbell, 1994; LaRoque, 1990), both knowledge and speaker can be safely 
ignored. For those in positions of power it means that the status quo is maintained: with teachers 
learning to suppress their free expressions of anger, to replace them with habituated feelings of 
shame, embarrassment, inadequacy, and fear which constrains not only teachers‟ potential to 
critically evaluate their working conditions but also their potential to work together to “affect 
social change” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642). 
 
The fact that we can experience emotions that are outlawed, “conventionally unacceptable” 
(Jaggar, 1989, p. 166) due to their incompatibility with dominant views and values such as anger, 
is of significant import if we wish to understand how we are “faring” (Bartky, 1996, p. 235) and 
“fairing” within the confines of our particular world and to render visible the covert patterns 
(Jaggar, 1989, p. 167; Campbell, 1994, p. 48) in our lives that display the effects of subjectivity-
in-the-making on us, though these are revelations that can be at one and the same time 
“ambiguous and oblique” (Bartky, 1996, p. 235). For outlaw emotions such as anger and 
revulsion can direct our attention to what are coercive, cruel, unjust and/or dangerous situations 
(Jaggar, 1989); to experience them is to have “antennae that track, not infallibly and not without 
proper tutoring, salience” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 36) and can lead us to “subversive 
observations” (Jaggar, 1989, p. 167): observations that might lead us to challenge currently 
constructed notions about the status quo. They can help us understand that what we have 
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assumed to be fact has, in fact, been constructed in such a way as to conceal the reality of  the 
subordinated, particularly that of women (Jaggar, 1989). And for women who are also teachers 
this constitutes a double bind: what Bartky (1996, p. 234) would call a case of “double 
jeopardy”. 
 
But this begs the question: why should we take these outlaw emotions as reliable evaluations of a 
situation? What is about the subordinate position that privileges their view of the world over that 
of the dominant group‟s? In response I turn to the postfeminist Donna Haraway (1988) who in 
arguing for a “politics of positioning” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586) posits that there is “good reason 
to believe [that] vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the powerful” 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 583). For to see from the “peripheries and the depths”(Haraway, 1988, p. 
583) is not to imply that these are “innocent” positions but rather that the subjugated have a 
better chance of affirming that at the heart of all knowledge lies a “critical and interpretive core” 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 584; see also Foucault, 1980d, p. 82). The stuttering of silenced voices offers 
the possibility of an unfixed and indeterminate world, a world where all are agential subjects 
rather than objects of subjugation (Haraway, 1988). And so outlaw emotions can be a way of 
paying critical attention to one‟s situation yet also a way of stuttering silently: “expressing 
ourselves” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 36) and our outlaw emotions. As such: “How we 
comport ourselves emotionally matters morally” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 37). Yet often 
women will dismiss their own “outlawed” anger, feel shame and guilt for having experienced it 
or fear that it will have been perceived as an act of insubordination by those against whom it was 





If we accept the notion that anger can be seen as justified then it would seem possible to describe 
certain school scenarios where anger would be justifiable (Kristjánsson, 2007). Consider the 
teacher who has reason to believe that she is being systematically discriminated against by an 
administration that views women teachers as subordinate and as such proscribed from 
challenging judgements made by her superiors. At the more personal level, consider the teacher 
who is accused of causing and exacerbating conflict yet because she is a woman is denied the 
right to contest. In such cases “collective and individual anger seems to be the morally fitting 
reaction” (Kristjánsson, 2007, p. 77) and answer. 
In the next chapter I discuss shame as it pertains to women and how it can be used to 
disempower and silence within the context of schools and conflict as well as engender anger in 
those shamed. I also discuss the emotions fear and anxiety and how they relate to the notion of 






CHAPTER 4: THE EMOTIONS: WOMEN, SHAME, FEAR, AND ANXIETY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
If the emotions are to be understood as constituted by beliefs or judgements, does it follow that 
emotions are solely accessible through a rational belief or judgement (Campbell (1994)? 
Feminist ethicists, such as Bartky (1996), argue that it is not always so in particular with respect 
to the emotion shame. 
 
4.1.1 Women and Shame 
To feel shame is to see oneself as a lesser creature and to feel anguish over this. It is an emotion 
called forth by our own perceived “shortcomings” (Deigh, 1983, p. 225) and is sharply aligned 
and hence difficult to distinguish from guilt which is felt “over wrongdoings” (Deigh, 1983, p. 
225), both being based on a “failure to measure up” (Bartky, 1996, p. 229). Yet as Deigh 
explains: “shame goes to failure, guilt to transgression” (Deigh, 1983, p. 225); shame is about the 
self rather than our acts (Nussbaum, 2003, pp. 196-200; see also Brooks, 2008). That both 
emotions can be accompanied by a physical and/or psychological cringing, a need to hide from 
the internalised antagonist stare of the Other suggests that shame (and guilt) is a condemnation of 
the self by the self; and can lead to what Leder (1990) calls social dys-appearance. Yet it is 
shame rather than guilt that can quickly turn into rage (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher & Gramzow, 
1992). For in being shamed we are treated as being of less worth (Brooks, 2008, p. 323) resulting 
in a loss of dignity (Deigh, 1983, p. 226; see also Brooks, 2008) and an accompanying need to 
reclaim both. Yet although Nussbaum believes that “a decent society needs to . . . protect the 
dignity of  its members against shame and stigma”  (Nussbaum, 2004b, p. 282), she also believes 
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that some types of shame can have a “positive ethical value” (Nussbaum, 2004b, p. 176); for it 
can tell a truth about certain goals, certain standards we hold dear and believe in but have failed 
to live up to through our own failings; it can thus urge us to do better (Nussbaum, 2004b). It can 
also tell us a certain truth about our social standing and how we see ourselves and are seen with 
respect to others for shame “always relates to others”, always “turns on an inter- and intra-
subjective hinge” (Shotwell, 2011, p. 79). 
 
However, the shame that women in particular experience, that “pervasive sense of personal 
inadequacy” (Bartky, 1996, p. 226) that is manifest when indeed one holds no such belief or 
judgement that one is inferior (that one does not quite measure up), is a conditioned response 
(Bartky, 1996), that pertains to women in a sexist and patriarchal society. This is not so much 
any one feeling or emotion, despite involving particular feelings and emotions, but rather “a 
pervasive affective attunement to the social environment” (Bartky, 1996, p. 226). It is a shame 
that is less easily rendered conspicuous, less easily rendered conscious; and is more often than 
not denied and most deeply disempowering (Bartky, 1996; see also Shotwell, 2006). For it is to 
have been taught, socialised to experience an emotion when we have no grounds for holding it 
and to internally sanction ourselves over a shortcoming we do not have, feel guilt for a 
transgression we have not committed (Bartky, 1996). For this shame is the shame of dys-
appearance (Leder, 1990), albeit a special case affecting as it does only women. Yet the 
mechanism remains the same and is dependent on one becoming conscious of and internalising 
the ethical distance of the Other, the condemnation of the Other; to accept oneself as alien; it is 
to view oneself as a type rather than an individual, and so render oneself invisible. There is no 
further need of the antagonistic gaze of the Other for we now carry that Other within ourselves 
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(Leder, 1990), ready to sanction ourselves for falling short, for failing to measure up for the 
arbitrary reason: that we are woman, disabled, aged – a member of any of the many subordinated 
group. Yet for women, Bartky (1996, p. 226) suggests, “shame may well be a mark and token of 
powerlessness” more so than for any other disempowered group.  As such, as Campbell (1994, p. 
48) posits, the emotions can reveal a “pattern to our experience that is not captured by our 
judgments,” and that may even be at odds with them. Emotions may thus be more than the mere 
consequences of subordination; rather within a patriarchal and hierarchical society, they may 
well be a way of knowing the reality of one‟s circumstances: a “corporeal disclosure of self in 
situation” (Bartky, 1996, p. 226; see also Shotwell, 2011). For shame “can make unspeakable 
things viscerally present” (Shotwell, 2011, p. 77). 
 
As such, the pedagogy of the school, family, workplace, media continues to uphold, “both 
overtly and covertly, a powerful patriarchal grasp” on what is presented as “truth” (Bartky, 1996, 
p. 239) to the young: that female students are different, that they do not psychologically belong 
in domains where the rational is valued over the emotional such as Science, Technology, 
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM11), that they can never live up to the expectations of such 
rigourous and rational disciplines, and as such they are subordinate to men. Such “truths” are 
often implicitly understood, an unconscious association made between being for example an able 
scientist, technologist, engineer, or mathematician and being a white male, and fall outside our 
conscious awareness, acted upon without our even knowing (Shotwell, 2011; see also Bartky, 
1996). Such biases form the epistemological context for our propositional thoughts, an “implicit 
                                                        
11A study published in 2014 by Coursera, an online provider of MOOCs, found that online enrolment by women in 
the company‟s courses was lowest – around 20% - for subjects such as computer science, mathematics, and 
engineering. Another study (Breslow, Pritchard, DeBoer, Stump, Ho, & Seaton, 2013) on edX, an online consortium 
also offering MOOCs, showed that its course on Circuits and Electronics had a female study body of 12%. 
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framework of practices, understandings, and situated knowledges” (Shotwell, 2006, p. 4) for our 
actions both prejudicial and not (Shotwell, 2011), embedded as they are in our embodied social 
interactions.  As such salient aspects of a woman‟s experiences, “potentially liberatory spaces” 
(Shotwell, 2006, p. 61) at that, and key aspects of gender formation are “passed over in silence” 
(Shotwell, 2006, p. 61), dismissed as irrelevant at best and worthless at worst. For what more 
often than not we understand implicitly is not or can not be put into words  (Shotwell, 2006, 
2011): the meeting or conversation (a propositional interaction) that effects a persistently 
worrisome feeling you just cannot put into words but through which you can unpack the 
underlying nuances of what occurred making the implicit explicit.  
 
As Nussbaum (2004b) has stated shame that goes beyond the personal to the group level, that 
targets the socially disadvantaged, what Brooks (2008, p. 323) calls the “disfavoured groups”, 
results in further social disadvantage. These are groups that are targeted on the basis of not only 
gender, but also race, and sexual-orientation with even the poor, as a socio-economic group, and 
slaves, both past and present (Kristof & WuDunn, 2009), seen as easy prey (Brooks, 2008; see 
also Nussbaum, 2004b). Such shame denies the individual members of such groups the “full and 
equal dignity they possess as human beings” (Brooks, 2008, p. 323). Shotwell‟s (2011, p. 91) 
advice for those so shamed: “refuse the shaming gaze or stare back”. Yet within the school 
context to take up the shaming gaze, to stare right back is tantamount to insubordination and a 
punishable offence. To the extent that gender like race is a “system of social relations” upheld as 
obdurate and unquestionable universal “truths” through “commonsense assumptions”, we will 
need to transform common sense in order to significantly transform the social world (Shotwell, 
2011, p. 35) and the discursive practices associated with it. In the case of race Smith (1997, p. 
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181) argues: “The challenge is to understand what race is, how it functions, and ultimately to 
theorize how we might endeavor within a culture bound by race to subvert the subordinating 
strictures that race was designed to perpetuate.” So too with gender: not only within the wider 
community but also most especially within schools with respect to women teachers and the 
conflicts that they endure therein. 
 
4.1.2 Women, Fear, and Anxiety 
Aristotle states that the “man that flies from fear and fears everything and does not stand his 
ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to 
meet every danger becomes rash” (NE, II, 2 [1104a2  ff]). Yet the object of fear, what inspires 
the “thought of the impending damage that threatens my cherished relationships and projects” 
(Nussbaum, 2004a, p. 189), can be such within the international school system that women 
teachers learn to stand their ground on nothing, habituated to experience fear and anxiety over 
any act that could possible threaten their current or future employ. For we lack the self training 
necessary to “despise and endure terrors” (NE, II, 2 [1104b]) and so are unable to despise and 
endure them when they arise in our day-to-day lives. 
 
Fear and anxiety are closely related emotions, both a part of an “evolved mammalian defense 
system” in response to life-threatening (Öhman, 2008, p. 709) situations. Yet despite the 
considerable “overlap” between the two emotions involving as they both do “intense negative 
feelings” and “strong bodily manifestations”, there is a significant difference in their subjective 
forms (Öhman, 2008, p. 710). For fear is a response to an obvious danger “located in space and 
time” that requires immediate action usually avoidance with flight (Öhman, 2008, p. 710). 
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Anxiety on the other hand is a response to an ambiguous threat obscure both in terms of time and 
location, relating as it does to long-lasting and aversive contexts that cannot easily be dealt with 
even by fleeing (Öhman, 2008). As such although fear and anxiety can be appropriate emotional 
responses to conflict within schools as it can potentially escalate out of control with dangerous if 
not dire consequences for a woman teacher‟s aspirations and career, not to mention the potential 
for shame and humiliation that conflict can incur, it is anxiety that debilitates for the ambiguity 
of the threat proscribes one from coping effectively (Öhman, 2008) if at all. This can in turn 
cause one to question oneself, to question one‟s sanity: to wonder indeed whether a threat does in 
fact exist. Anxiety can indeed “paralyse” (Öhman, 2008, p. 710) and prevent one from taking 
action. And it is endemic in schools that are led by people who “enhanced their own authority 
[and status] by diminishing that of others”, who live with a “paranoid fear of [their] own 
colleagues” (MacBeath, 1998b, p.5) and promote an often covert policy  “of „constructive 
destabilisation‟ – an emotional shuttling of . . . staff between censure and fulsome praise, 
between job satisfaction and job threat” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 6) so that they are never 
emotionally stable enough to be a threat to the “leader‟s” power, never fully cognisant of their 
experience, their situation, and as such unable to contest. 
 
As such the use and abuse of emotion is of particular concern in schools where fear, anger, 
shame and anxiety can be powerful sites for the political manipulation and control (Campbell, 
1994) of women teachers and can therefore also be powerful sites of contestation (Boler, 1999). 
To feel shame when one judges oneself to have no real cause for shame may point to an 
important aspect of a school‟s culture: one that by holding the individual responsible for 
structural, systemic issues diverts attention away from the school and the patterns of complicity 
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entrenched in the school. To be denied the right to anger or deemed “a crazy bitch” for 
displaying anger is to be denied the right to challenge unjust behaviours. Feminists such as Lorde 
(1984) and Spelman (1989) advocate the necessity of women claiming their right to anger, for 
Spelman (1989, p. 263; my emphasis) in reinterpreting Aristotle states that: “[anyone] who does 
not get angry when there is reason to be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right 
time and with the right people, is a dolt.” However, the socially constituted and construed role of 
fear and anxiety within schools is central to the control of teachers and any public display of 
“inappropriate/outlaw” emotions they might entertain. This makes the claiming of such a right 
difficult if not impossible to achieve for fear and anxiety are inculcated in women teachers from 
the moment they step into a school: fear of and anxiety about the very real and very serious 
consequences that can be incurred in standing up to a senior teacher or administrator, even when 
we have moral authority on our side (Colnerud, 1997; Reitz, 1998). For expressions of anger by 
members of subordinate groups such as women teachers endanger the status quo (Jaggar, 1989) 
and so are negatively construed by the powerful as an “inappropriate irrationality in need of 
containment” (Simola, 2010, p. 255). This is to deny the disenfranchised a “feminine” voice, one 
that can be vital to moral agency (Simola, 2010). It is to label them as irrational, unwilling “to 
„calmly‟ resolve conflict” (Simola, 2010, p. 260) and is to trivialise and dismiss or overtly label 
their claims as “crazy” or “uncompromising” without duly deliberating on or being held 
accountable for the “abuse”, “injustice, or carelessness” (Simola, 2010, pp. 256, 261) that 
occasioned and still occasions their anger (Frye, 1983). And “anger denied subverts community” 
(Harrison, 1989, p. 220). Yet within an ethic of care (Noddings, 199212) framework anger can be 
viewed as caring for ourselves politically as well as others. As Foucault (1984/1997, p. 285) 
                                                        
12I discuss Noddings‟ notion of an ethic of care more fully in Chapter 5. 
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admonishes: “‟Take care of yourself‟ [soucie-toi de toi-même]” for “ethics as the conscious 
practice of freedom” revolves and resolves itself around this practice. 
 
4.2 The Emotions, Phronesis and Epistemic Virtue 
Phronesis is a different way of knowing. It is a way of knowing through one‟s actions and 
experience and cannot be “learnt” as can episteme with its knowledge of rules for “matters of 
conduct admit of variation” (NE, VI, 6 [1140b6]). As such it is a way of knowing differently. To 
possess practical knowledge (phronesis) is according to Aristotle (NE, 350 BCE/1994a) to 
possess the moral virtues necessary in order to achieve eudemonia, happiness or wellbeing: the 
ultimate purpose or telos of life; for practical knowledge or wisdom is the knowledge necessary 
to do the right thing, at the right time and with the right intent. As such phronesis is concerned 
with particulars and how to act in particular situations, in unforeseeable and unforeseen 
circumstances; for one might learn the rules of how to act but applying them in the real world 
requires experience of the world. Indeed good moral judgements require phronesis, practical 
wisdom, rather than knowledge of rules alone (Nussbaum, 1992). For “practical wisdom is 
internal to moral virtue” (Garcia, 2007, p. 90) and it is moral virtue that Aristotle (NE, II, 6 
[1106b11 ff], my emphasis) states is concerned with “passions” and requires that we “feel them 
at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right 
motive and in the right way . . . [as] both what is intermediate and best, and . . .characteristic of 
virtue”.  
 
The emotions, what Aristotle calls passions, inextricably entwined as they are with thoughts and 
beliefs (Nussbaum, 1996), can thus guide us in the epistemic, ontological and hence ethical 
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activity of “grasping the truth” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 41), accepting or rejecting what is 
proffered as knowledge. They have what Simola (2010, p. 259) calls “epistemic value in moral 
recognition” that can enable us to choose to act in the right way, a way that proceeds from a firm 
moral character based on practical experience with the end goal of doing the right thing which is 
none other than the action itself (NE, 350 BCE/1994a). For believing someone as a credible giver 
of knowledge is not a case so much of believing what is being offered as knowledge but rather of 
belief  “both of” the wo/man, and therefore “of the truth of what [s/]he says”: it requires “[f]aith 
in the [wo/]man” (Hobbes, 2003, p. 48) per se. It is a question of trust, that of the hearer in the 
speaker and the speaker in the hearer: trust in that the speaker is an honourable person (Hobbes, 
2003, p. 48) and that the hearer a virtuous listener (Fricker, 2007). This feeling of trust (or 
distrust) that either experiences is an emotional response, a moral judgement, trained and honed 
as it is by experience. Aristotle (NE, II, 1 [1103b1 ff]) puts it well when he states that: “It is by 
our conduct in our intercourse with other men that we become just or unjust” and I would add 
trustworthy or untrustworthy. And it is by our conduct with other men that we learn who and 
how to trust. For with regards our passions, Aristotle (NE, II, 1 [1103b1]) believes that “acts of 
any kind produce habits or characters of the same kind.” It is thus through moral practice 
(praxis) that we habituate practical moral wisdom (phronesis), learning by experience and 
practice how, when and who to trust, for example, and through practical moral wisdom that 
moral practice is cultivated and revised. As such moral virtue encompasses not only action but 
more importantly emotion (Kristjánsson, 2006), with emotions not only directing our attention 
and expressing our concerns, but also motivating us to act (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 37) and 
react. And properly habituated emotional responses, as Aristotle states, will cause us to act in a 
deliberative and reflective manner. It is through such deliberation and reflection that we learn to 
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review and revise “the thoughts and beliefs that constitute our emotions” and in turn to modify 
and adjust the emotions themselves (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 43) and as such our practical 
moral wisdom. Thus it is that by cultivating and schooling the emotions from an early age that 
emotional virtue is achieved (NE, II, 1-2 [1103b1 ff]). 
 
Given this, would it not be the case, argue Sherman and White (2007), that “intellectual 
excellence” requires that we comport ourselves well, “in a way conducive to the function of 
grasping the truth” not only “with respect to beliefs” but also “emotions?” (Sherman & White, 
2007, p. 41). Would intellectual excellence also not require that “emotions be expressed in the 
right way, at the right time, towards the right person” (Sherman & White, 2007, p. 41)? I believe 
it would. For intellectual excellence is dependent upon the intellectual and moral virtue of 
practical wisdom concerned as it is with practice and the knowledge of both general truths and 
more especially particular facts. Aristotle is clear: having phronesis is both necessary and 
sufficient for being virtuous (NE, VI, 7-13 [1145a7 ff]) and being phronetic or prudent is to 
“show a faculty of foresight in what concerns [your] own life.” (NE, VI, 6 [1141a7) and that of 
others: “human and non-human nature” (Guattari, 1989, p. 133; see also Guattari, 2008), not 
only animal and vegetable but also “cosmic, and machinic” (Guattari, 1989, p. 133; see also 
Guattari, 2008; Haraway, 1988). 
  
As such a prudent person cannot act against their better judgement for a phronetic disposition 
requires the right and proper way of being. As Wisnewski (2012) suggests Heidegger sees 
practical wisdom as the “gravest of all knowledge, since it is concerned with human existence 
itself” (Heidegger cited in Wisnewski, 2013, p. 60), gained as it is from the practical and 
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embodied nature of our experience in and of the world, and is a way of comporting oneself in 
and toward the world. For phronesis  is a way of orienting oneself and thus of caring, seeing, 
knowing and enabling a particular way of being, one that sees at its end, its telos, a well-lived 
life, a life based on reflection and deliberation consistent with such an end. As such the 
intellectual and moral virtue of epistemic trust must be touched, however lightly, by emotion 
consciously or unconsciously, revised as it is through deliberation on past experience of the 
world. For without this, knowledge of the particulars of a specific situation is insufficient. As 
such the emotions as practical judgements are an important constituent of phronesis and 
phronesis, in turn, of the emotions. 
 
4.3 Schools, Conflict, Emotional Intelligence and the Intelligence of the Emotions 
Goleman‟s book on Emotional Intelligence first published in 1995 was not only a bestseller 
worldwide but also so popular in international schools that it and his ideas about emotions 
deserve a closer look to reveal why this might be the case. Especially in light of the fact that 
Goleman (2006, xxiv) himself emphasises the importance of Emotional Intelligence in the 
Aristotelian “challenge . . .  to manage our emotional life with intelligence.” 
 
According to Aristotle there are no negative emotions per se other than those seen as in excess or 
in deficiency of an emotion. Indeed as pointed out earlier, when it comes to anger for example 
“[i]ncreased moral understanding may even make you angrier than before, because it renders you 
more sensitive to how you or someone close to your heart has been insulted” (Kristjánsson, 
2006, p. 48). This is in stark and direct contrast to a current and commonly held notion within 
teaching of the value of Emotional Intelligence (EI) as defined by Goleman (2002, p. 13) where 
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“negative” emotions “powerfully disrupt work” making us “less emotionally intelligent”; where 
the “rational” head should be the master of the “emotional” heart, and anger is seen as an 
“afflictive” (Goleman, 1997, p. 34) emotion that needs to be “defuse[d]”, “de-escalate[d]”, and 
“deflate[d]” (Goleman, 2006, pp. 60-63) rather than the “emotionally intelligent reaction to 
certain states of affairs” (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 48). As such Goleman takes us back, as I see it, 
to the dark ages of emotion and reason: to the master/slave dichotomy of reason over emotion 
with reason as the head controlling the emotional heart rather than educating it as Aristotle, and 
recent cognitive theories of emotion, would have us do, where to quote Kristjánsson (2006, p. 
49) “emotion itself is seen as permeated by reason” and I would add reason is permeated by 
emotion. 
 
As such the good life as defined by Goleman in his version of Emotional Intelligence is in stark 
contrast to Nussbaum‟s “intelligence of emotions” (2003) where emotions are highly complex 
and discriminating forms of thought as responses to one‟s circumstances and experiences. 
Goleman‟s EI is one measured by the extent to which you understand and manage your negative 
emotions, such as anger, to bring monetary “success”, “prosperity” and “prestige” which in turn 
leads to “happiness” (Goleman, 2006, p. 36). Thus the Aristotelian “good life” (Goleman, 2006, 
p. xxiv), where “wealth is not the good we are seeking” (NE, I, 5 [1096a6]), has by 2002 been 
developed by Goleman into one that helps maximise company profits and works for the financial 
good of the company or organisation rather than the individual (Goleman, 2002, p. 251). For 
Aristotle (and myself as a teacher) the end aim of any virtue is to achieve well-being or 
happiness with the virtues “at once conducive to and constitutive of eudaimonia” (Kristjánsson, 
2006, p. 45) and happiness as a morally good end. As such for Aristotle “the happy life [is that 
88 
 
which] is thought to be virtuous” (NE, X, 6 [1177a]) and is not one based on wealth (NE, I, 5 
[1096a6]) or monetary success. It would appear that for Goleman life‟s aim is not a moral one 
based on moral goodness but rather one founded on financial success.  
 
To this end Goleman believes that any conflicts that arise within an organisation can be resolved 
by being “emotionally intelligent”, which requires compromise (Goleman, 2006). This end, 
Goleman believes, is possible only through empathising with others, placing ourselves, he says, 
in the other‟s metaphorical shoes (Goleman, 2006, xi, xiv, xvii, 43, 96-100, 103-107, 118, 146, 
149, 284-286). Goleman would do well to realise, as Kristjánsson (2006, p. 52) points out, that 
empathy is neither an emotion, constituted as it is neither by a set of beliefs or desires, nor 
inevitably a “moral concern” and can result in our delighting in rather than lamenting someone 
else‟s pain and suffering.  Empathy rather comprises a “capacity for differing emotions” 
generated by the “perception of someone else‟s situation” as they experience it (Kristjánsson, 
2006, p. 52). Rather than seeking to empathise and compromise we would do well to listen to 
John Stuart Mill‟s argument (cited in Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 51) for “the need to have one‟s 
deepest convictions constantly challenged in order for them to retain their heartfelt vitality, 
urgency, and immediacy.” For Goleman‟s views would seem to take us back to the notion of 
schooling as “factory farming” (Kelly, 2004, p. 205) and of education as ensuring the “economic 
and commercial success of the nation [/company/industry/organisation]” rather than the 
“spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical developments of pupils at school and of society” 
(Kelly, 2004, p. 205) as well as that of teachers. This presupposes a need for teachers to curb 
certain emotional responses in the interests of administrative efficiencies rather than confront 
unethical practices. Yet I have never read an obituary or heard a eulogy, teacher‟s or other, 
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where the monetary success of the deceased was praised or indeed even mentioned as opposed to 
their virtues and moral integrity. For indeed, financial success counts for little with regards 
providing a meaningful sense of purpose, a meaningful life, and rather should be seen as a means 
to achieving eudaimonia, a morally good end where one holds oneself not only accountable but 
also responsible for what we do and fail to do. 
 
Indeed, given such notions, I am not surprised at the enthusiastic welcome Goleman and his 
ideas have garnered from administrations in certain international schools, dove-tailing as they do 
with their own proclivities for power, control and subordination and hence the need to keep 
certain teacher emotions under control while simultaneously promoting others with even teachers 
seduced no doubt by Goleman‟s “eloquence” (Russell, 1938/2004; see also Gregg, 2011) and his 
appeal to the Platonic notion of the need to keep (teachers‟) emotions in check and under strict 
control. Indeed Salovey, Detweiler-Bedell, Detweiler-Bedell and Mayer (2008), who undertook 
the initial extensive research on emotional intelligence and coined the term, advise caution in 
taking at face value the claims made by Goleman about Emotional Intelligence such as that 
having “a highly developed emotional intelligence will make you a candidate for CEO or a 
brilliant lawyer” (Goleman, 1995, p. 76) and urge educational and business managers alike to 
remain “sceptical of  „quick-fix‟ programs” (Salovey et al., 2008, p. 543) based on Goleman‟s 
work for “it will not, at the end of the day, be the key to reducing international conflict” (Salovey 





4.4 The Emotions as Expressions of the Moral Dimensions of a School’s Culture 
The word anger derives from the old Norse words “angr” and “angra” meaning distress, sorrow 
and grief. As seen in Chapter 3, to feel anger is to feel aggrieved, to feel a sense of distress and 
sorrow at a loss. In the case of the anger of the disenfranchised it is a response to their sense of 
powerlessness; it is a judgement on and about the way one has been dealt with and asserts that 
“one has been harmed in unacceptable ways” (Simola, 2011, p. 261; Campbell, 1994; Shotwell, 
2011; Spelman, 1989). It is also about the desire to enact revenge and the pleasure one 
experiences in seeking it. 
 
Fear and anxiety are also dependent upon beliefs for their intensity: the greater the damage we 
believe and judge we will suffer the greater the fear (Nussbaum, 1996, 2004a), the greater the 
anxiety. As such to inspire fear in others is to control them for the fearful person will act in such 
a way as to avoid damage and suffering. In schools this can be put to “powerful political use” 
(Campbell, 1994, p. 46), to cause teachers to think twice before expressing certain emotions in 
certain ways for fear of being “dismissed” (LaRoque, 1990, p. xvii), of no longer being “taken 
seriously” (LaRoque, 1990, p. xvii) or of being permanently dismissed from the teaching 
profession. And to cause a teacher severe anxiety is to emotionally shuttle her between praise 
and threat so that she is never emotionally stable enough to understand her experience or 
situation, or even credit it as true. 
 
Shame is a powerful ally when it comes to disempowering teachers, fostering fear and 
“dismissing” anger. It is used by administration to distract attention away from the culpability of 
the school and its administrators. Teachers are loath to question rules and regulations, even the 
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standards against which they will be measured for fear of being accused of inadequacy 
themselves. Yet when they fail to measure up to the standards set, due to systemic failures rather 
than personal inadequacy, teachers will all too often blame themselves, see themselves as 
wanting, as failures and shamed (Winograd, 2003). They withdraw to their classrooms, close the 
door and hide ashamed of their failure to reach the given mark. As Winograd (2003, p. 1642) 
suggests: “the self-accusatory stance of teachers diverts teachers‟ attention from structural 
problems in their working conditions and, instead, focuses attention on the inadequacies of 
teachers as individuals.” It is however what Winograd (2003, p. 1641) calls the “dysfunctional 
dimensions” to teachers‟ emotions that can in fact alert them to oppressive working conditions, 
based on oppressive premises, to their own “potential to critique” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642), 
and move them in every sense to affect social change rather than let it inhibit them (Boler, 1999; 
Winograd, 2003). 
 
As such the emotions of anger, fear, anxiety, and shame within the educational context, their 
expression or lack thereof, can be seen as expressing the moral dimension of a school, one that is 
unethical, autocratic and immensely unfair to teachers in general (Scenes from the Battleground: 
Teaching in British Schools, 2008, 2014) and female teachers in particular (Tabula Rasa, 2013a). 
As the Scenes from the Battleground: Teaching in British Schools blog (2008) and the Tabula 
Rasa blog (2013b) point out: these are schools where open and frank discussion of a pedagogical 
and/or systemic nature does not occur. These are schools where teachers fear to speak out against 
unjust, unethical practices and refrain from confiding even in each other. And these are schools 
where minutes of meetings held are massaged so as to reflect the prevailing administrative view 
and displays of teacher anger aimed at “hierarchical/patriarchal structural arrangements or at 
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larger economic and political structures” (Winograd, 2003, p. 1642) are not only frowned upon 
but dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly. In schools such as these fear rules the day and is embodied 
in the teachers who talk with their feet with high teacher turn-over and high rates of sickness and 
sick leave the norm. The embodiment of these emotions should provide clear indications that all 
is not well at a school. 
 
Rorty rightly stated that the “rehabilitation of the emotions” (Rorty, 1980, p. 4) is long overdue. 
In over the three decades since she made the comment little I believe has changed for the 
historical and unequal association of the emotions with the feminine and of the rational with the 
masculine continues to lead to the subordination of women and their opinions in institutions, 




CHAPTER 5: THE ETHICAL TEACHER AND THE ETHICAL SCHOOL 
 
5.1 Introduction 
I attended convent schools throughout my primary and secondary school career. The fact that my 
father was Church of England and therefore a “non-believer” in the eyes of the nuns did not 
make life at school easy. I can well remember my first week at school when we were told by our 
form teacher that only Catholics went to heaven. I had asked where the rest went and was told: 
“Limbo for non-believers and unbaptised babies who die young, Purgatory for believers who die 
in venial sin and have to do penance before being admitted to Heaven and Hell where those who 
die in mortal sin go for eternity.” The teacher had smiled sweetly. “And after Limbo do they get 
to go to Heaven?” I had asked. “No, that‟s for eternity too but it‟s a very nice place.” I was 
unconvinced and cried myself to sleep that night. My father was old in the eyes of a 4 year old 
and at age 50 already had one foot in the grave in my book. This meant I would never have the 
chance to see him again once he died and I was sure this was imminent! Yet the teacher had 
seemed unaware of the possible moral import of her words. It would take a visit by my father to 
talk about the incident with the Mother Superior and the teacher concerned for the teacher to 
retract her pronouncement; though similar pronouncements made in the other primary classes 
remained intact, unretracted despite the fact that there were children with non-Catholic parents in 
those classes too. 
 
Many years later I would be reminded of this incident when the principal at the TISS sat down 
for “just a quick chat as I have a Chinese lesson to get to!” post observation of a lesson I had just 
co-taught.  He handed me his completed observation form and commented that the co-observer 
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had mentioned to him that he had thought ESOL13 should be taught one-on-one and that my role 
as the ESOL support teacher was to work with and challenge individuals rather than co-teach the 
class. This was noted on the form as the key area for development. He suggested that I take a 
look through the comments and, if I wanted, write a comment in the (one inch by one inch) box 
that had been provided for this purpose at the bottom right hand corner of the last page. Totally 
oblivious of the grief he was causing, he checked his watch, said that he was already late for his 
class and left. The moral indignation felt by myself and my co-teacher at his treatment meant that 
we had no choice but to act (Boss, 1998) and act we did, writing a 10 page document with a 
response to each point raised in the principal‟s observation notes. For the emotions can signal a 
truth about one‟s situation, one‟s circumstance (as I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4); they have what 
Simola (2010, p. 259) calls “epistemic value in moral recognition” that can guide us to choose to 
act in a morally right way and which we ignore at our peril.  
 
Both the teacher in the first instance and the principal in the second lacked the moral compass, a 
sense of responsibility, required of teaching professionals to navigate the complex environment 
that is the school (MacBeath, 2010), because they failed to understand their actions and words in 
ethical terms. They were oblivious to the “complexity of the ethical landscape” (Strike & 
Ternasky, 1993, p. 225) that teaching encompasses and did not, could not or would not reflect 
critically on their professional conduct “in ethical terms” (Campbell, 2003). Their lack of self-
awareness about levels of integrity, honesty and compassion and how these pertain to the 
educational context was indicative of a marked deficiency in moral sensitivity (Coombs, 1998; 
MacBeath, 2010)  and the practical wisdom required of “good deliberation” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 
                                                        
13 “English to Speakers of Other Languages” (ESOL) is becoming a more widely used acronym than ESL (“English 
as a Second Language”) at international schools. 
95 
 
74), “where what counts is flexibility, responsiveness, and openness to the external” (Nussbaum, 
1992, p. 74). Where to “rely on an algorithm . . . is not only insufficient, it is a sign of immaturity 
and weakness” (Nussbaum, 1992, p. 74). The fact that my co-teacher and I were the only 
teachers to challenge the principal‟s observation ethics is a sad testimony to the fact that teachers 
have a tendency not “to rock the boat” (Reitz, 1998, p. 48). They have as MacBeath (2010, p. 2) 
puts it “learn[t] to do what they are told” no matter how badly they and others less powerful than 
them are treated, remaining silent and silenced, in the margins of institutional life (Boler, 1999; 
see also Foucault, 1977). 
 
As instances of the practical expression of ethics (or lack thereof) by both teachers and school 
administrators, which is the emphasis in this study rather than a study of meta-ethics and 
questions about ethics itself, the above “stories” and others from my own experience raise a 
range of philosophical questions that I will be addressing in this chapter and that need answering 
“in ways that illuminate both the beneficial and the harmful influence teachers can have on 
students” (Hansen, 2001, p. 826) and I would add on each other. These are questions that go to 
the heart of ethical teaching and the ethical teacher: Are teachers required to be more ethical than 
other professionals? Are teachers required to speak out when they see injustice done despite the 
ramifications that doing so might have on their own lives and careers? Are teachers required to 
care about their feelings and actions as they pertain to their school lives? What reasons are there 
for teachers and school administrators to act unethically? And why do teachers “learn to do what 
they are told?” (MacBeath, 2010, p. 2). I address these questions and issues as they pertain to 





My concerns, issues and dilemmas discussed in this study are philosophical in nature; this is due 
to the fact that the “activity of teaching is itself saturated with moral significance” (Hansen, 
2001, p. 826). Given that teaching is by its very nature both a moral and ethical act14 (Campbell, 
2003, p.10) ethics, or the lack thereof, as Campbell rightly observes, “emanates from the realities 
of teaching, rather than being applied to these realities” (Campbell, 2003, p. 10). Simply put, 
“practical ethics” (Baron, Pettit & Slote, 1997, p. 229) is about being fair, honest, responsible 
and accountable, treating others with care and respect (Campbell, 2003). Choosing not to do so is 
also a moral act. It requires that we “live mindfully: to take some care about how we act and even 
about how we feel” (Weston, 1997, p. 2). It requires that we “reflect wisely” throughout the 
course of our teaching day on the ethical implications of what we “say or do not say, do or do not 
do” (Campbell, 2003, p. 10). For as Hansen sensibly observes: “not everything that teachers do 
necessarily has moral significance, but any action a teacher takes can have moral import” 
(Hansen, 1993, p. 669). It requires above all else that we have the courage to act, to speak out 
when injustice is done or seen to be done by colleagues, administrators and/or others (Campbell, 
2003) despite peer pressure to do otherwise (Colnerud, 1997; Reitz, 1998). 
 
However Barrow (1992, p. 108) in her review and criticism of Goodlad, Soder and Sirotnik 
(1990) argues that it is the teacher‟s ability to “communicate worthwhile understanding” that is 
important not “his or her moral integrity”. Barrow makes a valid point, arguing that teaching is 
“no more about morality than many other human activities; [rather] it is about developing minds” 
                                                        
14 As does Campbell (2003) so too do I use the terms moral and ethical interchangeably as “both address virtue and 
basic principles of right and wrong as they influence belief, intention, and behavior” (Campbell, 2003, p. 17). 
However, I do use the term moral rather than ethical when it reflects a teacher‟s individual stance on principles and 
the term ethics when considering a more collectively conceived set of principles such as professional ethics. 
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(Barrow, 1992, p, 107) and asserts that: “neither good teachers nor educated people are 
necessarily particularly moral” (Barrow, 1992, p. 105). However as Hansen  (2001, p. 831) 
points out: “Teaching is a moral endeavor because it influences directly the quality of the present 
educational moment, a moment in which, Dewey reminds us, the persons we are becoming hang 
in the balance”, both as teachers and as students. Given that students look to us as models of 
ethical behaviour (whether we wish it so or not) we as teachers need to display a higher degree of 
moral integrity than those engaged in many other human activities; for if schooling is to mean 
more than mere training then ethics needs to lie at the heart of our teaching. As such I firmly 
stand with Hansen (1993, 2001) on this issue (see also e.g., Campbell, 1996, 1997, 2003; 
Colnerud, 1997; Delattre, 1998; Hall, 1996; MacBeath, 2010; Noddings, 1992, 2002; Nucci, 
2001; Nussbaum, 1992; Reitz, 1998; Weston, 1997) and believe that teachers have a moral 
obligation to, at the very least, cause no harm and at the very best cultivate an ethics of care. For 
turning a blind eye when administrators do not allow a teacher to contest a serious accusation of 
misconduct causes irreparable damage to the teacher and sends a clear message to staff and 
students: do what is in your own best interests rather than what it is morally right to do (Taylor, 
1989). 
 
5.2 The Ethical Teacher 
It would appear, however, that the predominant tendency of teachers is to remain silent when 
confronted with the unethical conduct of either colleagues or their superiors: to display what 
Campbell (2003, p. 6) calls “suspended morality”. Despite any discomfort we may feel at 
witnessing unethical acts, teachers fail to act (by not confronting those whose behaviour is 
ethically inappropriate) citing the need to be “careful”, “tactful” or “protective” of themselves 
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(Campbell, 2003, p. 88). Such  “gutless behaviour” and “cowardice”, to use teachers‟ own words 
(Campbell, 2003, p, 88), arises from the very real fear of being labeled a “tattletale”, punished by 
administration or, worse, standing accused of professional misconduct themselves (Colnerud, 
1997). With the added anxiety that confronting a colleague or superior can lead to not only a 
very personal conflict but also possibly a very nasty one, compliance is ensured (Campbell, 
2003). Teachers thus can feel silenced by school cultures that emphasise the need not “to rock 
the boat. [Where] peace at any price seems to be the order of the day” (Reitz, 1998, p. 48). It is 
alarming but not surprising given my own experience that Reitz concludes, from his study of 300 
teachers, that in virtually every case reported of unethical conduct it was “encouraged or 
enforced” by school administrators, or organisational “policies and procedures” (Reitz, 1998, p. 
42). It is no wonder that new and trainee teachers are quickly “apprenticed” into the code of 
collegial loyalty that the group demands (Colnerud, 1997; Reitz, 1998). As such unequal power 
structures (Fricker, 2007) based on a shared social construction of teacher identity (Fricker, 
2007, p. 14) act “passively” (Fricker, 2007, p. 9) undetected in their ability to control and 
manipulate under the guise of “collegiality”. This should cause us to critically reflect as teachers 
on “the internally coercive power that this sort of „we-attitude‟ can have” (Fricker, 2012, p. 300) 
and “what mere relations of power are doing to our thinking” (Fricker, 2007, p.3) and actions. 
 
Consequently being an ethical person does not necessarily guarantee becoming an ethical 
teacher. The extent to which a person is critically self-aware, reflective about their levels of 
integrity, honesty, compassion as well as the courage “to be responsible” (Campbell, 2003, p. 5; 
see also MacBeath, 2010), to oppose unethical workplace practices despite a collective 
commitment to do otherwise (Fricker, 2012, p. 299), will determine the extent to which they will 
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become an ethical professional and teacher. That is not to say that we cannot have different 
interpretations of what it means to be honest, just, compassionate or brave. It does however mean 
that when we beg to differ, we are able to support and defend our “actions and our attitudes on 
ethical grounds alone” (Campbell, 2003, p. 37). As Coombs (1998, p. 569) wisely comments: 
Actions they [teachers] may see as insulting, belittling, arrogant, patronizing, or unfair in 
other contexts may not be perceived as such in the educational context. Consequently an 
important aspect of the task of enhancing the moral sensitivity and perception of 
educators is that of engaging them in a consideration of how the educational context, with 
its particular constellation of power, authority, and responsibility relations, affects the 
applicability of their moral concepts. (Coombs, 1998, p. 569) 
 
Practical ethics thus requires that teachers as professionals in positions of power and authority 
not only over students in their care but in certain cases teachers as well, should hold themselves 
accountable to a higher standard than that which they hold themselves to in private life. It 
requires that they view students and others in the school environment less powerful than 
themselves as equally deserving of moral sensitivity and fair and just treatment. It requires that 
the fact that those in their care have limited power and even less authority not corrupt their view 
of the moral implications of their actions and behaviours. For the “idea of power corrupts” 
(Bateson, 1972/1987, p. 492) and the oppressed can make the “colonisers‟ laws” (Richards, 
2012, p. 118) their own, taking out their own disappointments and dissatisfactions on those less 
powerful than themselves: those who cannot or will not fight back (Farrell, 1997; Griffin, 2004; 
Marquard, 1957). In institutions such as these “very bad things” (Richards, 2012, p. 118) can and 
do happen. Hence, the power and authority given to us as teachers carries with it a responsibility, 
“an accountability for how we use it, not to our own personal benefit but for the benefit of 
others” (MacBeath, 2010, p. 5). As such professional ethics can in no way stand alone, apart 
from ordinary ethical norms of everyday life: “Ethics is ethics” (Delattre, 1998, p. 2) and so the 
“ethical teacher” is consequently also an “ethical person”, their “professional ethics . . . the 
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extension of everyday ethics into the nuances of a professional‟s practices” (Campbell, 2003, p. 
12).  
 
Despite this, there are those teachers who throughout the course of their teaching careers appear 
oblivious to the “complexity of the ethical landscape” (Strike & Ternasky, 1993, p. 225) that 
teaching encompasses. They do not, can not, or will not reflect on their professional conduct in 
ethical terms and often cite context as the rationale for their unethical behavior. However, as 
Campbell so succinctly puts it: “Context can not make a disrespectful action suddenly 
respectful” (Campbell, 2003, p. 43). For morals and ethics are neither “all provisional, all 
exchangeable” (Hunter, 2000, p. xiii); they should not be confused with individual preferences of 
a non-moral nature. Some things are just “inherently wrong” (Somerville, 2000, p. xii, 21) and it 
is those things that fail to respect life or intentionally cause harm (Somerville, 2000) that are 
equally ethically wrong. 
 
There are also a number of teachers who lie and cheat for personal gain, who are knowingly 
cruel and unfair (Campbell. 2003). There are also those teachers who, though not intentionally 
cruel or unkind, are insensitive to the needs of others, who fail to realise that “treating others 
fairly may mean treating people unequally in the sense that equity requires adjustments that bring 
people into more comparable statuses” (Nucci, 2001, p. 88), and who by respecting the “letter of 
the law” fail in every sense to respect its spirit. Good moral judgements require phronesis, 
practical wisdom, rather than knowledge of rules alone (Nussbaum, 1992). For if “practical 
wisdom is internal to moral virtue” then “so too many moral virtues are internal to practical 
wisdom, and thus to intellectual virtue and practical rationality themselves” (Garcia, 2007, p. 
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90). Respect is a two-way street: it is ethically problematic to demand the respect of students and 
colleagues alike without respecting them in return (Campbell, 2003). 
 
As such the emotions can play a significant cognitive role, not only signaling but also expressing 
the moral, the immoral, the just and the unjust word or action not only of others but of ourselves 
as well. For as Jaggar (1989, p. 167) contends “outlaw emotions”, those emotions that are 
considered unacceptable within a specific domain can:  
provide the first indications that something is wrong with the way alleged facts have been 
constructed, with accepted understandings of how things are. . . . Only when we reflect 
on our initial puzzling irritability, revulsion, anger or fear may we bring to consciousness 
our „gut level‟ awareness that we are in a situation of coercion, cruelty, injustice or 
danger.  
 
As such listening that is attentive to “what it is that one doesn‟t want to know” (Boler, 1999, p. 
200) requires we be not only attentive but open to emotions as “part of critical and ethical 
inquiry” (Boler, 1999, p. 23). For as Barad (in interview with Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 
69) makes abundantly clear: ethics entails: “[l]istening for the response of the other and [having] 
an obligation to be responsive to the other”. As such, Aristotle (as cited in Nussbaum, 1992, p. 
78) holds that: 
the truly good person will not only act well but also feels the appropriate emotions about 
what he or she chooses. Not only correct motivation and motivational feelings but also 
correct reactive and responsive feelings are constitutive of this person‟s virtue or 
goodness. If I do the just thing from the wrong motives or desires (not for its own sake 
but, say, for the sake of gain), that will not count as virtuous action. 
 
Choice thus lies carefully balanced between the rational and the emotional, and can be described, 
says Aristotle (NE, VI, 2 [1139b1]) “as desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire” (as cited 





5.3 The Ethical Administrator 
Noddings (1992) writes about the ethic of care as it pertains to education. In her forward to 
Beck‟s (1994) work on educational administration as a caring profession, she reminds readers 
about “the tendency in highly bureaucratized systems . . . to attend most diligently to those above 
us in the hierarchy” leading one to conclude that much, if not all, of an administrator‟s time 
“goes into compliance” (Beck, 1994, p. ix). She also reminds us that by evaluating our work 
through the lens of caring: “we experience a motivational shift toward those who need us and to 
whom we must now respond” (Beck, 1994, p. ix). As “caring” administrators it is our duty “to 
promote our friends‟ moral growth” (Noddings, 2002, p. 98) and this requires alerting colleagues 
and others to their unethical practices and providing an environment where teachers too will feel 
unafraid to speak to colleagues and superiors alike about unethical behaviour, their own and 
others. An ethic of care thus provides a different lens through which an educational 
administrator‟s decision-making process can be understood and provides a condition necessary 
for transforming schools into thriving living and learning ecosystems (Marshall, Patterson, 
Rogers & Steele, 1996) where teachers unafraid to apprise colleagues and superiors as to 
unethical aspects of their behaviour would be seen as caring professionals who open up 
possibilities for growth and change for colleagues rather than “tattletales” looking to mete out 
punishment. This is a notion we would do well to extend beyond the individual to all that is of 
the world, in the world. 
 
Although Kanter (1975, p. 43) points to the fact that institutions, schools included, seek to 
appoint administrators with “a tough-minded approach to problems; analytical abilities to 
abstract and plan; [as well as] a capacity to set aside personal, emotional considerations in the 
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interests of task accomplishment” – characteristics “assumed to belong to men” - Marshall 
(1992, p. 370) asserts that there is compelling evidence that the ways female school 
administrators view schooling, their approach to, their manner of prioritising and managing, as 
well as “structuring interactions” have “elements that hold great promise for improving school 
leadership”; that in fact we should not be training women “to fit within a male-defined decision-
making mode” (Marshall, 1992, p. 370). Rather should we not as Almond (1988, p. 42) proposes 
be using these feminine and feminist perspectives to “rewrite the map of morality to promote a 
separate moral perspective?” My answer would be a resounding yes as I explain and explore in 
the section that follows. 
 
5.3.1 Leadership and Gender 
Leadership theories conceptualised in the early 20th century were “presented as if gender-
neutral” (Klenke, 1996, p. 9). Yet as Klenke (1996, p. 9) rightly observes: 
traditionally, women were believed to lack the traits and behaviours considered 
prerequisites for effective leadership, traits such as aggression, competitiveness, 
dominance, Machiavellianism, ambition, and decisiveness. . . . qualities which typically 
have been missing from descriptions of women. (Klenke, 1996, p. 9) 
 
This is a conceptualisation sadly lacking in the notion of ethics as caring as introduced by 
Noddings in her seminal work of 1992. And it might have been acceptable in certain “cultural-
historical contexts” (Fricker, 2008, p. 70) when there was a “gap in collective understanding – a 
hermeneutical lacuna . . . owing to the relative powerlessness of [women]” (Fricker, 2008, p. 69) 
with respect to gender (Fricker, 2007, 2008) and the view that women‟s qualities were somehow 
inferior when it came to leadership in the workplace in general and schools in particular. Yet 
despite the fact a hermeneutical lacuna no longer exists with regards gender, gender prejudice 
remains alive and well in educational institutions (and others) with the epistemic injustice this 
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can and does perpetrate. This certainly begs the question as to whether my co-teacher and I (and 
the observation protocol used to assess us) discussed in the prologue to this chapter would have 
been treated in such an off-hand and derisive manner had we been male. 
 
In a study by Hall (1996) where she documents, describes and analyses “headship . . . as done by 
women” (Hall, 1996, p. 26), women leading schools in Britain, she appropriately argues that to 
challenge the current association of management with “masculinity and the autocratic control 
over others” (Hall, 1996, p. 5), educational leaders need to practice what she calls “critical 
leadership” (Hall. 1996, p. 5), a more feminine conceptualisation of leadership. This is leadership 
that not only seeks to but in fact “liberates rather than controls”, sees as its strength “its concern 
with ethics and morals” rather than exclusively “efficiency and means” (Hall. 1996, p. 5). She 
continues: 
It represents „power to‟ rather than „power over‟. Leadership and followership are 
interchangeable. The power of the individual leader is limited. The awareness of non-
dominant groups is raised. Finally, critical leadership stimulates organizational change 
through mutual education. (Hall, 1996, p. 5) 
 
It is a leadership that does the right thing for the right reason and with the right intent, with no 
thought of gain or emotional doubt or reluctance (Nussbaum, 1992), irrespective of pressures 
exerted on it to act differently. It is a leadership that is honest, fair, compassionate and 
courageous: traits that the majority of the world‟s population holds in high esteem, irrespective 
of race, class, culture or creed (Fenstermacher, 1990). And it regards as inherently wrong that 
which: “harms, deceives, manipulates, deprives, neglects, cheats, intimidates, and uses others for 




Marshall et al.‟s (1996) findings strongly suggest that in order for administrators to make 
decisions that sustain an ethic of care, they need to nurture the emotional health of individuals 
and the institution alike. As both social and moral agent (Murphy, 1992) as well as instructional 
leader, they need to establish connections and respond to needs in ways that synthesise the 
realities of their particular contexts yet also contribute to establishing a peaceful and congruent 
school culture: “living places that fit children” (Murphy, 1992, p. 130). Care is at the “forefront” 
of a caring and ethical administrator‟s mind when making decisions (Marshall, 1992; Marshall et 
al., 1996). 
 
5.4 The Ethical School: A Symbiotic Relationship 
An educational leader has an impact, for better or worse, on a school‟s culture (Klenke, 1996). 
Yet, as Klenke (1996, p. 18) argues, context defines the leadership process, moulds it:  
“Contextual factors set the boundaries with which leaders and followers interact and determine 
the constraints and demands that are put on leaders” and are both many and varied. They can 
include: the political, economic, socio-cultural as well as the historical as it pertains to the school 
and its geopolitical location as I discuss in Chapters 1 and 6. Yet often, as Campbell states in her 
study of administrators‟ decisions: “Fairness and equity are not used as [their] guiding principles, 
and . . . as a practicing teacher you have very little power” (E. Campbell, 1997, p. 253). 
Treatment such as this continues to be “not uncommon” (Campbell, 2003, p. 71) and is described 
by one teacher as “part of the unethics of administration” (Paul cited in Campbell, 2003, p. 71).  
 
In such school cultures, to stay out of trouble, teachers will often succumb, as do administrators, 
to the trap of “suspended morality” (Campbell, 2003, pp. 6, 92). They will compromise on or 
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abandon their own beliefs about what is right and wrong and justify they actions as a result of 
having no choice in the matter (Holmes, 1992; see also Piddocke, Magsino & Manley-Casimir, 
1997). However, to do so is to abdicate one‟s personal as well as professional responsibilities 
and thus abandon the professional discretion that comes with acting ethically (Holmes, 1992). 
 
Administrators and teachers alike also have a tendency to succumb to the notion of “the false 
memory trap” (Campbell, 1996, p. 72): to validate and excuse unethical or immoral behavior on 
the basis that it is “vital”, “crucial” or “essential” and to act in any other way would be 
catastrophic. However, as Piddocke, Magsino and Manley-Casimir (1997) sensibly observe both 
teachers and administrators, as members of a profession, have a moral obligation to “uphold the 
dignity of the profession by his/her actions” and a responsibility to “duly criticize the profession 
and its members when they fail to abide by the profession‟s own proper standards” (Piddocke, 
Magsino & Manley-Casimir, 1997, p. 224). Although the “tyranny of the group” (Malcolm, 
1973; Fricker, 2007) can weaken our commitment, our resolve and determination to do what we 
know is right (Boss, 1998; Fricker, 2007), anything less falls short of what it means to be an 
ethical educator and ethical person. 
 
As Campbell rightly concludes, there are: 
two clear roles for principals: to facilitate efforts by teachers to enhance and share ethical 
knowledge; and to ensure that their own behaviour, attitudes, decisions, and leadership 
practices contribute positively to an overall ethical environment rather than to a 
dysfunctional community that places little premium on professionalism and moral 
agency. (Campbell, 2003, p. 126) 
 
It is the duty of the ethical principal to connect people morally not only to each other but also to 
their work as teachers (Sergiovanni, 1994). It is the duty of the ethical principal to develop 
107 
 
“shared purposes, beliefs, values, and conceptions themed to teaching and learning, community 
building, collegiality, character development, and other school issues and concerns” 
(Sergiovanni, 1994, p. 7). And it is the duty of an ethical principal to consider his/her decisions, 
actions, attitudes, policies and procedures as well as his/her own personal proclivities from the 
standpoint of moral agency before foisting them on teachers and students alike. If, however, as 
Marshall (1992, p. 383) suggests, due to a serious lack of training in the moral and ethical 
approaches to decision-making (McKerrow, 1997), principals are making decisions based on 
“[s]eat-of-the-pants ethics” (Marshall, 1992, p. 383), an approach that uses intuition and 
experience rather than a real understanding and appreciation of the moral implications of 
decisions reached and actions taken, then this is an approach to ethics that simply “does not 
work; [but] gives us stressed administrators unable to make decisions with any sense of 
professional guidance or support” (Marshall, 1992, p. 383). This is untenable as “we cannot 
realistically hope to reinvigorate the moral climate of the schools . . . if schools are not managed 
ethically” (Reitz, 1998, p.49): where ethics is not at the forefront of the administering and 
governing. 
 
The ways of the playground where to “report a peer is regarded as a betrayal of the in-group 
member to the alien out-group authority” (Power, 1993, p. 153) belong in the playground where 
emotions are in the process of being educated and such beliefs need to be challenged. They are 
neither appropriate nor professional in the adult teaching world or the ethical school. 
 
5.5 A Moral Education 
Which brings us to the issue of whether a moral education could and would benefit teachers: 
“Might it not be advantageous for all educators, no matter what their job or where they work, to 
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become increasingly aware of the moral potency of their actions?” Jackson, Boostrom and 
Hansen (1993, p. 2) ask.  My answer would be a resounding yes. That is not to say that all 
teachers and administrators act unethically, rather, as Rose (1999, p. 97) suggests, drawing on 
Foucault, the freedom to act ethically may be more about an educator‟s “capacity to judge, 
accept or transform the practices that subjectify” her. Yet, as Jackson, Boostrom and Hansen 
(1993) imply, many teachers remain critically unaware of the ethical implications of their own, 
and others‟, actions and words, and are hence unable to transform those practices and systems 
that would subjectify them into ones that will free them. 
 
In applying Murris‟ notions of what teachers expect of children (Murris, 2013) to educators, it 
becomes apparent that teachers, as do children with teachers, present to administrators that which 
the latter want to hear and not necessarily what the teachers feel they want and need to 
communicate. Similarly, administrators present to school boards that which the board wants to 
hear rather than what needs to be said. As Murris (2013, p. 249) so cogently argues, there is “a 
deeper engrained epistemic orientation [in schools] that profoundly influences how we speak” as 
well as how and if we listen, for as Fiumara (1990, p. 8) points out, “in the absence of a radical 
reciprocal openness to listening „no genuine human relationship‟ exists.” In applying Murris‟ 
(2013, p. 248) concepts on children to teachers and administrators, it would appear that the sole 
capacity an administrator or board has to “hand out punishments influences and regulates” 
behaviours. Such passive epistemic injustice which Fricker (2007, p. 145) describes as the act of 
“wrongfully excluding” someone “from the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in a co-
operative practice of pooling information” and hence “from participation in the practice that 
defines the core of the very concept of knowledge” leads to systemic and systematic silencing of 
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teachers and administrators alike. We teachers are habituated to conform: moulded, transformed 
(Rabinow & Rose, 2003; MacBeath, 2010) to the “norm”. Thus teachers maintain a close 
scrutiny over their own lives, the source of power never visible: colonised and colonisers become 
one. From the “periphery” (Pratt, 2002), from a space of “not-belonging” (Said, 1978) the 
obscure becomes obvious. It is thus a teacher‟s critical awareness as to their moral agency and 
the behaviours that this implies that not only defines them as a moral teacher (Sockett, 1993) but 
also gives them the moral courage to act. 
 
As stated previously, knowing is not yet acting. The need for teachers in international schools to 
define themselves as an ethical profession and act accordingly is long overdue. It will take 
courage and determination to achieve. However, as Stenhouse (cited in Rudduck, 1988, p. 35) so 
pointedly remarked: “It is teachers who, in the end, will change the world of the school by 
understanding it” and I would add by acting on that understanding in a moral, ethical and timely 
manner. With this study and this story I hope to provoke teachers in the international school 
community to think: “That could be my story.” I do not want to provoke empathy but to ask “for 
us to become critically conscious of our subject-positions in the ongoing practices of denial” 
(Kennedy, 2001, p. 130). I hope it serves to bring these teachers together, “emotionally binding” 
them together, as Richardson (1990, p. 26) would say, and offering the potential for both “social 
action” and “societal transformation” (Richardson, 1990, p. 26) in the international school 
domain. For as Barad (in interview with Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 69) states: “Matters 




CHAPTER 6: THE APPARATUSES OF CONFLICT 
 
6.1 Introduction 
What constitutes an apparatus (Foucault, 1977) of conflict, an “apparatus of bodily production” 
(Haraway, 1994, p. 62), cannot be known prior to “engaging in the always messy projects of 
description, narration, intervention, inhabiting, conversing, exchanging, and building” (Haraway, 
1994, p. 62) of a phenomenon such as conflict. Nor can the relative importance of any one 
apparatus to a particular social practice such as conflict within a particular international school 
be known prior to the enactment of the practice itself.  For according to Foucault (1980b, p. 39) 
power is not imposed from outside an event but becomes apparent in the power relationships that 
develop within the event itself: “within the social body, rather than from above it.” These are 
relationships that Foucault (1984/1997, p. 292) defines as: ones “in which one person tries to 
control the conduct of another. . . . [but where] there must be at least a certain degree of freedom 
on both sides” for without such freedom there can be no power relationship at all, only 
domination. As such it requires placing the event, the enacted practice, in a unique position at a 
unique time within the four dimensions of space and time in order to render visible the 
apparatuses deployed, and how they were deployed to constitute a certain phenomenon, a certain 
subject; as such it is to render visible the discursive practices and social relations of a particular 
community involved in so doing. As such in this chapter I will be returning to specific moments 
in time and space as they relate to the conflict, to specify particular apparatuses that became 
entangled in the phenomenon of conflict at this one particular international school, how they 




6.1.1 England & Hong Kong: 1990s through to the early 2000s 
Although the conflict took place August 2006 through to September 2008 the historicity of the 
administrators involved in the conflict as well as that of the school itself had a marked impact on 
how the conflict arose, evolved, was handled and ultimately “resolved”. As such it requires that 
we examine the literature pertaining to the 1990s and 2000s during which time the principal15 
and deputy principal16 were administrators in England in the public sector to understand what 
neo-liberalist policies and practices and other apparatuses had produced in terms of 
administrators with respect to the “leadership” and the management of teachers in general and of 
conflict in particular; and to see how this understanding interacts with what it means to be an 
ethical educational leader as discussed in the previous chapter. For the fact that the principal 
emerged from his time within the public education sector as a recognised “Beacon School17” 
leader in England can be misleading implying that he was exemplary not only in terms of the 
technical knowledge required to lead a school but also in the practical wisdom (phronesis) 
required in the moral work of leading teachers and students.  
 
It also important that within this particular space and time we situate the school itself within its 
own historicity, the hand-over of Hong Kong by the United Kingdom to the People‟s Republic of 
China in 1997, an event that brought into being serious political and economical ramifications 
for the school and those employed by it, creating a pervading culture of insecurity and fear 
among staff about the future of the school, Hong Kong and themselves. As such I turn to a 
                                                        
15I use the term “principal” to mean the head of the school which in British literature is used interchangeably with 
the terms headteacher and head. 
16The term “deputy headteacher/principal” in the English literature is synonymous with the term “assistant 
principal” used in US literature. For clarity and ease of reading I will refer to the position throughout this study as 
deputy principal. 
17
 A Beacon School was a government designated award given to “outstanding” primary and secondary schools 
in England and Wales from the late 1990s until the mid 2000s. The programme purported to identify schools that 
were “beacons” of “good practice” and funded them to share “effective” practice with other schools. 
112 
 
review and re view of the literature, a reflection on the literature, as it pertains to Hong Kong and 
the UK 1996 through 2004, in order to situate this autoethnographical study of conflict in an 
international school within its own socio-historical educational context. I do this advisedly 
believing that as Haraway (as cited in Richardson, 1990, p. 27), so cogently argues: “There is no 
view from „nowhere,‟ the authorless text. There is no view from „everywhere,‟ except for God. 
There is only a view from „somewhere,‟ an embodied, historically and culturally situated 
speaker” that speaks within the framework of a particular community, a particular conflict. 
  
I begin my discussion of the literature as it relates to leadership and education with a section on 
Hong Kong circa 1990s, where the conflict took place and then move on to sections that cover 
the role of school administrators in England and Wales as both the principal and deputy principal 
in this study hailed from the UK. They had both been administrators (1996-2001 and 2002-2004 
respectively) in the public sector in England at a time when the public education system had been 
dominated for several decades by state prescription (Fullan, 2003) and where “efficiency” and 
“effectiveness” were seen as hallmarks of an “outstanding” (Office for Standards in Education 
[Ofsted], 2007, p.25) school and leadership, terms that smack of the “factory floor” (Kelly, 2004, 
p. 42) that view schools as “teaching shops” (Kelly, 2004, p. 42) and administrators as managers 
hired to ensure that “value for money” (Kelly, 2004, pp. 55, 170) is assured.  
 
6.2 Hong Kong, an International School, the 1990s 
China and Hong Kong have been at the forefront of the proliferation in the number of 
“international” (Caffyn, 201118) schools (Brummitt, 2007, 2009b19) offering local families an 
                                                        
18Caffyn (2011) suggests such schools are “artificial structures placed in complex environments with a diverse 
populace. They cannot create consensus because they are too diverse” (p. 66). 
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English-medium education. The enforcement of mother-tongue education in Hong Kong 
(Cheung, 2008; Lin, 1998a, 1998b; Morris, 1996; Slater, 1998; Wong, 2000) in 1997 by the 
Hong Kong government meant that local schools, which had previously been free to choose their 
language of instruction, were designated either Chinese-medium or English-medium. The 
Chinese-medium schools tended to be labeled as “inferior” by local parents and found it hard to 
attract students (Cheung, 2008; Morris, 1996, 2004; Wong, 2000). According to Slater (1998), 
Wong (1993) and Wong (2000), the English-medium schools had strict admission requirements 
and many students, given their levels of academic English and Chinese, found it hard to gain 
access to one of these schools, considered elite because of the native-like fluency of the students‟ 
English language skills (both social and academic) as well as their fluency (written and spoken) 
in Chinese.  Local parents then turned to the international school sector in search of schools that 
offered English-medium instruction for many of these schools not only provided an English-
medium education but very often support for those students who had a language other than 
English as a mother tongue. One of the cheapest and often easiest ways for a local family to gain 
access to an English-medium education was to apply to one of the Tepapawei International 
Schools (TIS) Group of schools which in the years prior to the 1997 hand-over of Hong Kong 
was struggling to fill its schools. By the time I arrived at TISS in August 1996, approximately 
25% of the student population was both ESOL and local Chinese yet the school was still 
contracting with teachers‟ jobs on the line. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
19There are currently around 5,000 international schools worldwide with an associated expatriate teaching staff of 
around 250,000 predicted to grow to 10, 000 schools and 500,000 teachers by 2020 (Brummitt, 2007, 2009b). 
According to the web site http://www.iscresearch.com/ (April, 2008), of the 1,375 English medium international 
schools that opened in 2008, 50.4% of these were in Asia. 
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With the run-up to the hand-over of Hong Kong from the British to the People‟s Republic of 
China in 1997, many expatriates had left Hong Kong taking their children with them, children 
who had filled many of the places at the TIS schools both at primary and secondary level. Their 
school fees had been subsidised by the Hong Kong government under a special ordinance to 
cover Native English Speaking (NES) students who were unable to access the curriculum at 
many of the local schools that taught in Chinese or a mixed code of Cantonese and English. Now 
the children of local middle class and well-to-do families who could not gain access to a local 
English-medium school or international school with stricter entrance requirements for non-native 
English speakers had the option of attending one of the most “prestigious” (Hayden & 
Thompson, 1998) educational establishments in Hong Kong at a minimal price as the substantial 
subsidy provided to TIS by the Hong Kong government (approximately 30% of fees charged per 
student) would remain in place after the hand-over.  
 
The English as an Additional Language (EAL20) admissions test for the secondary schools was 
basic21 and allowed for an influx of local students into the TIS schools who had neither the 
academic abilities in English necessary for “success” within the TIS system nor the desire to 
assimilate into the English National Curriculum school culture that was on offer. That the TIS 
did not see it as part of their remit, neither a moral obligation nor even an instrumental one, to 
provide these students with the language support (both English and mother tongue) necessary for 
them to realise their full potential within the system was not only negligent but unethical, an 
                                                        
20 EAL (“English as an Additional Language”) is used in the UK in lieu of ESOL (“English to Speakers of Other 
Languages”) and ESL (“English as a Second Language”) the more generally used terms at international schools. 
21The test comprised a set of short non-academic-like sentences which required a verb (provided) to be inserted 
using the correct tense. A short interview where the student was asked general questions about their lives, eg., where 
do you come from., was also administered. The test was the same irrespective of whether the student was aged 11 or 
older, applying for admission to a year 7 or year 10 level of entry. Admission to A level courses was based on the 




unwillingness to respond to the needs of both staff and students alike. That TIS teachers were 
neither trained nor experienced in teaching ESOL students compounded the issues and was a 
recipe for disaster for students and teachers alike, evaluated as both would be on their external 
examination results that would mark both teachers and students as successes or failures, included 
or excluded by the practice of normative evaluation. 
 
The TIS primary schools fared no better than the TIS secondary schools as they continued to 
accept students with the most rudimentary of English language skills in order to “put bums on 
seats22”. As with the TIS secondary schools, these schools also failed to provide the most 
rudimentary of language support, both English and mother tongue, for these students, failed to 
train their teaching staff the basics of ESOL support, yet readily accepted the financial gain these 
students provided. However, given that TIS could not meet the ever-increasing demand for an 
English-medium education by the local population and had in addition already put in place more 
rigorous admission tests23 with a view to cutting language support costs for those whose mother 
tongue was not English by excluding students who did not possess a certain level of English 
language skills, the number of international schools offering an English-medium education to a 
local and “returnee24” clientele grew dramatically and with it the demand for native English 
speaking teachers and administrators, the majority of which came from the UK. Bates (2011) 
states that international schools will need to recruit approximately 250,000 extra teachers from 
English speaking education systems, mainly UK and American, over the next decade if they are 
                                                        
22Personal communication from TIS teachers. 
23 This was based on a cost effectiveness evaluation leading to the admission of ESOL students that would not 
require substantial language support. 
24 These were local Chinese families that had immigrated to English speaking countries prior to the hand-over in 
1997 but who had returned post 1997 when they saw that stability had been maintained. The children spoke neither 
their “mother‟ tongue” Cantonese nor English fluently and had poor literacy skills in both Chinese and English.  
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to meet the demand of the estimated 4.9 million students Brummitt (2007, 2009a, 2009b) expects 
will be enrolled by them over the next 5-10 years. 
 
This influx of non-native English speakers with poor academic literacy skills, both in English 
and their “mother” tongue, did not sit well with a TISS teaching staff that was used to a student 
body that not only had excellent academic skills in English but also understood and was a party 
to the British colonial culture of the school25. That these ESOL students were subsequently 
blamed by staff for the school‟s sudden decline in examination results (in all subject areas except 
mathematics, physics and chemistry) was not surprising given the antagonism with which they 
were viewed by many teachers and administrators alike. Yet teachers had only to look to 
themselves to understand that much of what they were “teaching” was not being “learnt” for the 
sole reason that there was very little effort being made to make the information 
“comprehensible” (Krashen, 1982/2009; see also Carder, 2002) and hence accessible to non-
native English speakers. They had only to look to the administration not solely for having caused 
the “problem” but more importantly for not having provided them with the appropriate support 
(at the appropriate time and for appropriate reason): the training necessary if they were to 
provide these students with the best education possible. The fact that it can take up to 7 years for 
an ESOL student to become proficient in academic English (Carder, 2002) was lost on many of 
the teaching staff. The fact that the school was still contracting, despite it having taken on close 
to 200 ESOL students (almost 30% of the total student population) during the previous two 
years, meant that teachers‟ jobs were still on the line. The upshot of this was that if your teaching 
contract came up for renewal at a time when there was a need to cut a member of staff  then you 
would be terminated, irrespective of circumstance, length of  tenure. As such the fear, anxiety 
                                                        
25Personal communication from the Head of the English Curriculum Group for the TIS Group, June 1997. 
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and the anger generated by this situation which to teachers appeared beyond their control was a 
palpable presence in the classrooms and staffroom. The ESOL student became the object of their 
anger and fear: the scapegoat no less. For poor examination results meant that local parents, 
fixated as they were with these results, would look to other schools to which to send their 
children thereby causing a drop in student enrolment and further contraction and job loss for the 
school and more importantly the staff: the effect of “social power” which according to Fricker 
(2007, p. 13) following Foucault is “a practically socially situated capacity to control others‟ 
actions” actively or passively, solely structurally or through social agents. Divide and conquer 
has for millennia been the provenance of power, a tried and tested formula for its success (Trinh, 
1988). 
 
It was in such circumstances that the Head of English (HoE) at TISS took it upon himself on the 
eve of the British handover of Hong Kong to the Chinese to address the TISS teaching staff on 
the issue of language use at TISS.  In a “paper” titled The State of English at TISS, the Head of 
English started his polemic, a clearly racialised reading on the use of languages other than 
English, with a scathing attack on the quality of students‟ English at the school, stating that 
during his tenure proficiency had deteriorated drastically due to the fact that the school was not 
enforcing its “English-only” policy – a policy which was in fact non-existent. His proposal: that 
we enforce the policy irrespective of the fact that students had in fact voted (the previous year) to 
be allowed to use their mother tongue, responsibly and with consideration for others who might 
not understand. Elaborating further on this positivist and neo-colonial stance, he extolled the 
virtues of an English-only policy: how it would improve examination results; would be lauded by 
parents and teachers alike, and more importantly would  stop the “pervasive alienation” he stated 
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was currently occurring among the school body, positing that the “neutrality” of English would 
diffuse any “petty divisions” that could arise among different ethnic groups with national 
passions “inflamed” by the use of different languages. If an English-only policy were not 
enforced, it would, he warned, be just one “short step” from this Tower of Babel to all kinds of 
bullying that the staff would find very difficult to deal with. 
 
His polemic served to expose the extent to which neo-colonialist and positivist views were (and 
continue to be) entrenched within the TISS system couched in the paternalistic and autocratic 
language of the neo-colonial, not only within this particular school but also within the wider 
organisation. It painted a picture of an organisation arrogant and secure in its own knowledge 
with little use for what others, who disagree, have to offer to the pool of knowledge or even 
information, an organisation that views diversity as a “problem to be managed rather than 
engaged with” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 191) and celebrated. As such it is an organisation that hires 
“leaders” whose ideology resonates with that of the status quo and expects teachers to tow the 
line and not rock the boat. 
 
In light of his “paper”, my response sought to demystify the notion that the use of a mother 
tongue was detrimental, interfered with the learning of another language and was disruptive and 
divisive. I stated that there was compelling evidence that speaking one‟s mother tongue neither 
interfered with nor caused regression of a second language already acquired; rather it had a 
direct, positive and significant impact on Second Language Acquisition (SLA). I suggested that 
from purely pragmatic considerations we should seek to encourage rather than proscribe a 
student‟s use of their mother tongue, to even go so far as to provide them with support in this 
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endeavour, as it could only benefit the English language outcome for them and the school. I 
argued that any English-only language policy, whether written or unwritten, formal or informal, 
spoken or unspoken, that sought to deny students the right to use their mother tongue was not 
only seriously misguided with regards SLA but also highly questionable ethically for to deny a 
student their mother tongue was to deny them access to their own ethnocultural identity. 
 
I ended my response as follows: 
To believe that English is a „neutral‟ language is naïve. It is as ideologically encumbered 
as any other language and „has ideological as well as behavioral and econo-technical 
consequences‟ (Phillipson, 1992). And if our aim is to empower rather than assimilate 
ESOL students, value what they bring rather than denigrate it, then introducing a 
reductionist educational policy of English only is not the way forward.  For many, if not 
most, of these students call Hong Kong home and as such the need for them to be 
bilingual (if not trilingual given the eminent handover of Hong Kong to the Mainland), 
bi-literate and bicultural should be obvious, rather than a semi-lingual with no language 
to call a metaphorical home. As such honouring and observing the rights of these 
students to maintain and develop their mother tongues implies at the collective level their 
right to be different, their right to exist (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994) within the current 
framework of Hong Kong law. At the individual level it implies a right to identify 
positively with their mother tongue and have it accepted and respected by us and others 
(Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994) – a basic human right. 
 
 
There had been a scribbled note at the top of my copy of the paper from the Head of English 
stating: “Carmen, I know we see eye to eye on this and so I will go ahead and put a copy in 
everyone‟s pigeon-hole26”. This was despite the fact that he was well aware of my views on the 
issue as I had made them perfectly clear to both him and the teaching staff on numerous 
occasions. The use of the term “we” was no doubt an attempt to make me complicit, the note a 
written verbal equivalent of a hand on the shoulder to ensure compliance, a reminder of a female 
teacher‟s commitment to the collective, her subordinate position to male teachers (Bartky, 1996; 
                                                        
26A pigeon hole is a small post box, generally in the staff room, with one assigned to each and every teacher for 
internal and external mail and communications. 
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Shotwell, 2011) and the “internally coercive power that this sort of „we-attitude‟ can have” 
(Fricker, 2012, p. 300). At almost the same time that the TISS HoE was penning these words, 
Edward Said was “revisioning” (Richardson, 1997, p. 299) his time spent at Victoria College, 
Cairo in the 1940s where: 
the school‟s first rule, emblazoned on the opening page of the handbook, read: „English is 
the language of the school; students caught speaking any other language will be 
punished.‟ Yet there were no native English-speakers among the students. Whereas the 
masters were all British, we were a motley crew of Arabs of various kinds, Armenians, 
Greeks, Italians, Jews and Turks, each of whom had a native language that the school had 
explicitly outlawed. Yet all, or nearly all, of us spoke Arabic – many spoke Arabic and 
French – and so we were able to take refuge in a common language in defiance of what 
we perceived as an unjust colonial stricture. (Said, 1998, p. 3) 
 
It would appear that little had changed in the intervening 50 years in educational attitudes at 
British schools overseas, the apparatus involved in both situations very much alive; for the 
HoE‟s ability to present racialised views in the guise of an ethic of care was the voice of ghosts 
past, present, and future of racialised, colonial and neo-colonial patriarchs in their interactions 
with the „Other‟, students and teachers as other: the „[n]ot you/[l]ike you‟ of Trihn T. Minh-ha‟s 
post-colonial world which presumes that a “clear dividing line . . . between I and not-I” (Trinh, 
1988, para. 1) can be drawn, for the students are not white, not from a Western background and 
not native speakers of English; the teacher‟s background is equally suspect having been brought 
up bi-culturally and bi-lingually with a Cuban mother and an English father. Drawing on 
Foucault (1980a) and his theory that it is the discursive that produces specific and local relations 
of power allows for the patriarchal voice of the HoE to define what is in the students‟ best 
interests. Yet at this border, this liminal place where “everything happens” (Deleuze, 1969/1990, 
p. 9), the HoE‟s paper and my response becomes an engagement of the human (HoE, me, others 
that think like us, the students, the staff) and the non human (schools both international and 
national, neo-liberalist and neo-colonial policies, as well as notions of and policies on second 
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language learning, gender, race, class, age) that is triggered by a perceived potential loss of 
power and which places students and certain staff in the shadows and in the margins of school 
life. With this one act the HoE and his “paper” also positions the administration as culpable for 
any future possible shortfall in examination results, any and all teaching deficiencies having been 
split and projected (Dunning et al., 2005) onto the administrators as their failure to enforce the 
language policy of the school. It also positions the HoE and the staff firmly in the winners‟ seat. 
 
6.3 The Role of School Administrators in Public Education: England & Wales 
1980s/1990s/early 2000s 
6.3.1 Introduction 
Literature pertaining to the era when both the TISS principal and deputy principal were public 
school administrators in England (1996-2004) such as Fullan (2003), Hoy, Bayne-Jardine & 
Wood (2000) and the PricewaterhouseCoopers27 (2007) study, makes clear that there were a 
growing number of issues associated with school administrators and administration in England 
and Wales, not least the lack of capacity and critical self awareness of school leaders about their 
leadership practices, the entrenched prescriptive nature of both administrative and teaching 
practices and the systems that supported them. This interplay between policies, practices, bodies 
(government ministries and organisations, public schools, government administrators, policy 
makers as well as school leaders and teachers) resulted in leaders that lead very much by the 
book – the government “book” of neo-liberalism. As such issues arise when administrators from 
contexts such as these move overseas to take up senior positions at international schools where 
                                                        
27The project management group for the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study (2007) on school leadership 
commissioned by the UK Government Department for Education and Skills (DfES) consisted of officials from: the 
DfES, the National College for School Leadership (NCSL) and an observer from the School Teachers‟ Review Body 
(STRB). The study involved extensive surveys of school leaders, their leadership teams, and teachers using a 
criterion-referenced set of survey items. 
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apparatuses such as transience, diversity and a lack of accountability to a higher “disinterested” 
authority such as a local and/or other government office (Hayden, 2006) which is no part of the 
administrative or governing bodies, are part of the terrain.  
 
In the case of the particular administrators associated with this study, they both came from a 
system that viewed leaders as “the initiator and innovator” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190) of 
organisational change within the school, change designed to align with predetermined 
managerial outcomes: a system where teachers were expected to be loyal irrespective of any 
personal conflict they might have over professional issues of “equity and care” (Blackmore, 
2006b, p. 190; see also Schmuck, Hollingsworth, & Lock, 2002). They came from an educational 
terrain where mainstream educational research had enabled the depoliticisation of education and 
schools at a time when both were becoming highly political in nature (Blackmore, 2006b). This 
panopticonic aspect of teachers‟ lives had ensured within the UK not only compliance by 
teachers to the norm but also habituation of teachers and administrators to that norm. In addition 
the increased flows of population during the 1990s across and within countries combined with 
the “rapid internationalization” of education had “produced a cultural diversity that required 
schools [to] be more responsive through individualised pedagogy and [an] inclusive curriculum” 
(Blackmore, 2006b, p. 191). Within this new framework for the management of schools, 
“diversity was seen to be a problem to be managed rather than engaged with as productive” 
(Blackmore, 2006b, p. 191) and leadership an instrument through which the notion of education 




As such a move overseas by administrators emergent from terrains such as these can serve to 
exacerbate and magnify the issues such systems have by “exporting” them intact, transplanting 
“knowledge” and practices so to speak rather than grafting/amending them, with principals and 
deputy principals “leading” very much as they did in their home country. This ignores the fact 
that knowledge, educational as well as other, although presented as reflecting reality is rather a 
practice of intervention (Barad, 2011), a situated reconfiguring of the world rather than a 
metaphysical presence (Barad, 2011). It also ignores the fact that an overseas environment can be 
far more complex than the home environment and the school viewed as a “deliberative” 
(Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) democratic institution where agreement is negotiated and “informed 
by a professional ethics of democratic accountability” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 194) rather than 
autocratically imposed by administrators. For leadership, to quote Blackmore (2006b, p. 194) is 
“a situated, social and collective practice undertaken by different people, informally and 
formally, differently in different contexts”: a complex interplay of apparatuses such as 
institutional policies and practices, the discourses of gender and professional status within the 
school, political and economic forces, the details of the personal as well as professional lives, as 
well as many other factors.  
 
As such international schools as institutions of great diversity require productive engagement 
rather than mere management (Blackmore, 2006b) if power struggles over the focal point that is 
the school are to be resolved collectively and in ways that are socially just. For these are 
institutions where emotions can be “valued performatorily” different across “different national 
cultures and across ethnicity and gender” (Fineman, 2004, p. 730) yet where difference needs to 
be viewed as an exploration of  “a different terrain of consciousness . . . a terrain in which clear 
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cut divisions and dualistic oppositions such as . . . masculine vs feminine, may serve as departure 
points for analytical purpose but are no longer satisfactory if not entirely untenable to the critical 
mind” (Trinh, 1988, para. 4). These are terrains where how we feel becomes as important as 
what we think and do (Hochschild, 1990) to the outcome of interactions within the school. The 
leader who approaches such complex terrains unaware of and/or unprepared to engage with the 
diversity that exists across the many domains within an international school (as discussed in 
previous chapters), who comes with ready-made managerial solutions for “foreign” situations – a 
product of previous ethico-political educational experiences - then the possibility of resultant 
power struggles and conflict remains high. For such an approach is to view the international 
school as a territory to be colonised, the teachers as natives to be subjectified, and the 
administrators as paternalistic neo-imperial colonisers.  
 
6.3.2 The Principal 
6.3.2.1 Introduction 
The 1980s and 1990s saw the rapid implementation of neo-liberal policies in response to the 
escalation in “flows of people, money, goods, images and ideas” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190). 
This was particularly the case in the UK, New Zealand and Australia (Blackmore, 2006b) with 
schools viewed as part of the market place and education a product-based enterprise, strictly 
controlled however by the state through the “strong accountability requirements of outcomes-
based education and performance management” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190). Discourses of 
“choice, competition and accountability” replaced those of “equity, comprehensiveness and co-
operation” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190), with the “discourse of choice” reduced to “rights” rather 
than “needs”, supplanting the social liberalist notion of “collective interests” with the 
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“competitive individualism” of neo-liberalism (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 190; see also Kelly, 2004). 
This resulted in a dramatic change in the way in which students were viewed. Whereas 
previously the assumption had been that all students were capable of learning and entitled to 
access all of “life‟s goodies” (Blackmore, 2006a, p. 182) irrespective of “differences”, and that 
this would require extra resources as well as time to achieve, students were now viewed as 
needing to “fit into economical imperatives, be „polished up‟ in a particular way” (Blackmore, 
2006a, p. 182). And if teachers failed to demonstrate this with appropriate student outcomes on 
standardised testing, testing which did not take into account the diversity of a school‟s student 
population, within the required timeframe, then they would be held responsible and the school 
deemed to be a “failing school” and its students failures. This perpetual positioning of schools, 
teachers and students as failures irrespective of the fact that their achievements may have been 
substantial relative to where they started can lead to “self-perpetuating cycles of despair” 
(Blackmore, 2011, p. 222), fear and anxiety: “stress and distress” (Blackmore, 2011, p. 222). It is 
also a stark example of what social power can enable in the production of identity prejudice, with 
particular social groups at once stereotyped, stigmatised and unable to understand their own 
social positioning (Fricker, 2007, p. 13-14) as academic failures. And for those concerned with 
social justice, it leads to the ethical struggle between “what it is right to do rather than . . . what it 
is good to be” (Taylor, 1989, p. 3), for it is undoubtedly better in terms of self interest to comply 
but what of the demands of social justice for colleagues and students alike (Blackmore, 2011)? 
 
Governmental neo-liberal policies focused on effectiveness and quality have continued to 
influence educational policy in the UK for over two decades primarily due to the fact that they 
easily align themselves with the notion of the self-managing school, isolated and seen as a 
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“discrete unit”, with “leadership as the solution to „underperforming schools‟” in the 1990s 
(Blackmore, 2014, p. 504), teachers as the solution to underperforming students in the 2000s 
(Hattie, 2008) and  “effective” schools as having identical attributes irrespective of terrain: the 
context and/or demographic (Thomson, 2002), with the end goal being to “out-source” public 
educational systems (Blackmore, 2014). 
 
Yet in 2003 at a time when leadership had become synonymous with the notion of reform in self-
managed schools, with “innovation and change” (Blackmore, 2011, p. 210), the UK government 
was still seeking to improve the “quality” of school leadership as a system focused on relentless 
structural change had not brought about the predicted changes in student outcomes 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007).  It took an “outsider” to the British system to point out that to 
move from an age of “prescription” to one of “professionalism” in the area of educational 
leadership would be no easy task as: “it takes capacity to build capacity,” and if there is little 
capacity initially then it is foolhardy to believe that a “move” to “professionalism” provides the 
foundations of a new way forwards (Fullan, 2003, p. 7). 
 
That the recruitment process for principals in the UK was and continues to be: 
characterised by variable rigour, the application of instinct and „gut feel‟, a lack of 
foresight to future needs, a lack of knowledge about statutory requirements and standards, 
and a rush to advertise spurred by fear of delays in appointment. (National College for 
School Leadership [NCSL], 2006, p. 4) 
 
ensures that the recruitment of the leader of the school, one of the defining positions, was and 





6.3.2.2 Role and Responsibilities of the Principal in England & Wales 
The primary role and responsibility of a principal is leadership and management (Kruchov, 
MacBeath & Riley, 1998, p. xi); however it is quality and effectiveness that are the key measures 
in England and Wales by which they were and continue to be judged.  The origins of the 
National Standards for Headteachers in England (Department for Education and Employment 
[DfEE], 2000; Department for Education and Skills [DfES], 2004; Teacher Training Agency 
[TTA], 1997) with its emphasis on quality and effectiveness can be traced back to the 1990s and 
the transfer of Deming‟s ideas on “quality management”, “quality control” and “quality 
assurance” from the business/factory floor to the educational setting. Deming‟s ideas did not 
survive the transfer intact, losing as they did his notion of “philosophy of moral action that 
regards organizations as systems subject to variation” (Holt, 2000, p. 2), a concept of quality “of 
what it is good to do” (Holt, 2000, p. 2) and reminiscent of Aristotle‟s own view of practical 
wisdom. It instead gave rise to the notion that all you have to do is “collect data at each [key] 
stage, optimize it and wait for the desired” (Holt, 2000, p. 3) result to emerge at the end of the 
line. This assumes that if the performance benchmarks are defined and observed (Holt, 2000, p. 
3) at specific stages then quality will naturally result (Deming, 1994). Nothing could be further 
from the truth (Holt, 2000; MacBeath, 2000; Winch, 1996). As Holt (2000, p. 3) points out: 
“Painting by numbers cannot reproduce a Monet.” The quality resides in the product and is 
unique to that product: “Quality stems from the way in which the product takes shape as it moves 
through the system; it resists hierarchy and eludes determinism” (Holt, 2000, p. 3). As such, the 
“capacity of any system to generate quality” (Holt, 2000, p. 5) defies numerical measurement. 




The notion that a school that does well on exams, meeting targets and standards set, possesses 
quality is also flawed as with the push for accountability, the relentless pursuit of targets and 
results, teachers “begin to treat understanding as a luxury they cannot afford” (MacBeath, 2000; 
see also Mullen, Holt, Shaw & Parratt, 2000). The pursuit of quality therefore becomes reduced 
to items such as: teaching to the test, the transference and imposition of out-of-context “best 
practice” and the relentless ticking of tick boxes in the assessment of teachers and students alike 
by senior and other “leaders”, intent on their school emerging or remaining at the top of the 
market place, the league tables28, thus ensuring that they retain their own positions (Blackmore, 
2006a, 2011; Holt, 2000; MacBeath, 2000). It would appear that “[t]he curriculum may be 
impoverished, yet still satisfy the demands of accountability” (Holt, 2000, p. 4). In other words: 
the accountable school may in fact lack quality (Winch, 1996). Schools however require, “inspire 
a different sense of a-count-ability, a different arithmetic, a different calculus of response-
ability” (Barad, 2014, p. 178). It requires/inspires the return of those excluded: a return to needs 
rather than rights. 
 
With a focus on quality in the educational sector came an equal focus, if not fixation, by the UK 
government on the notion of school effectiveness – Orchard (2007) correctly states that the third 
edition of the National Standards for Headteachers in England (DfES, 2004) refers to 
“effectiveness” twenty-three times in the space of three pages – a fixation that can be traced back 
to the Blair government of 1997 when:  
It took upon itself responsibility for delivery, in effect treating the education system as a 
large company producing goods. For this it needed a measurable product and it chose to 
regard test and examination results as the equivalent of the barrels of oil extracted by a 
petroleum company. . . . Targets were set for test and exam scores against which the 
                                                        
28 Schools in England and Wales are awarded points as to their formal exam results and then ranked in a league table 
of academic results for schools that is published annually.  
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performance of schools would be judged, with the obvious corollary that unproductive 
units in these terms became candidates for closure. (Smithers & Robinson, 2007, p. 2) 
 
As such the notion of school effectiveness would appear to be as equally impoverished as that of 
school accountability (Holt, 2000; Hoy et al., 2000; MacBeath, 2000) as “we can make the trains 
run on time,” – “which is what effective school research is all about” (Holt, 2000 p. 5) – “but if 
they do not go where we want them to go, why bother?”(Postman, 1996, p. 61; see also Gregg, 
2011). Education as such can inhabit either end of the “quality” spectrum from the low end of 
attainment and tactical learning to the high end of understanding, metacognition, learning skills 
and strategies where paradoxically a focus on understanding produces deeper meaning/learning, 
integration into memory and ultimately higher standards (Hoy, Bayne-Jardine, & Wood, 2000, p. 
13; see also Ball, 1999; MacBeath, 2000). However the notion that “effectiveness” can lead to 
“quality” in education ignores the fact that this notion is dependent on a particular view of what 
“quality” in education entails (Orchard, 2007, pp. 2-4; see also Winch, 1996) and what a 
“quality” education looks like. It also ignores the fact, as Reid (as cited in Holt, 2000, p. 5 ) has 
commented, that “the term „effective‟ is devoid of moral content”, and as such an inappropriate 
term to apply to education if by that we mean schooling as opposed to mere training: “Cheap 
liquor is effective. We do not say that a good bottle of vintage claret is effective” (Reid, 1997, p. 
216). The term also cannot speak to “the real internal character of a school” (Mullen, Holt, Shaw 
& Parratt, 2000, p. 448) focused as it is solely on the differences between inputs and outputs. It 
cannot speak to the needs of a child as opposed to the rights of a child and as such confuses “the 
„thin‟ democracy of markets and managerialism” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) with the 
“deliberative democracy” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) of social justice. As such good leadership 
and management, Orchard (2011, p. 2) suggests, might have more to do with “professional 
judgement” and “practical wisdom” than notions of quality management, quality control and 
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quality assurance, and the associated effectiveness implied, transplanted as “best practice” from 
the commercial and industrial sectors intact. Yet the notion of effectiveness “continues to exert 
considerable influence on educational policy in Britain however as a form of captured discourse” 
(Ball cited in Orchard, 2007, p. 3).  
 
And it is this view of “quality” and “effectiveness” in education that the TISS principal and 
deputy principal transplanted and imposed as “best practice” from England to the school with 
their arrival at TISS, attempting to control and shape through these apparatuses not only how we 
teachers should teach but also what we should feel and how we should express those emotions 
(Bartky, 1986; Jaggar & Boddo, 1989; Winograd, 2003). Rather than acknowledge that the 
emotions form an integral part of the warp and woof of our social and thus by implication our 
teaching practices (Hochschild, 1990), they instead stripped these practices bare of all but those 
emotions valued by their administration: fear, anxiety, and shame. And for those teachers “who 
fail[ed] to measure up” (Fineman, 2004, p. 725) on emotions both prescribed and proscribed by 
the powers-that-be the consequences were dire. 
 
Together the academic “straitjacket[s]” of the National Standards for Headteachers and the 
National Curriculum for England and Wales have conspired over the past two decades to 
“fostering mediocrity” and eradicating quality (Holt, 2000, p. 9). Unfortunately on being 
transplanted to TISS intact they enacted the same consequences. A focus on “excellence” to the 
exclusion of all else and the use of instrumental practices for organisational ends are as 
Blackmore (2006b, p. 197) states “inadequate normative bases to inform ethical judgements.” 
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And ethics are not an “optional extra” (Blackmore, 2006b, p. 197) when it concerns educational 
leaders, leadership, teachers, and schools. 
 
6.3.2.3 Principal Attributes 
In a study of effective school leadership (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998), of the skills, 
knowledge, qualities and traits the principals (from Denmark, England and Scotland) interviewed 
found most important to being a good principal was: the ability “to resolve conflict” (Reeves, 
Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 33). In the top 29 categories, coming in at numbers 6, 7 and 9 were: 
“Courage and the ability to confront difficult situations”; “Being concerned and able to help 
people to develop professionally and personally” and “[b]eing able to handle/manage people 
well” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 33-34). When looked at more closely across national 
boundaries the data yielded that the Danish principals valued the ability to resolve conflicts and 
manage people effectively (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 35) as well as being able to 
mediate and negotiate more highly than their English or Scottish counterparts with the English 
principals adopting a “rather more managerial . . . Total Quality Management” (Reeves, Moos & 
Forrest, 1998, p. 36) approach to leadership.  The Scottish valued relationships more and placed 
a high value on “mentoring, coaching and the creation of a positive ethos” (Reeves, Moos & 
Forrest, 1998, p. 36). Differences were also seen in the analysis when experience was taken into 
account. Those principals new to the role (with 3 years or less in the position) chose categories 
favouring “the „hard‟ end of leadership style” (Reeves, Moos & Forrest, 1998, p. 38) such as 
“[b]eing prepared to wield [their] authority” and “[b]eing able and prepared to evaluate and make 




In this same study principals were asked to discuss a series of ethical dilemmas they might 
encounter in schools. The English principals responded “in a way which seemed to belie the 
personal angst which had been expressed” in private interviews and “[a]ny sense of dilemma 
disappeared to be replaced . . . [with] clear courses of action underpinned by strongly expressed 
moral principles” (Dempster & Mahony, 1998, p.135). When asked why the activity had not 
afforded them the opportunity to talk about the issues these dilemmas had raised for them, 
featured at either end of the range of responses given were: from “I‟m not going to reveal in 
public how vile I can be” (Dempster & Mahony, 1998, p. 136) to “What I am going to do isn‟t 
necessarily a request for a solution. It‟s a cry for understanding – look how awful this is for me” 
(Dempster & Mahony, 1998, p. 136). In other words the English principals were unwilling to 
“present themselves [in public] in any way other than morally virtuous” (Dempster & Mahony, 
1998, p. 136). 
 
Yet another key finding of the study, and one of the most significant, was with regards to gender 
with women principals identifying: “• caring • collaboration • courage • intuition • vision” 
(Reeves et al., 1998, p. 38) as the five key elements for school leadership. This showed a clear 
overlap with the features identified by USA Women principals in a study by Regan and Brooks 
(1995) (see also Marshall, 1992), demonstrating a clear conceptualisation of an “ethic of care” 
(Noddings, 1992) in their understanding of what the notion of leadership entails, sadly lacking in 
the male principals‟ responses. 
 
Unfortunately, however, Reeves et al., (1998, p. 40) found more often than not that the senior 
staff admired by deputy principals had also “actively supported them in preparing for leadership 
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and in furthering their career” (Reeves et al., 1998, p. 40). This was very much the case at TISS 
for the deputy principal had been handpicked by the principal with the intention of grooming her 
for principalship. This would indeed suggest that: 
the road to induction was quite haphazard and would tend to perpetuate and reinforce 
tradition because upcoming leaders were looking to the previous generation to help 
define their own role. (Reeves et al., 1998, p.40) 
 
thus ensuring that the quality of leadership is likely to remain unchanged in the years to come 
(Marshall, 1992). 
 
6.4 The Importance of the Emotions in Leadership and Administration 
Fineman (2000, p. 11) reminds us that , as we have seen in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, emotions neither 
interfere with nor serve rationality, rather emotions and rationality “entwine”, flow together. 
From Fineman‟s perspective there is no such thing as “pure cognition; thinking and deciding is 
always brushed with emotion, however slight” (Fineman, 2000, p. 11). Indeed, emotion, 
according to Fineman (2004, p. 721): 
penetrates and defines many of the processes and consequences of organizing. These 
include the subjective meanings of work, leadership, decision making, negotiation, 
motivation, ethical conduct, communication, gender and ethnic relationships. More 
sharply, emotion draws attention to the psychological injuries of working, such as 
harassment, bullying, violence, stress and emotional labour. (Fineman, 2004, p. 721; my 
emphases) 
 
Educational ethicists such as Campbell (2003) and Marshall (1992) appropriately lament the 
dearth of decision making models based on moral and ethical principles to be found in most 
school leadership programmes. Rather most of these programnes focus on “instrumental, 
technical, managerial, political and strategic models of decision making” (Campbell, 2003, p. 
127; see also Marshall, 1992) to the exclusion of ethics and the emotions that could signal 
unethical and immoral attitudes, practices and actions. Educational ethicists have also rightly 
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disparaged the exclusion, “by default”, of a “serious consideration of ethics in a profession 
whose mission is fundamentally moral but whose practice is not” (McKerrow, 1997, p. 210). As 
one principal in Campbell‟s (1997) study remarked:  
Ethically, you don‟t have a really good basis for making decisions and you have to hunt 
around and build a value set . . . Until you have the experience, you tend to back off so 
sometimes you find yourself allowing things you think are wrong, but you don‟t think 
you have a basis to act on. (E. Campbell, 1997, p. 254) 
 
Hence, it would appear that school leaders tend to make decisions that have an impact for better 
or worse on the school community without a clear understanding of the moral and ethical 
dimensions and implications of those decisions and are left to rely as previously mentioned on 
what Marshall (1992, p. 383) calls “[s]eat-of-the-pants ethics”.  However, if administrators, as 
Campbell (2003) fittingly concludes:  
do not consider their actions, decisions, policies, procedures, habits, inclinations, personal 
styles, and attitudes from a perspective of moral agency before subjecting them on 
teachers and students, they injure the chance to foster truly moral communities. 
(Campbell, 2003, p. 127) 
 
Yet many senior administrators at international schools seldom receive any formal training in 
practical wisdom, where dialogue and deliberation go hand in hand with the use of the emotions 
(Blackmore, 2006b; Caffyn, 2011) to address unequal power structures identified within schools 
and provide greater distribution of agency to all: teachers, parents and students (Blackmore, 
2006b). For the principled administrator‟s practice is distinguished by being morally fitting for 
the particular socio-political and material terrain in which it is situated (Orchard, 2011) and 
encompasses the ability to recognise, manage and resolve conflict (Caffyn, 2011) in an ethically 
appropriate way. Stout (2005, p. 16) comments that conflict:  
is a natural concomitant of social interaction and has been so since the day of Eve and her 
apple . . . Social groups require a certain degree of dissonance in order to achieve 
progress . . . Conflict can have positive as well as negative effects, but which state 




However, it is unfortunate that in many cases, the initial cause of a “governance/management 
conflict begins with a tiny issue. This escalates into a personal agenda, and then all too often 
becomes a cause célèbre” (Stout, 2005, p. 16) leading to short-term ethically questionable 
solutions to a highly complex organisational issue.  
 
As such there is a need for administrators that can comply with official criteria for demonstrating 
“quality”, “effectiveness” and “efficiency” for example while also demonstrating a marked 
commitment to “values, learning communities and shared leadership” (Orchard, 2011, p. 2). 
There is a need for administrators who resist change for the sake of change, resist prescriptive 
injunction from above and directly involve all members of the school community in any 
decision-making process ensuring that when change does occur it has a high probability of being 
accepted and implemented by those concerned (Gold, Evans, Earley, Halpin & Collarbone, 2003; 
Orchard, 2011). We need administrators that believe in “open governance”, in making the 
decision-making procedures not only transparent but also inclusive with information 
communicated regularly and publically to all members of the school community in a way that is 
respectful of them as individual people rather than “elements of an organisational structure” 
(Orchard, 2011, p. 3). We need administrators who are able to apply to great effect the notion 
that the sum of the parts is greater than that of the whole to ensure that executive functions are 
not only shared among the leadership team but also result in exceptional outcomes for all; this is 
collaborative team work that should also extend to the pedagogical ensuring that leaders are seen 
by the teaching staff as trustworthy in matters educational as well as operational (Bush & Glover, 
2003). For “Principled Principals” (Gold et al., 2003) are not only willing to listen and learn 
from colleagues they are also willing to trust and entrust them with the responsibilities and rights 
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of leadership roles ensuring that leadership is distributed throughout the school. They are school 
leaders whose attitudes and dispositions are such that they model what it means to open-minded, 
trusting and curious to know what others have to offer the pool of knowledge that exists within a 
school (Gold et al., 2003). They understand and value what it means to be a democratic society 
within the school context and wider community and act on that understanding. 
 
“Outstanding” yet principled school leaders are thus able to work “creatively within a tension; 
between „standards‟ of educational „effectiveness‟ prescribed by the national level government” 
or other and an environment within which those directly involved in the school have the 
opportunity to shape its future (Orchard, 2011, p. 4). They have by virtue of reflecting on their 
experiences acquired the disposition necessary to do the right thing, at the right time, for the right 
reason and with the right feeling (NE, 350 BCE/1994a) and thus know when and where to best 
draw the line between a CEO‟s or governing body‟s involvement and school-directed change: 
they know where the “mean” lies with respect to any such situation. 
 
6.4.1 The Meaning of Leadership within Schools 
The ability of a school to handle change, with transience and diversity two of the key features 
effecting change in an international school, is dependent on its leadership and is an expression of 
its “belief system, attitudes and values” (MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 1998, p. 28). And it is a 
leadership‟s ability to acknowledge and welcome internal tensions as well as problems that 
creates the internal conditions necessary for managing the complexity and speed with which 
change occurs (Fullan, 1993, 2001, 2003) in international schools. Leithwood, Leonard and 
Sharratt (1997) state that it is only in a supportive environment where collaboration and trust 
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exist that conflict and ambiguity can be dealt with positively. For it is only within such a school 
culture that teachers and students learn to thrive and survive any challenges the future might hold 
(Dalin, 1995).  
 
As such the primary duty of school leaders is to ensure that conditions for engagement and open 
dialogue exist, that teachers are not only challenged with respect to their basic assumptions and 
values but feel free to express their thoughts and opinions without fear of punishment 
(MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 1998). As MacBeath, Moos and Riley (1998, p. 28) suggest, it is 
“[t]ransformational leadership” that helps teachers to “cross the thresholds of their classrooms” 
to rich and challenging interactions with others both inside and outside their particular schools 
and communities. As such transformational leadership requires an ability to be flexible and 
pragmatic, to “accommodate different demands and expectations” (MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 
1998, p. 29) rather than depend solely on a belief in “the right way”, a way based on “hard” data 
rather than the practical wisdom acquired through deliberation on past experiences. And it is this 
ability that Rosener (1990) suggests is more aligned with a woman administrator‟s repertoire of 
management practices than that of men; for a woman‟s repertoire of leadership practices are 
grounded in the emotional rather than solely the rational, enabling the transformation of 
subordinates “own self-interest into the interest of the group through concern for a broader goal” 
(Rosener, 1990, para. 6; see also Orchard, 2011, pp. 2-3). 
 
6.5 Summary 
In the 1990s the saying: “It is better to ask for forgiveness than ask for permission” became a 
leitmotif for “proactive leadership” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 2) in England and Wales. In a four 
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country study conducted by MacBeath (1998a) he noted that “it was the English headteachers 
who were the quickest to admit to being manipulative and deceptive in order to achieve the goals 
of the school” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 2). However if the principal task of leadership is “to build 
the conditions for reflection, open dialogue, mutual respect for ideas and for both professional 
and institutional growth” (MacBeath, Moos & Riley, 1998, p. 28) then transformational 
leadership, a democratic concern with political equality and thus the ability “to include members 
of the community actively in decision making” (Orchard, 2011, p. 3) by being flexible and 
pragmatic, “transparent as well as inclusive” (Orchard, 2011, p. 3), is essential. This requires a 
shift away from Total Quality Management and its emphasis on the technical to: “total quality 
leadership, which takes the technical side and marries it with the human side” (Levine & Crom, 
1994, p.29). It requires that leaders be not only “good at” what they do but also “morally good” 
(Orchard, 2011, p. 6), both practically wise as well as pragmatically sound and well-versed in the 
technical aspects of education.  
 
Good leaders, according to MacBeath et al., (1998, p. 30) are those “who know where they want 
to go but also know how to tack with the wind”; good schools, says Hopkins (cited in Macbeath, 
1998b, p. 7), “are sailed rather than driven . . . tacking and changing with a reading of wind and 
current.” For if we are to move away from “institutions [with] deeply entrenched vices” (Fricker, 
2012, p. 296), where the morally and ethically suspect actions of administrators and teachers 
alike, actions that belie their morally and ethically considered words, are condoned then we need 
to consider these institutions from the standpoint of those “on the losing end” (Fricker, 2012, p. 
288), from the “point of view afforded . . .  by a given social identity positioning and the range of 
social experience that typically attends it” as the “underdog” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288), 
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considerations I will be exploring in Chapters 7 and 8 where I tell “my” story of teacher conflict 
within the international school context and one particular international school, using “verbal 
snapshots” of events I experienced during “the” conflict.  
 
The fact that up to this point in time no one had listened to me, “heard” me and  “my” story, 
means that my desire for epistemic justice, which is all about being listened to, acknowledged as 
worthy of being listened to, runs deep within me. This study, this piece of work, fulfills this 
function, hence the length and detail of several of the verbal snapshots I provide in the chapters 
that follow; they act as testimonies of a sort as well as events and experiences to be 
problematised and theorised, used to explore the literature as it pertains to conflict. However, 
that said, I let go of any pretence that there is only one truth, “my” truth, and that I am in the 
right. As such the study has become philosophical therapy/transformation, so to speak, a way of 




CHAPTER 7: MY STORY OF A CONFLICT (PART 1) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In late 2006, the year the conflict started, I started to suffer from loss of central vision. The 
episodes at the onset would last a few seconds and would occur irregularly and infrequently; by 
the end of the year they had become a regular occurrence, often daily, and would last from 15 to 
20 minutes. What had been a mild inconvenience had become a frightening daily occurrence. So 
off I went to consult a doctor who sent me to an ophthalmologist who on ruling out any disease 
of the eye promptly sent me to a neurologist. He in turn ordered a Magnetic Resonance Image 
(better known as an MRI) and told me to come and back and see him when it was done.  I duly 
did. He pointed me to an office chair to the left side of his desk which when I sat in it left me a 
good eight inches below his line of vision. He peered down at me from on high and glanced at 
the MRI scans. “You have a lot of lesions on the brain and that to my expert eye suggests 
Multiple Sclerosis (MS),” he stated matter-of-factly. I jacked up my chair to eye level with him 
and responded: “Actually it could mean a number of things: lupus, Lyme Disease, a Vitamin B13 
or B12 deficiency, allergies or MS. So can we test to eliminate some of these?” (I had been busy 
doing my own research.) He looked annoyed. “Well, for starters we don‟t get Lyme Disease 
here” he replied. “Yes but by the same token MS is virtually unheard of here. I however have 
lived in the States and South America and Lyme Disease does occur there.” He looked very 
annoyed: “I suggest you see your local doctor to arrange for those sorts of tests.” He handed me 
the scans and looked down at his notes: I was seemingly dismissed. Campbell (1994, p. 49) uses 
the term “being dismissed” to “capture” the “nuance of being treated . . . like a piece of 
furniture” when a conversation is taking place, when the knowledge one has to offer is seen as of  
141 
 
no import, one‟s epistemic agency not taken into account (Code, 2008a, p. 37; see also Fricker, 
2007); “once thus dismissed we [do] not have to be taken seriously” (LaRoque, 1990, xvii) and 
both knowledge and speaker can be ignored.  
 
In contrast, the MS specialist I went to see a few months later in Sydney, Australia made no such 
assumptions on looking at the scans. Rather he asked me to tell him about the episodes, the 
attacks, to describe them in detail not only in terms of their quality, frequency and duration but 
also in terms of the circumstances and contexts of their occurrence. He listened attentively, 
actively, respectfully interrupting my story only to ask questions of clarification. He studied the 
journal I had kept of the attack episodes and then asked me to perform several physical exercises: 
for example standing with my eyes closed; balancing on one foot and then the other. At the end 
of the two hour session his prognosis was that he very much doubted that I had MS rather he 
suspected stress-induced late onset migraines without the accompanying headaches. However 
just to make sure he suggested I undertake a simple test that would check to see if electrical 
impulses were travelling along my nerves at a reasonable speed or had been “delayed” due to 
myelin degradation as occurs in MS. He did not “play” the expert (Jones, 1997; see also 
Foucault, 1961/1988) and I the unknowing layperson rather he constructed the interaction as one 
of a team – with both of us playing on the same side and with important knowledge to share. The 
prognosis had mattered but his respect for the knowledge I had to share with him had mattered 
more. As Code (2008b) suggests: to be recognised and acknowledged as a reliable epistemic 
resource is to have one‟s social standing with regards knowledge and knowing accepted. It is to 
be seen as different yet equal in the epistemic domain rather than a source of information, an 
object from which “true belief, can be extracted” (Craig, 1990, p. 36), to be viewed and judged 
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from afar with little or no interaction necessary. For to be seen as a source of information is to be 
“perceived and treated as a lesser human being” (Fricker, 2012, p. 294), it is to be seen as an 
object rather than part of the apparatuses in the phenomenon that is the materialisation of 
knowledge. Code (2008b, para. 9) continues: 
Not being asked blocks possibilities of epistemic collaboration, contestation, negotiation; 
it silences the voices of the powerless, objectifies them epistemically, thereby again 
enacting patterns of dehumanizing testimonial injustice that the [sic] preempt the 
exchanges -- the team-work (in Craig's words) -- on which viable epistemic community 
depends. It is at once personally and socially damaging. (Code, 2008b, para. 9) 
 
 
What lies at the heart of such epistemic injustice is “structures of unequal power” (Fricker, 2007, 
p. 7) which when combined with our very inability to be sensitive to those “stray residual 
prejudices that threaten to influence our credibility judgments” (Fricker, 2007, p. 5) leads us to 
silence those we should in fact be listening to. Perhaps if the neurologist had affected the “active, 
attentive silence of those who are listening, perhaps trying to make out a voice that is seldom 
heard” (Fricker, 2012, p. 287) but which still has a major contribution to make, he would have 
been more open to other possibilities and perhaps would have revised his misdiagnosis. The view 
that those in positions of less power, in the loser‟s seat so to speak (Fricker, 2012), have nothing 
to offer the “experts”  when it comes to knowledge about their own condition is unremarkable 
given Weil‟s comment (Weil cited in Fricker, 2012, p. 287): 
Human beings are so made that the ones that do the crushing feel nothing; it is the person 
who is crushed who feels what is happening. Unless one has placed oneself on the side of 
the oppressed, to feel with them, one cannot understand. (Weil, 1978, p. 139) 
 
For being in “a position of social power” (Fricker, 2012, p. 287) eclipses certain truths, which 
leaves the powerful with only a “partial perspective” of the particular social world considered, a 
not very useful one at that as its their own (Fricker, 2012, p. 288), a reflection from a look in the 
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mirror of reflexivity (Haraway, 1997). Despite this, the “expert” continues to hold a privileged 
position in the medical world (Jones, 1997), one which they would seem unwilling to relinquish. 
 
7.2 Epistemic Injustice 
In the sections that follow I turn to the work of ethicist and  philosopher Miranda Fricker to 
develop my argument that as a teacher in an international school I remained unheard and 
silenced as a direct result of how my identity was constructed and constituted as one that is 
gendered and subordinate to those in positions of “social power” (Fricker, 2007) – those who by 
virtue of their position have the capacity to control what others do and say, a control that Fricker 
(2007) asserts acts both actively and passively29. Though as Winograd (2003, p. 1646) observes 
male teachers, although in a profession that embodies the cultural expectations of women, are 
privileged by virtue of their gender positioning allowing them “to express [their views and] 
outlaw emotions more freely than women.” 
 
7.2.1 Fricker on Epistemic Injustice 
In her book Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007), Fricker departs from 
mainstream principles of epistemology by positing that ethics and epistemology are inextricable 
intertwined in the practice of constructing knowledge. Her work is grounded in and builds on the 
feminist philosophy of the 1980s onwards, a philosophy that in exploring the notion of 
“standpoint”, an epistemology based on, though not assured by, one‟s “social identity 
positioning” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288) (e.g., female, gay, disabled) within a given social context, 
links power (or the lack thereof) to voice and one‟s social identity. This is a positioning that 
                                                        




makes the “underdog [‟s]” (Fricker, 2012, p. 288) voice hard (if not impossible) to hear. It is a 
notion that asserts that “[s]ubjectivity is multidimensional; so, therefore, is vision” (Haraway, 
1988, p. 586) and requires “a politics of positioning” (Haraway, 1988, p.586), of being critically 
located and critically aware, in order to understand the “standpoints of the subjugated” 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 586): those “partial” (Haraway,1988, p. 586) perspectives that when joined 
together “see together without claiming to be another” (Haraway, 1988, p. 586). This is a notion 
that ironically provides us with the basis for objectivity – “inter-subjectivity” - for in 
experiencing the world in our own particular way and communicating it with others (Eyres, 
2014, p. 24) we respond to “the call of each individual freedom to all the others” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964, p. 9). It is a notion that uncovers the fact that those who decide what counts as 
knowledge have power over those that do not (Haraway, 1988; see also Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). It is a notion that uncovers the fact that male-dominated “material-semiotic fields of 
meaning” (Haraway, 1988, p. 588), the discursive practices and the “apparatus[es] of bodily 
production” (Haraway, 1988, p. 595) such as geography, gender norms, stereotypes, emotions 
such as fear and anxiety, guilt, shame and anger, work together to form a matrix within which 
institutions have translated and continue to translate gender differences into “female 
disadvantage” (Bem, 1994, pp. 5, 42). And that economic power controls not only what is 
socially constructed as knowledge but also who and what counts as epistemically trustworthy 
(Shapin, 1995). The implication of these notions is to assert that in order to fully understand any 
social phenomenon you must look at it from the standpoint of the underdog: those whose voices 
are difficult to hear. As such if,  as Fricker (2007, 2012) contends, the “epistemology of 
testimony”  can be seen as the epistemology of a human social practice – the human social 
“practices of telling, and accepting (or not) what we are told” (Fricker, 2012, p. 290) -  then to 
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understand such practices will require looking at them from the standpoint of those who are in 
the loser‟s seat, whose social positioning and lack of social power results in their acquiring little 
or no epistemic agency (Fricker, 2007) in their interactions with others.  
 
Fricker (2007, p. 145) explains that: 
When someone is excluded from the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in the 
co-operative practice of pooling information, they are wrongfully excluded from 
participation in the practice that defines the core of the very concept of knowledge. 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 145) 
 
They are thus denied on three counts: ethically for being wrongfully excluded, epistemically for 
being wrongfully mistrusted, and ontologically for being wrongfully positioned as a lesser being. 
Social position and social power are what determine the extent to which a person is considered 
epistemically trustworthy Fricker (2007) contends. They are involved in “two of our most basic 
everyday epistemic practices: conveying knowledge to others by telling them, and making sense 
of our own social experiences” (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). As such Fricker goes on to explain that 
when you are seen as a type rather than an individual your credibility as a giver of knowledge 
can be diminished to such an extent that you are silenced, dismissed: you dys-appear. Fricker 
calls this kind of epistemic injustice based on “identity prejudice30” (Fricker, 2007, p. 4), any 
arbitrary fact such as that you are woman, gay, disabled, or otherwise “other”, testimonial 
injustice. If  however we fail to understand our own social situation, “our own social 
experiences” (Fricker, 2006, p. 96), due to unequal power structures,  “structural identity 
prejudice‟” (Fricker, 2007, p. 155), then this can lead to what Fricker (2007, p. 6; see also 
Fricker, 2006) calls “hermeneutical injustice”, with certain social groups unable to make sense of 
their own situations and experiences and thus unable to contest the distorted interpretations of 
                                                        
30Fricker (2007, p. 4) defines “identity prejudice” as “a label for prejudices against people qua social type” which 
leads to “testimonial injustice”. 
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these by others (Fricker, 2006, 2007). As a woman and teacher in a hierarchical and patriarchal 
organisation that is the international school, the potential to be subjected to testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustice is very real. As such the epistemic, ontological and thus ethical 
challenge, following Murris (2013, p. 249), in international education is that of “hearing 
[teacher‟s] voice31”, of making it determinate. And so in the sections that follow I turn to ways of 
making one particular teacher‟s voice determinate and thus heard. 
 
7.3. The Verbal Snapshots 
Although as stated previously in Chapter 2 I have no actual snapshots with which to retell my 
own tale, the five verbal snapshots I have chosen are representative and symbolic of the 
encounters I have omitted telling in this story. As such they embody the notion of unequal power 
relations and how this can lead to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice in the international 
teaching world; they are chosen advisedly pointing as they do to the cracks, fissures and silences 
in what is said and not said, yet when viewed together “they seek to fracture the lens through 
which” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11) dissenting teachers are viewed. These verbal snapshots are of 
critical incidents, what Muncey calls “key milestones” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11), in the journey of a 
teacher, from disempowered and voiceless to empowered and with voice, from invisible to 
visible: “together … they juxtapose power and truth with the spiritual and emotional journey 
from victim to survivor” (Muncey, 2005, p. 11). 
 
The verbal snapshots I present in this and the subsequent chapter are presented in chronological 
order and occurred during my final two years at the school, a school that had been a part of my 
                                                        
31 Murris (2013) in her paper “The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child‟s Voice” talks about how children are 
often not heard by adult teachers due to the fact they are children. Murris states that (black) child is “wronged 
specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Murris, 2013, p. 245) due to their age. 
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life for 12 years. All save a handful of teachers continue to this day to be employed on the same 
finite two year contract I was hired on, irrespective of a teacher‟s length of service. These are 
contracts that can be arbitrarily not renewed. A small minority of TIS teachers hired in the early 
1970s and 1980s (when it was difficult to attract English national teachers to work in Hong 
Kong) were however given general contracts at the time of hire which meant that they enjoy 
tenure until retirement at age 60; they are known as the “untouchables” and can only be 
terminated for proven gross misconduct. The fact that I had served the school and community for 
such a length of time made the termination I suffered all the more painful: the most personally 
devastating incident in my 30 years of international teaching. 
 
7.3.1 Snapshot 1: Request or Demand? 
Carmen, Could you come and see me today period 2b please. 
 
The note on my desk from the deputy principal was brief, cryptic yet to the point. I had found it 
waiting for me on my return from teaching period 1. Period 2b was just about to start so I went 
down to the office she shared with the other deputy principal and an assistant deputy. The other 
two were there, the deputy nowhere in sight. After waiting for 15 minutes I asked the assistant 
deputy if she knew where the deputy was. “She‟s in the middle of a scheduled interview and 
won‟t be free for a while” was the response. She suggested I leave a note which I did to say I 
would return at lunch time. I returned at lunch time: no deputy and no note left for me; my note 
had vanished. I left her another note to say that I was meeting with the Head of English and the 
Head of Science to discuss scheduling for the coming year if she cared to join us. She neither 
responded to the note nor joined us for the meeting. Her silences were not the “active, attentive” 
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(Fricker, 2012, p. 287) silences of the listener. For as Foucault (1976/1990a, p. 101) reminds us: 
“silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions”. 
 
I returned to the ESOL office 2 hours later to find the deputy waiting for me seated at my desk. 
“I‟ve been looking for you all day,” were her first words then that there had been “an incident 
last week” and a member of the team, Rachel, had been to see her to say she did not want to be 
line managed by me. The deputy demanded an explanation. I had none to give. I had no idea 
what the issue could be, said as much and asked the deputy what she thought the problem might 
be. She said she did not know but demanded to know what I intended doing. “Meet with her and 
as soon as possible to discuss the situation” I replied. I checked Rachel‟s and my timetables for 
the next day. We were both free first period. A terse “Fine” and then a “we will meet here 
tomorrow morning at 8am sharp” was her response. As she walked out the door, she gave the 
following parting shot: “This is the most dysfunctional department in the whole school and 
you‟re responsible for this. In the meantime, I advise you reflect overnight on what you have 
done to cause this crisis.” I had no clue as to what had happened and so it would appear neither 
did the deputy, or so she implied. And reflecting on the matter would have made me none the 
wiser for as Haraway (1997, p. 16) makes clear: “reflection only displaces the same elsewhere, 
setting up . . . worries about . . . the search for the authentic and really real.” 
 
I was at a loss as to what exactly I was supposed to reflect upon: confused and angry with her 
“arbitrary interference” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301) I went home. The deputy had already made up 
her mind as to whom she believed: for whatever reason I appeared to have no credibility in her 
eyes and it seems to me now that it was to be one very small step from that label of dysfunctional 
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to one of dys-appeared, that moment when the self becomes conscious of itself as an “alien 
thing” through the ethical distance and/or condemnation of the “Other” and is in turn shunned, 
rendered invisible (Leder, 1990, p. 96) seen as a type rather than an individual. Said reminds us 
that: words and texts “are in and of the world” (Said, 1975, p. 7; see also Said, 1983) with their 
effectiveness, their use more a matter of “ownership” (Said, 1975, pp. 11, 17), “of power . . . 
authority” (Said, 1975, p. 14) than the imposition of force. The conversation/relation between 
text and reader is thus not one between equals but rather more usually typified as that “between 
colonizer and colonized, the oppressor and the oppressed” (Said, 1975, p. 17). As Nietzsche 
(cited in Said, 1975, p. 14) asserts: “texts are fundamentally facts of power, not of democratic 
exchange”. 
 
The entire incident, from receiving the deputy‟s note to meeting with her, had felt like a bad 
dream: one from which there was no awakening. Had the deputy expected me to accept 
responsibility for the situation irrespective of being totally in the “dark” as to what had 
happened? Had she expected me to just “roll over” (Richardson, 1997, p. 297) and take the 
blame without any discussion ever taking place? Or was she “exploit[ing] a ready-made set of 
gender prejudices” (Code, 2008b, para. 8) within the teaching world that constitute the emotions 
as sites of social control (Boler, 1999), their expression inappropriate (Campbell, 1994), their 
suppression (in particular that of anger directed towards the administration) and replacement 
with a “self-accusatory stance” (Winograd, 2003, p.1642) the norm? Apparently so, for the 
meeting with Rachel scheduled for the next day never took place, as according to the deputy she 
had refused to attend any meeting at which I was present and I received in lieu an email from the 
deputy threatening me with termination. It is clear to me now that “[w]hen a speaker should be 
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heard, but is not heard, [s/]he is silenced” (Fricker. 2012, p. 290 ) and you are left wondering 
what you have done wrong rather than questioning the unequal power relations that are in play, 
thereby causing you to question yourself instead. 
 
This much I know now: that a contrapuntal response (Said, 1983), a “voyage in” (Said, 1993, p. 
261) of “mimicry …and menace” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 86) would have spoken “truth to power” 
(Said, 1996, p. 102; see also Said, 1978), would have recreated a self with the ability to resist, 
shown a “technology of resistance” (Tamboukou, 2008a, p. 107) in action yet I question whether 
it would  have changed the final outcome. I believe not. For institutions that lack the “virtue of 
testimonial justice” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301) make it impossible for certain groups to contest 
injustices. And if you cannot do that then as Fricker so cogently argues you are “politically 
unfree” (Fricker, 2012, p. 302). Although individual members of the administration and school 
per se might not have agreed with the deputy‟s behaviour or handling of the situation, the fact 
that they viewed themselves as members of the school, part of the collective, resulted in their 
condoning the behaviour or at the least going along with the practice as just part and parcel of 
“workplace culture” (Fricker, 2012, p. 299). As such “[t]he collective commitment to the 
practice thereby [had become] part of the very practical identity” (Fricker, 2012, p. 299) of 
teachers and administrators in that institution and difficult if not impossible to oppose within the 
interactions that followed. 
 
7.3.2 Snapshot 2: When is a Disciplinary not a Disciplinary? 
 
We waited: 10, 12, 15 minutes and still no sign of the deputy. The principal called her 
office once, twice: no response. „She must be teaching.‟ he said. We all knew she wasn‟t. 
After another 5 minutes: he went to look for her. She finally arrived 35 minutes late with 
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no apology given. We sat in silence for what felt like an age but could not have been 
more than a minute. I finally broke the silence. 
 
 
“Why did you send me an email threatening me with termination on the eve of my 
departure for serious medical tests in Australia?” 
 




“That a member of your department emailed me [holding up a piece of paper]to say that 
she was uncomfortable with your style of management and no longer wished to be line-
managed by you.” 
 
“I‟d like to read that email please.” I put out my hand for the piece of paper she was 
holding. 
 
“It is private and confidential.” She very quickly put the sheet of paper away. 
 
I looked at the principal. He looked down at his shoes. 
 
“But you told me that Rachel had been to see you about the issues. You made no mention 
of an email” I said. 
 
There was no reply and so I continued: 
 
“And your comment to me this morning in the departmental office: that I was seriously 
escalating the situation by involving the Teachers‟ Association Representative (TAR)?” 
 
“She was quite right to state the obvious” the principal responded in lieu. 
 
“Carmen has every right to involve the union given the deputy‟s email and the implied 
threat to her position” the TAR intervened. 
 
“Yes, yes, of course however . . .” The principal left his sentence hanging. 
 
“Where was the deputy‟s duty of care towards me?” I asked. 
 
Nobody spoke. It was so quiet the metaphorical pin dropping would have sounded like 
the noonday gun32 going off. 
 
                                                        
32The noonday gun is a gun that has been fired off in Hong Kong over Victoria Harbour since colonial days to 
indicate it is twelve noon. 
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“Procedures agreed to are being circumvented and department members are going 
directly to the deputy with apparently accusations about how I manage the department” I 
continued. 
 
 “It‟s up to you to open up lines of communication within the department and better 
manage relationships. You need to move the department forward and work hard to 
improve the team” the principal stated, avoiding the question. 
 
“I cannot do this with the deputy as my line manager and I respectfully request a change 
of line manager” I replied. 
 
 “Request denied. She is ideally situated to help you get communication with the team 
back on track” the principal continued. 
 
“She has done everything possible to derail any progress made. The problem is that she 
spends her time listening to the team but at no point am I included in those discussions”. 
 
 “I have spent hours talking with you and helping you” the deputy commented. 
 
“You did not schedule a single line management meeting with me at your request prior to 
April of this year and the handbook categorically states that line management meetings 
should be held every 3 weeks. If there was such a crisis in the department why didn‟t you 
initiate 3-weekly, even weekly meetings with me to resolve the situation?”  
 
“I spent hours with you” the deputy repeated, though she was looking at the principal not 
me. 
 
“When?” I asked. 
 
Silence. There was no response. 
 
“To ensure that proper procedures are being followed where disciplinary action might 
occur, what process is now being put in motion and what are the steps?” the TAR asked. 
 
“It is not yet at the stage where disciplinary action might be taken. Carmen has to work 
with the deputy to draw up an action plan to resolve the issues over the next few months. 
I want to see an Action Plan within 2 weeks. That plan will be reviewed 2 months into the 
next term to assess progress. I am happy to have someone to act as a mentor to Carmen 
in the planning process but I will not change her line manager” the principal stated. 
 
The principal stood up, quickly followed by the deputy, indicating that the meeting was 
over. The TAR and I left, the deputy stayed behind. 
 
[When we were out of ear-range of the principal and deputy, the TAR told me that he did 
not want anything more to do with matter and that I should contact the Chair of the TIS 





The principal had addressed his final words to the TAR. It was as if I was not there anymore: I 
had apparently become such a “monstrous” sight, a female teacher who contested a principal‟s 
and deputy‟s demands, that I had literally dys-appeared; for the English word for monster derives 
from monere the Latin word for to warn and instruct and as such has much to do with 
scapegoating and demonising. The word also has the same roots as to demonstrate, as such 
“monsters signify” (Haraway, 1992, p. 333). I had been brought in to confess and if confess I 
would not - to behaviour both deviant and fundamental - then I would be found guilty none-the-
less (Foucault, 1976/1990a, pp. 66-67; see also Said, 1978). For the principal was what Foucault 
would call “the master of truth. His was a hermeneutic function” (Foucault; 1976/1990a, p. 67). 
 
The above snapshot illustrates the import of an apparatus that Senge calls organisational 
“learning disabilities” (Senge, 1990, p. 18): that is an institution fails to learn what everybody 
knows because “people speak from and through positions – I speak as „only the secretary‟, the 
caretaker, a junior member of staff, the union spokesperson, the managing director, the 
headteacher” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 10): for “I am my position” (Senge, 1990, p.19), my 
“responsibilities limited as to the boundaries of [our] positions” (Senge, 1990, p. 18).  This 
failure to allow free and open dialogue, dialogue “not blinkered by positional status” (MacBeath, 
1998b, p. 10), allows those in positions of social power33 to evade, ignore and redirect answers to 
key questions posed, to remain silent, thereby blocking any open exchange of information and 
silencing people as both seekers and givers of knowledge within a phenomenon such as conflict 
                                                        
33Fricker (2007, p. 13) defines “social power” as: “a practically socially situated capacity to control others‟ actions, 
where this capacity may be exercised (actively or passively) by particular social agents, or alternatively, it may 




within the international school domain. It is in this way Code (2008b, para. 2) suggests that 
“hearers deny or withhold credibility to/from speakers qua members of a certain social type”. 
Code (2008b, para. 2) continues: “Structurally, members of some social groups are ill-
understood, marginalized, reduced to unintelligibility through patterns of testimonial and 
hermeneutic injustice that often seem to be everyone's and no one's responsibility”. Thus the 
policies and practices that support such patterns remain uncontested and unchanged. 
 
As MacBeath (2000) notes: “Learning disabilities may be tragic in children but they are fatal in 
organizations”: they lead to disabled organisations. These are organisations that are led by people 
“who enhanced their own authority [and status] by diminishing that of others” (MacBeath, 
1998b, p. 5), who live with a “paranoid fear of [their] own colleagues” (MacBeath, 1998b, p. 5) 
and promote an often covert policy “of „constructive destabilisation‟ – an emotional shuttling of . 
. . staff between censure and fulsome praise, between job satisfaction and job threat” (MacBeath, 
1998b, p. 6) so that they are never emotionally stable enough to be a threat to the leader‟s power, 
never fully cognisant of their experience, their situation, and as such unable to contest the 
distorted interpretations of their leaders: practices that promote both testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustice at one and the same time. Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993, p. 
28) echo these sentiments when they say “participation is not a technique designed to get 
workers to do what their managers wanted in the first place”, but rather an eagerness and 
capacity to positively engage with “an unforeseen initiative or suggestion”.  
 
Code (2008a, p. 47) echoes their sentiments when she states that those in positions of power, 
those doing the listening, need to demonstrate a “readiness to engage with surprises” if we are to 
move to undo the “power/knowledge imbalance and injustice structures” that currently exist. It 
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requires being open “to imagining beyond instituted possibilities” (Code, 2008a, pp. 46-47), first 
seeking to understand before seeking to be understood. It also requires a “critical reflexivity” so 
that the apparatus of identity prejudices does not intervene to diminish another‟s capacity as a 
knower and giver of knowledge (Fricker, 2007, 2012) within any interaction and allows all to 
share and participate in the creation that is knowledge, institutional and other. The “games of 
truth and error through which being is historically constituted as experience” (Foucault, 
1984/1990b, pp. 6-7) structure and mark the narratives of teachers‟ lives, professionally and 
personally, and serve to give cohesion to the catechism of the organisation‟s teaching 
community. They are what Frank (2012, p. 49) describes as “practices of self-knowledge by 
which people are made into proper subjects of institutional necessity.” They arise out of and in 
relation to specific practices: “the places and spaces, the apparatuses, relations, and routines that 
bind human beings into complex assemblies of vision, action, and judgment” (Rabinow & Rose, 
2003, p. xxi) wherever those places and spaces might be. Yet as Frank (2012, p. 49) suggests 
following Foucault, in order to live a life that is not only ethical but free requires not a rejection 
of these truth games, “but learning to play them well – another instance of phronesis34” - by 
contesting what Code (2008b, para. 12) calls the “instituted social imaginary35” that holds such 
institutional practices and policies in place in the “gaps, the interstices [where] there is room for 
dissent to enter.” For as Foucault (1976/1990a, pp. 100-101) reminds us: 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more 
than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process 
whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing 
                                                        
34 I discuss the notion of phronesis in detail in Chapter 4. 
35Code (2008a, p. 34) describes an “instituted imaginary” as carrying “the normative social meanings, customs, 
expectations, assumptions, values, prohibitions, and permissions . . . into which people are nurtured from childhood” 
and a “social imaginary” as the “implicit but effective systems of images, meanings, metaphors, and interlocking 
explanations-expectations woven through a social-political order, within which people, in specific time periods and 
cultural-geographic climates enact their knowledge and subjectivities and craft their self-understandings.” 
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strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines 
and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. 
 
In other words, power can be not only negative and confining but also positively affirming 
producing alternative subject positions, alternative power relations, and as such disrupting the 
status quo within a practice such as conflict within the teaching world and reconfiguring the 
power relations that emerge to being more socially just. It is this postmodern perspective on what 
Kelly (1995, p. 55) calls “the problem of knowledge” and its associated discursive practices that 
allows for a plurality of values and perceptions while recognising the inherent “dangers of 
manipulation through the control of discourse” (Kelly, 1995, p. 72). Applying Lionnet‟s (1991, 
p. 18) notion of “Darwinian divergence” to the discourse of knowledge allows for a greater 
diversity in the “aesthetic, moral and cultural” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74) ecosystems associated with a 
“truly democratic form of social organization” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74), which in turn allows for 
more meanings to emerge. As Lionnet (1991, p. 18) makes abundantly clear: “a given space 
(text) will support more life (generate more meanings) if occupied by diverse forms of life 
(languages).” By privileging these “intermediary spaces where boundaries become effaced” 
binary modes are subverted and allow for more meanings to emerge (Lionnet, 1991, p. 18). 
However as Lionnet (1991, p. 18) also points out, this “principle of divergence” is all too often 
“excluded by a politics of knowledge”. As such a view of knowledge as one of a “slowly 
unfolding pattern of eternal and unchallengeable „truths‟, or as derived from some kind of 
objective, scientific inquiry” (Kelly, 1995, p. 74) is incapable of supporting a continuum of 
divergent views on any one matter and can only support autocratic forms of “political 




If as Murris (2013, p. 249) so cogently argues there is “a deeper engrained epistemic orientation 
[in schools] that profoundly influences how we speak” then it would appear that the sole capacity 
an administrator has to “hand out punishments” (Murris, 2013, p. 248) manipulates and controls 
teacher behaviours. Fear flows through and between bodies so that the power relations that 
emerge within schools support the status quo and view the teachers as objects. Fricker (2007, p. 
145) describes such “epistemic injustice” as the act of “wrongfully excluding” someone “from 
the relations of epistemic trust that are at work in a co-operative practice of pooling information” 
and hence “from participation in the practice that defines the core of the very concept of 
knowledge” leading to the systemic and systematic silencing of teachers. It is an act that 
diminishes, that destructively positions teachers as Other. We teachers are fashioned, 
transformed (Rabinow & Rose, 2003; MacBeath, 2010) to conform to the “norm” and as such we 
maintain a close scrutiny over our own lives, the source of power never visible: colonised and 
colonisers become one. From a space of “not-belonging” (Said, 1978), from the “edges” 
(Fadiman, 1997), the “periphery” (Pratt, 2002), the obscure becomes obvious. And it becomes 
clear that a teacher‟s critical awareness as to their moral agency and the behaviours that this 
implies not only defines them as a moral teacher (Sockett, 1993) but also gives them the moral 
courage to act, contesting those institutional and instituted policies and practices that would 
subjectify them. This might not be enough in the short term to enable change to occur, to 
eradicate epistemic injustice within the international school terrain, however it might be 
sufficient, according to Code (2008b, para. 12), to set “a wave of justice-motivated collective 





As such the principal‟s and deputy‟s lack of “uptake” (Frye, 1983, p.89; see also Boler, 1999; 
Campbell, 1994) of any expression of anger or indignation I, as a female teacher, make – using 
what Campbell (1994, pp. 54, 56) calls “techniques” or “strategies of interpretive dismissal” that 
“block” (Campbell, 1994, p. 48) the successful expressions of emotion such as silence, 
redirection, ignoring the emoter and what she has to say – serves to silence, apportioning the 
blame for not being “heard” on what is considered unfeminine, “unhealthy” (Campbell, 1994, p. 
47, 49) and hence “unacceptable” and insubordinate teacher behaviour, (the expression of anger 
directed towards the administration (Boler, 1999; Campbell, 1994; Jaggar, 1989; Winograd, 
2003)) rather than any deficiency on the part of the hearers. Campbell (1994, p. 63) notes:  
[W]hen our feelings are trivialized, ignored, systematically criticized, or when they are 
extremely constrained by the poverty of our expressive resources, this situation can lead 
to a very serious kind of dismissal - the dismissal of the significance to a person of her 
own life, in a way that reaches down deeply into what the significance of a life can be to 
the person whose life it is. 
 
As such women‟s long-standing association with the emotions continues to provide a “long-
standing historical ground” (Campbell, 1994, p. 49) on which to dismiss them and the emotion 
being expressed. Any injustice, any deficiencies on the part of the hearers – what Campbell 
(1994, p. 51) calls “the failure of others to listen and act” – as such remain hidden.  This social 
control of “outlaw emotions” (Jaggar, 1989) in schools structures our experience of gender, race 
and class (Boler, 1999) as well as social position and also serves to embed and reproduce it 
(Bartky, 1996; Boler, 1999). For the emotions have a collaborative and public (Boler, 1999; 
Campbell, 1994) dimension, requiring “uptake” (Frye, 1983, p. 89) as a social act, without which 




Democracy, Kelly (2004, p. 215) argues is more than just “a political system”; it is above all else 
“a moral system”, one that is based on “equality and freedom” with respect for the individual as 
the guiding principle that holds all others in place. As such any institution, Kelly (2004) argues, 
any school that purports to be democratic must respect these core principles and must be seen to 
adhere to them, reflect them not only in their policies but more importantly in their day-to-day 
practices. Democracy in education is fundamentally about equality, eschewing as it should the 
belief that only those in positions of power have a voice, privileged by their social positioning. 
For a school or institution that does not allow for vigorous debate is an unhealthy educational 
and intellectual environment embodying as it does what Freire (1972) would call a “pedagogy of 
the oppressed” and generating a climate of assent based on fear and oppression rather than one of 
inquiry and understanding based on fact and principle. For when “argument ceases - blood 
happens” (Postman, 1996, p. 73); in schools this means that sometimes people are fired, 
sometimes they just leave; more often than not “they retreat to their rooms, close their doors, and 
go about their own business living a lonely existence” (Anderson, 2010). To deny teachers the 
freedom to speak freely is to “deny democracy itself” (Kelly, 2004, p. 216; see also Fricker, 
2012); it is to actively and passively (Fricker, 2007), overtly and covertly seek to constrain 
“knowledge, thought, opinion, expression and speech” (Kelly, 2004, p. 216) and in so doing 
maintain and replicate the status quo – a dictatorship no less. 
 
7. 4 Cracks, Crevasses, Fissures and Interstices: Silences and Omissions 
When I finally sat down to write my story it just simply gushed out – 283 pages of anger, pain, 
regret, a sense of betrayal and grief at a passing. The story would lurch from chaos to quest to 
restitution then back to chaos again. It was a rollercoaster ride of emotion. Although Frank 
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(2012, p. 47) uses the terms “chaos”, “restitution” and “quest” narratives to describe “illness 
stories”, I find them equally appropriate and applicable to conflict stories.  
 
The restitution narrative of “thin medical resources . . . technical accounts, not stories” (Frank. 
2012, p. 48) has a parallel life in the legal and human resources “stories” told by conflicted 
people involved in conflict; these are stories that have uncertain endings, with the outcome for 
the protagonist hanging in the balance. Equally the chaos narrative of illness where “life is 
collapsing around” (Frank, 2012, p. 47) the protagonist as “[o]ne bad thing has lead to another” 
(Frank, 2012, p. 47) with no resolution seen as possible – “which is its chaos” (Frank, 2012, p. 
47) - and the expected outcome bleak, is mirrored in conflict. The quest narrative, appearing as it 
does in both illness and conflict stories, however presents a series of “obstacles” (Frank, 2012, p. 
47) which the protagonist encounters and overcomes, in the process gaining “power and 
wisdom” (Frye, 1957/1973, p. 193); the question though still remains as to whether the 
protagonist‟s “original attitude towards the illness[/conflict] will transform into understanding 
the transformative potential in the illness[/conflict] experience” (Frank, 2012, p. 47). 
 
I would describe my own story of conflict as encompassing all three “typologies” (Frank, 2012, 
p. 49). However as Frank (2012, p. 49) states “a typology is never an end in itself.” Rather 
narrative typologies tell the narrator exactly what resources they have available to them in telling 
their story and for those “who can represent their lives only in chaos stories . . . limited [as they 
are] in imagining anything that could make those lives better; their story becomes their fate” 
(Frank, 2012, p. 49; see also S. Campbell, 1997; Spector-Mersel, 2010). As such stories can, 
according to Frank (2012, p. 49), by “imposing themselves on people” limit them “to 
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representing their lives according to whatever imagination the stories make available.” This is 
not to say that the outcome per se will necessarily be different by adopting a different typology, 
however, it is to say that “any ending is necessarily provisional” (Frank, 2012, p. 49) with the 
quest story “traffick[ing] in human possibilities” (Sparkes, 1996, p. 484) other typologies and 
their endings do not. As Spector-Mersel (2010, p. 208) so eloquently puts it: narratives have 
“enormous power to shape reality. If we narrate ourselves as active agents, we will conduct 
ourselves in the „real world‟ very differently than if we base our life stories on victimhood.” 
 
When my legal narrative failed I was left in chaos, confused and silenced – once and for all I 
thought until reframing my story as an inquiry, repositioning it as: “a quest to know, to 
understand, to make meaning” (Richardson & Lockridge, 2002, p. 237) for Richardson 
(Richardson & Lockridge, 2002, p. 237) makes clear: “inquiry and quest come from the same 
root”. Rather than the traditional quest narrative where the protagonist is cast as the archetypal 
romantic hero, usually in the form of a third son (Frye, 1957/1973, p. 187) (I was and am 
neither), this inquiry/quest seeks to understand my conflict from the standpoint of the loser 
(Fricker, 2012) and the epistemic injustices enacted on and embodied by the loser. It seeks to 
explore the ethics of international schools as organisations, to understand and find meaning 
through this particular conflict from a position of marginality of being (Said, 1978), a position 
that “frees you from having always to proceed with caution, afraid to overturn the applecart” 
(Said, 1996, p. 63) and as such find a home, if albeit a provisional one, for this “nomadic 
narrative” (Tamboukou, 2008b, p. 1). It seeks above all else to be heard, As such “revisioning” 
(Richardson 1997, p. 299) “my” story for this inquiry involved the omission, rather than silences, 
of much of what appeared in that first writing. The silences that do occur have much to do with 
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anguish and little to do with occultation, in my not wanting to relive yet again extremely painful 
experiences. 
 
For some teachers termination is an end point, the destination so to speak, as in the international 
school arena non-renewal leads more often than not to being blacklisted making it virtually 
impossible to get a job as a teacher ever again. You might leave the locale, even move to another 
country where you hope to pass in Goffman‟s (1963/1990) sense of the word as that which you 
once were: a teacher without a “past”, yet the stigma, although not a visible sign on one‟s body, 
lurks in the shadows waiting to make its presence known, to signify you as a “blemished person, 
ritually polluted, to be avoided” (Goffman, 1963/1990, p. 11) disgraced and seen as morally 
wanting.  The past can never be left behind (Barad, 2007). The ripple effects of blacklisting, 
sooner rather than later, catches up with you: there is no escape. For others, such as Winograd 
(2003) who was on sabbatical leave and so not terminated from the elementary school position 
he was finding difficult to be “successful” in, having a teaching position to go back to, means 
that the experience becomes a part of their professional journey, one which can be written about, 
published so that others may learn from the experience but one that is in no way stigmatising. As 
such the narrative one might write very much depends on whether the experience was part of a 
journey or final destination. For some the stigma of non-renewal can be so shaming as to render 
one silent, precluding the very notion of making the story public (or even private) knowledge, 
leaving one to embrace anonymity instead, and a “false” social identity, the real you, a teacher 
who embodies the epistemic injustice perpetrated at a particular international school, not seen at 
all. As such learning to pass as something you no longer are, a teacher without a “history”, can 
result in an all-consuming “game of truth” one that can cause you to pass, to die metaphorically, 
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no longer the person you were nor who you truly are either, validating the notion that there is no 
place for people such as us in society: we live in the shadows:  
A borderland . . . a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an 
unnatural boundary. . . . The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants. Los atravesados 
live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the 
mulato, the half-breed, the half dead; in short, those who cross over, pass over, or go 
through the confines of the „normal.‟ (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 3) 
 
Passing can have many meanings; it can also lead to many unexpected consequences. I explore 
the notion of passing, its various meanings and the consequences of those meanings, in the 





CHAPTER 8: MY STORY OF A CONFLICT (PART 2) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The hallmark of an international school is its “diverse communities and social-ecological 
situations” (Code, 2008a, p. 32) as discussed in Chapter 1. As such it would appear that Code‟s 
(2008a) comments on the place of testimonial resources (in her case of local rural Tanzanians) 
not usually accorded a position of epistemic authority, could equally apply to the epistemic 
resource that is the international school teacher. It is ironic that Code‟s analysis is of passing: 
how “verbal autopsies36” on rural Tanzanians conducted with sensitivity and understanding not 
only evidenced the “burden of disease . . . in a particular ecosystem” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) but 
served to trouble the “entrenched power” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) of commonsense understanding of 
a centrally planned and administered system and its practitioners. Passing can thus provide not 
only meaningful and valuable understanding to those who are passing (such as in my own case) 
but it can also serve to make visible the epistemic injustices (the “burden” of entrenched power 
rather than disease, in a particular ecosystem, as discussed in this study) that exist in entrenched 
ways of knowing and the “intricate epistemic negotiations and advocacy” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) 
necessary to reverse them. For without either, Code (2008a, p. 32) insists, “knowledge may not 
be possible, in a strong sense, across diverse communities and socio-ecological37 situations.”  
 
                                                        
36Code (2008a, p. 40) explains: “When a death occurred in a household, trained local researchers traveled by bicycle 
to conduct “verbal autopsies” with the survivors. . . . Such thorough interviews - rich in context and detail – 
minimize the likelihood of misdiagnosis. . . . provid[ing] a markedly reliable picture of disease within the general 
population” and a much improved targeting of disease across the demographic terrain. 
37 Code (2008b, p. 36) defines a “social-ecological responsiveness” as one that is attuned to the “detail of place and 
demography and naturalized in a quintessentially down-on-the-ground fashion. . . . [with] intricate epistemic 
negotiations and advocacy”. 
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Code‟s notion of “ecological thinking” marked as it is by a reallocation of the epistemic 
resources of agency and authority allowing for more “[i]maginatively initiated 
counterpossibilities” (Code, 2008a, p. 35) with which to deconstruct the commonsense notion of 
foreign aid, finds deep resonance with my own sentiments about agency and authority within the 
international teaching community. So too does her (Code, 2008a, p. 34) sentiment for “case-by-
case” analyses as being “a central ingredient of social and naturalized epistemology and of 
morally-politically responsible epistemic conduct” resonate with my own. For it is by presenting 
a case-by-case analysis of my own experiences in a “down-on-the-ground fashion” (Code, 
2008a, p. 36) that I hope to render visible, and hence fragile, the organisational practices and 
processes by which epistemic injustices, both testimonial and hermeneutical, are enacted and 
embodied in one particular ecosystem, the TISS, on one particular organism – me.  
 
It is my hope that the remaining verbal snapshots (snapshots that take the form of words) that 
follow, those critical incidents that I tell of from this one particular international school and 
which I experienced during my final year at the school, serve to paint a comprehensive picture of 
an institution lacking the virtue of epistemic justice (Fricker, 2012), a powerful apparatus in the 
phenomenon of conflict in this international school. 
 
8.2 The Remaining Three Snapshots 
8.2.1 Snapshot 3: The Collective Commitment to the Unjust Action  
I had completed and given copies to both the principal and deputy principal of the “action plan” 
the principal had required I write and submit on how to improve communication with the ESOL 
team. Despite the fact that I had not been given any information as to what the issues the team 
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was complaining about were, I had gone ahead and put together a document before we broke for 
the summer as required. I left immediately when school broke for the summer and headed to 
South Africa to meet up with my husband. While there my husband suggested I meet with a 
human resources expert to discuss my situation and see what he thought of it. “They‟re going to 
terminate you” was his candid opinion, one my husband shared. His advice: to file a grievance 
complaint against the principal and deputy as soon as I returned to school. But that was easier 
said than done as first I needed to find out what the grievance procedure was and this was 
information that was not readily available on the school web site nor in other school 
documentation I had been given throughout my 12 year career at TISS.  As such it was as 
Rabinow and Rose (2003) drawing on Foucault suggest maybe a time to “suspend acting and 
think about how life is led and the extensive effects of living that way” (Frank, 2010, p. 73). 
 
Broyard (1993, p. 19) describes chronic acute illness as a “series of disconnected shocks”. So too 
is conflict. This pronouncement of my imminent demise, for I equated termination with the death 
of what defined me as a person - teaching, was the latest “disconnected shock”; it was the closest 
I had come to emotionally understanding the “truth” about my situation: that despite all the 
reassurances to the contrary - from the principal, the teachers‟ association vice chair, the “team” 
embodied in and by Rachel – they were going to terminate me. The signs had all been there all 
along, just as with the “perfect storm” where a complex set of apparatuses come together and are 
there for all to see yet remain “invisible” to some. I too had been unwilling to see them 
constrained as I was by my own “reality tunnel” (Wilson, 2000, p. 40) – what “Performance 
Philosopher” Jason Silva calls that “idiosyncratic, linguistic, conceptual and symbolic 
framework” (Shots of Awe, 2014a) that not only constructs but also constrains reality. I had 
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believed that such an ending would be averted: that if I could somehow make “my” story heard I 
could change the outcome. But “my” story no longer had a “happy ending”, in the minds of 
others as well as my own. On the surface I appeared calm, confident yet I was so crippled by 
anxiety, by panic that I could not think straight. I was in chaos no longer able to make sense of 
what had become my “chaos story” (Frank, 2012, p. 47) or my narrative self (Polkinghorne, 
1991). The disjuncture was frightening. It appeared that only by filing grievance complaints 
against both principal and deputy could the “chaos” ending be averted but this assumed that I 
would be able to contest the injustice I felt had been done to me. Only “I” had any chance of 
saving “me”, I naively believed: subject and object as one. Yet my positioning as Other, as 
object, would be difficult to contest; as such “I” was in disarray. 
 
Like other schools, this school was a political site involving as it did “asymmetrical relations of 
power” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. ix), relations which should be subject to contestation. The 
fact that the ability to contest is dependent upon an institution possessing the “virtue of 
testimonial justice” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301) means that in instances where this is lacking, some 
groups (e.g., female teachers) are “politically unfree” (Fricker, 2012, p. 302) and unable to 
contest injustices enacted on them and others. This is especially true in the international school 
context as discussed previously where there is no higher power that is not part of the 
administration or governing body, and no independently run teachers‟ union a teacher can appeal 
to when conflict occurs. As Caffyn aptly comments: “There is no system [in international 
schools] to protect those who do not have power from the vagaries, micropolitical manoeuvring 
and power plays” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71) of those who do. The school, in all its guises, is 
according to Rabinow and Rose (2003, p. ix) drawing on Foucault a site “where power [is] 
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articulated on bodies, where knowledge of human individuals [becomes] possible, and where 
souls [are] produced, reformed, and even, sometimes liberated”. It is an apparatus that in its 
interactions with power can determine which “truth” is produced, and as such makes truth “a 
thing of this world, intrinsically bound” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. ix) to the apparatus, school, 
for its production, reproduction and distribution (Rabinow & Rose, 2003). However to render 
such “games of truth” (Foucault, 1984/1997, pp. 282, 296-297) visible requires adopting the 
disposition and position of the “exile”, in the margins of institutional life. The verbal snapshot 
that follows is one such example of inhabiting the margins of institutional life and occurred on 
the first day back at school after the summer vacation. It also provides a vivid example of how 
power acts as a force felt not only by those it acts upon but also those it is passed on to in varying 
degrees (Foucault, 1980b, p. 39) in the form of professional violence: what Farrell (1997, p. 504) 
describes as “professional terrorism”. 
 
AFTER THE SUMMER BREAK 
The deputy principal had allocated the department a very small damp and musty room to have 
our departmental meetings in. Indeed so small was it that when the four of us were all seated our 
knees actually touched rather than just brushed one another. This was the first departmental 
meeting of the academic year and was being held just after a rushed lunch lasting 40 minutes. 
The mood was sour, the outcome looked bleak. 
, 
Carmen: So to the Departmental Development Plan (DDP). 
 
 






Carmen: Unless the department wasn‟t involved in teaching the IB. 
 
 
Rachel: Well I do! 
 
  
Carmen: Yes, but the rest of us don‟t. Maybe you would like to feedback on that? 
 
 
Rachel: Well no, I don‟t think I do because it‟s not relevant to the department.  
 
 
Carmen: Mmm, okay. So how would you like to resolve this? 
 
 
Rachel: I‟m not going to resolve this. This is a nonsense Carmen! 
 
 
Carmen: We can stop the meeting now or… 
 
 






Rachel: You know the vice chair!  
 
Carmen: Actually it was the principal who requested she meet with you. 
 
Rachel: Oh really! Fancy that! How convenient! 
 
Carmen: It‟s just the way it was. So are we going to move on to the DDP? 
 
Rachel: I‟d like to point out Carmen, if I may, that one of the difficulties that we are 
facing here is that there is a total lack of trust in the department. And I would like to 
point out to you that last year you published a booklet, a whole document, folder of every 
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conversation, misquoting almost every conversation . . . I think we‟ve got to deal with a 
situation where we are working with a complete lack of trust. Last year we were in a 
situation where really we had a dysfunctional department. The Deputy worked on that . . .  
 
 
Carmen: I‟m sorry but there‟s no document published. 
 
 
Rachel: No, I‟m sorry the union representative, the vice chair, showed me a document 
which misquoted nearly every conversation I had with you over the last few months, so 
you now need to cope with a situation. 
 
 
Carmen: And what situation would that be? 
 
 
Rachel: It discredits my qualifications, my experience, my . . . You know I‟m not having a 
document out there and then have a conversation with you, I‟m sorry. I‟m not prepared 
to have this conversation! 
 
 
Carmen: Then what do you want? 
 
 
Rachel: You needn‟t sound so sage, Carmen! 
 
 
Yvonne: If we‟re going to talk about the Department Development Plan that is the 
Department Head‟s job to do like the Head of Geography and now we have to do it as a 
department because . . .  
 
 
Carmen: I‟m sorry but it‟s not the Department Head‟s job to do it alone. It‟s a . . . 
 
 
Yvonne: It‟s like the Team Review, there was no team review. 
 
 
Carmen: No and there was no Team Review last year. 
 
 
Yvonne: So now you‟re blaming me for that? 
 
 
Carmen: I‟m just stating the facts. We didn‟t have a Team Review last year because the 





Yvonne: But it‟s you that hasn‟t done the development plan. 
 
 
Carmen: No, it is the department that hasn‟t done its development plan. 
 
 
Yvonne: That email that was sent about not doing the DDP was sent to YOU! 
 
 
Carmen: Yes and I forwarded it to you. 
 
 
Yvonne: You‟re the Head of Department aren‟t you? 
 
 




Yvonne: Then you need to get it finished „cause you haven‟t done your job for two years. 
 
 
Carmen: At this point I‟m going to close this meeting. 
 
 
Rachel: Elizabeth was right about you! 
 
 
Carmen: And how would you know what Elizabeth thinks about me? 
 
 
Rachel: We‟ve been emailing since she left TISS! 
 
 
Carmen: Well, I‟m really not interested in what she has to say about me or anything else 
for that matter. The meeting is closed. 
 
 




Catherine had remained silent throughout. Rachel and Yvonne filed out of the room, 
slamming the door behind them as they went. I looked at Catherine who was hurriedly 
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packing her bag and making a bid for the exit. That I felt sick to my stomach, violated, 
would be putting it mildly. 
 
 
The above snapshot is an archetypal example of the violence that Farrell (1997, p. 504) describes 
as “professional terrorism” and Griffin (2004) as “lateral violence” which they contend frequents 
the medical and nursing world and I would add the educational and teaching world. In explaining 
the phenomenon it is important to turn to notions of power and oppression. Bateson (1972/1987, 
p. 492) argues that the “idea of power corrupts”, as such the oppressed make the “colonisers‟ 
laws” (Richards, 2012, p. 118) their own, taking out their own disappointments and 
dissatisfactions on those perceived as less powerful than themselves: those unable or unwilling to 
fight back (Griffin, 2004; Farrell, 1997; Marquard, 1957). It is in institutions such as these that 
“very bad things” (Richards, 2012, p. 118) can and do occur. Richards (2012, p. 125) describes 
her three years in an adult renal unit as a time when: 
We were treated as numbers and, worse, we were treated as hopeless cases. The doctors 
could not cure our disease, so we ceased to matter to them (or so I experienced it). . . . so 
the adult renal unit was merely a holding pen for untreatables. (Richards, 2012, p. 125) 
 
Richards continues: 
It was an unspeakable place of uncaring doctors, hostile nurses and spiteful clerks. . . . No 
one (for instance, the doctors) ever stopped the clerks from tormenting us and the patients 
were too frail and too dependent on their „care‟ providers to fight back. . . . As a patient 
you were not human there, but a number to the clerks, a file to the nurses, and a urinary 
tract to the doctors, and you gradually had all your hope and dignity stripped away from 
you.  (Richards, 2012, p. 118) 
 
Farrell (1997, p. 504) in describing this type of violence as “professional terrorism” cites “raised 
eyebrows, snide remarks and turning away” as some of the covert behaviours associated with the 
nursing profession. Griffin (2004, p. 259) adds to the list: “face-making”, “[s]abotage 
(deliberately setting up a negative situation)”, “[s]capegoating (attributing all that goes wrong to 
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one individual)”, “[b]ackstabbing (complaining to others about an individual and not speaking 
directly to that individual)”, and a “[f]ailure to respect privacy”  - all are common manifestations 
of what Marquard (1957 as cited by Wolpe, 1990, p. 29; see also van den Berghe, 1978, p. 296) 
would call “internal colonialism” or “internal colonization”. Griffin (2004) notes that this is a 
common occurrence in the nursing world; I would add it is also very much in evidence in the 
world of international education.  
 
Farrell (1997, p. 502) contends that because “nurses are dominated (and by implication 
oppressed) by a patriarchal system headed by doctors, male administrators, and marginalized 
nurse leaders, nurses lower down the hierarchy [of power] resort to aggression among 
themselves” and on others who depend on them such as the patients and their families. I would 
argue that it is equally true of the teaching world, a profession also devoted to the notion of 
“caring” and equally satisfying the criteria of Hochschild‟s (1983) notion of “emotional labour”: 
face-to-face contact with the public, eliciting an emotional response from the client as well as 
exhibiting some degree of external control over the worker. This is a world where teachers 
dominated by a historically constituted patriarchal system can take their frustrations out on 
others, teachers and students alike. Fricker (2007, 2012) would view such behaviour as indicative 
of  the collective dimension of epistemic injustice – systemic, structural and institutionalised – 
that results from the “collective commitment to the [unjust] practice” (Fricker, 2012, p. 299) and 
which marks the identity of each and every person in the institution (Fricker, 2012). Contesting 
such practices marks one as no longer part of the group, no longer part of the collective which 




Viewing the above verbal snapshot in terms of affect and the emotions displayed, as “emotional 
manifestations of disempowerment” (Zembylas, 2014, p. 407), makes for discomforting reading. 
Yet it these moments of discomfort that MacLure (2010, p. 14) affirms as moments of 
“productive disconcertion”, moments that point to the material and embodied nature of our 
connections with others that are “far more complex” than we imagine them to be. It is the 
palpable anger that “flowed in-between” bodies “affecting us all” (Davies, 2014, p. 45), the very 
physical feelings of violation, the embarrassment, the sarcasm that point to what Zembylas 
(2014, p. 405) calls the “transformative potential in our shared vulnerability, grief, and loss 
which appeals to the development of empathetic connections with others”. For he states that 
“empathy foregrounds the importance of feeling as knowledge” (Zembylas, 2014, p. 405), 
providing as it does a lens with which to view others‟ experience: to understand their emotions. 
Zembylas (2003, p. 230) contends that “it is in the presence of [the] emotions that we bring [to] 
mind as we try to understand …[the] emotions” of the other that allows for an empathetic 
connection. It is also the emotional responses associated with any particular empathetic 
connection, whether they be feelings of anger, suspicion, respect, or mistrust, that make a 
“positive cognitive contribution to [the hearer‟s] epistemically loaded perception” (Fricker, 2007, 
p. 80). For with epistemic trust, as with moral trust, listening to one‟s emotions can be a good 
idea, trained and sharpened as they are by experience with diverse and differing speakers and 
situations (Fricker, 2007). For as Fricker (2007, p. 80) notes: “The feeling of trust in the virtuous 
hearer is a sophisticated emotional radar for detecting trustworthiness in speakers.” For it is these 
emotions, what Jaggar (1989, pp. 166-167) calls our “outlaw emotions” as seen in Chapters 3 
and 4, that may allow us to see our teaching world more clearly than when perceived through a 
veil of conventionally school-appropriate ones, may allow us to discern which apparatuses are 
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acting on and through us and others within the framework of a particular phenomenon such as 
conflict. 
 
In reading Griffin, Farrell, Fricker and Zembylas the one through the other, privileging no one 
text, no one author but seeking to better understand one through the other, reveals that far from 
being applied from outside a phenomenon such as conflict, power in its repeated applications as 
a force acting on bodies within the conflict, causes bodies to react. In other words, according to 
Foucault (1980a, 1977), power flows through bodies through its repeated interactions with and 
within bodies: power operates through yet is limited by a body‟s “responsiveness” (Barad, 2007, 
p. 189; see also Foucault, 1980d, p. 98, 1980b. p. 39) to the forces applied to it and as such 
bodies are the material through which power operates to a greater or lesser extent. For as 
Foucault (1980a) states: a body is at once discursive enactment and transmission of the material 
and material enactment and transmission of the discursive. As such the nature and notion of 
power as relations that emerge from within conflict and of the categories “gender” and “teacher” 
are not fixed in time but rather emerge as the particular outcome of particular discursive 
practices and their interactions with bodies within particular phenomena (Foucault, 1980a) such 
as conflict in an international school. These power relations are reconfigured through time and 
locally defined with each new interaction (Foucault, 1980a), with each new phenomenon. 
 
8.2.2 Snapshot 4: Letter of Non-Renewal 
Dear Ms Blyth 
As per your employment Contract Clause 3.3 and on behalf of the CEO of the TIS Group 





Signed: TIS Group HR Director    Principal TISS 
(Letter of Non-Renewal) 
 
I remember this period of time as a hiatus from the personal and professional chaos and 
upheavals of the previous years; professionally, the worst had come to pass: I had lost my job in 
the worst possible way but there was nothing more that they could do to me . . . or so I believed 
at this point. I had survived this and a misdiagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) in the same year. 
I fell into the quiet and calming rhythm of going to work, teaching my classes and coming home 
to work on my Labour Tribunal submission (I was feeling heroic, thinking that I was not going to 
take the non-renewal lying down: this was not going to become my “chaos38” story or so I 
believed), sometimes working until 2 or 3 o‟clock in the morning.  
 
Before the school had broken for the summer vacation, the deputy had sent me a note stating that 
for the coming academic year I was to be allocated a small, dark room as my office in a part of 
the building where teachers and students rarely ventured; it could accommodate two small desks 
and a filing cabinet. There was no discussion. According to the deputy‟s note the other three 
members of the ESOL team had requested and been allocated permanent desks in either the large 
English Faculty Office or the even larger and light-infused Humanities Office with the now-
defunct ESOL Office being given over to the Modern Foreign Languages Faculty to be 
transformed into a classroom. As such I was the only teacher from a teaching staff of over a 
                                                        
38 Frank (2012, p. 47) describes the chaos narrative as one where “the actors are buffeted by forces they cannot 
control, and the plot leads to no resolution, which is its chaos”. 
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hundred that was so accommodated: alone and with no formal or informal interactions possible 
with other teaching staff over the course of the school day. With that one move the deputy 
effectively marginalised, silenced and segregated me from the rest of the teaching staff and 
department; she might as well have given me a bell and hung a sign saying “Unclean” on the 
office door: teachers would stay away afraid of contagion. 
 
The primary meaning of contagion is the spreading of a disease from one person to another by 
close contact; however it can also mean the spreading of “harmful” ideas or practices. The 
appropriation of  the medical metaphor with ideas and/or practices seen as disease, whether they 
be considered “pathologies” (causes and effects of  “disease”), “plagues” (widespread 
“afflictions” with connotations of “divine retribution”), “epidemics” (widespread occurrences of 
“infection” within specific communities at particular historical points in time) or contagion with 
its need for “isolation”, is prevalent in educational discourse. Further extending the metaphor and 
applying it to the notion of educational conflict in general, and to those on the loser‟s side in 
particular, is to see the challenge of alternative ideas, alternative ways of seeing and knowing, as 
dangerous to the epistemic “health” of those in positions of power. For the “threat of difference” 
(MacLure, 2010, p. 6), what Stenhouse (1981, p. 103) calls the “threat of heresy” in an 
orthodox/heresy binary, lies in its ability to render visible and fragile the epistemic practices that 
subjectify and objectify; as such they challenge the status quo. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) aptly 
argue that metaphors, such as these, help to “partially structure” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5) 
our own discourse, the way we understand, perform and talk for example about difference. In 
using the metaphor, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 5) state: “The concept is metaphorically 
structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, consequently, the language is 
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metaphorically structured.” As such “we act according to the way we conceive of things” 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p, 5) and if we conceive of difference as a threat, as “contagion”, 
something potentially harmful if not fatal, then we will act accordingly to isolate and destroy it. 
It can thus become “embodied knowledge” (MacLure, 2010, p. 5) tracing as it does “intensities 
of affect that move” (MacLure, 2010, p. 5) through and between bodies connecting them “sub-
atomically, biologically, physically and culturally” (MacLure, 2010, p. 5). However, in this age 
of technology, technology can provide us with alternative ways of challenging the status quo; it 
can provide us with the capacity, the ability and capability of making radical ideas spread, “go 
viral”, before they can be quarantined. It is these new technologies of resistance that might afford 
us with an apparatus for making subjectifying practices both visible and fragile. 
 
Only two staff members (who had already resigned their positions and had successfully gained 
employment elsewhere for the coming year) ventured into the uncharted and seemingly deadly 
waters my office space had become, to visit and interact with me beyond the superficial for I was 
specifically required by the administration not to attend any meetings. I was in “limbo” but a 
limbo I could control or rather felt that I could control. This was not the limbo I had learnt of at 
the convent school where the souls of unbaptised babies and heathens who had led a “good” life 
resided. No this limbo, although on the edges of Hell, was a liminal place, a place to pass from 
one life to another: that of teacher to that of outcast. I was a stranger in a strange land and as 
Tzvetan Todorov (1984, p. 76), the French critic, reminds us: “The first, spontaneous reaction 
with regard to the stranger is to imagine him as inferior, since he is different from us” which 




Dwight Conquergood, the ethnographer best known for his work with marginalised groups such 
as the Hmong of SE Asia, believes that: “People and actions that disturb order, violate 
categories, mess up the system are branded as unclean” (Conquergood, 1988, p. 197). For: “The 
unclear is the unclean” (Turner, 1967, p. 97): the ambiguous, the liminal, the “neither here nor 
there” (Turner, 1997, p. 97) of the “recognized cultural topography” (Turner, 1997, p. 97). 
Conquergood (1988, p. 197) goes on to explain that “[l]abeling” someone or something as 
“dirty” is “a way of controlling perceived anomalies, incongruities, contradictions, ambiguities – 
all that does not fit into our categories, and therefore threatens cherished principles.” As such 
unclean – “dirty” – is an expression of our “uneasiness when confronted with Difference, the 
Other” (Conquergood, 1988, p. 196), the stranger out there rather than the stranger within 
(Kristeva, 1991). This was despite the fact that this stranger was already within, and the danger I 
posed was perhaps one of political “auto-immunity” (Derrida, 1998, 2003) with the institutional 
body politic under attack by its very self: a deconstruction of the self by the self.  As such the 
term “dirty” corrupts “Difference” into “danger”; it “loads the perception of „Difference‟ with a 
moral imperative, and enables the move from description to action, from „is‟ to „ought‟” 
(Conquergood, 1988, p. 197). The politics of blaming and shaming the victim, of seeing them as 
dangerous, opens the way for control and domination, legitimising both (Conquergood, 1988; 
Said, 1978; Todorov, 1984) within the phenomenon that is conflict in international schools. 
 
For someone who has never lived in the littoral this can be a devastating event; something which 
may account for the dearth of studies on or by teachers who have been dealt this kind of blow, a 
blow which casts you adrift as you are unable to secure another job as a teacher without your 
previous principal‟s recommendation. It is an act that is destructive, diminishes, irrespective of 
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whether the act was ethical or not, and shames - you might not look any different on the outside 
but deep down inside you always wonder just a little if you did not bring this on yourself; this 
despite the fact that as Fricker (2012, p. 301) so cogently argues: 
[I]f you are employed by someone who could sack you without due reason, leaving you 
with no redress, then you are dominated, and to that extent not free. What is doing the 
work here is the question of your safety or non-safety from certain forms of arbitrary 
interference . . . bad things happen . . .  But what is crucial to such interference not 
counting as arbitrary is the victim‟s ability to contest the wrongful treatment. . . . So long 
as one can contest it, the treatment no longer counts as arbitrary. . . . we are free insofar 
as we are . . .  able to contest it if it were to happen. 
 
As such it is an act that has the power to silence, alienate and isolate; in most cases it does all 
three. It is not something most would want to shout from the rooftops or even tell their best 
friends and family about, knowing that most will instinctively apportion most if not all of the 
blame on the teacher. There are no support groups and rarely any support. However, I had spent 
my entire life on the edge, on the fringes and although this act would diminish me, I would not 
“go quietly into that good night” as might be hoped for. For as Shotwell (2011, p. 77) argues: 
“shame can reveal the implicit” as evidenced in “unconscious” sexism. Even though “implicit 
understanding” always moves in tandem to power, shame confuses and causes one to pause 
offering a space within which systems of power are rendered visible in their pursuit and exercise 
of hegemonic privilege (Shotwell, 2011, p. 77). It is a space that offers us the possibility of 
contesting. What emerged from this period of time was the second retelling of “my” story.  
 
The first had been a human resources narrative of “the” conflict with issues identified, strategies 
put forward and a timeframe proposed. This time I would produce a legal narrative where “the” 
story was again relegated to the appendices while the legal narrative proper, of policies and 
procedures, ordinances and regulations, laws both local and international took centre stage. The 
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TIS Teachers‟ Association Chair, Tom, had recommended the legal recourse as the only option 
available to me if I wanted to contest what I believed had been an unjust act by the principal and 
the TIS as an institution; this was about justice rather than revenge, being heard rather than 
ignored. However, I had failed to understand that the ability to contest “requires that one be 
properly heard, without prejudice” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301). It requires that the institution as a 
body, as a collective, “possess the virtue of testimonial justice” (Fricker, 2012, p. 301). It also 
requires that the Labour Tribunal possess the same. This “susceptibility to testimonial injustice 
means that [teachers‟] ability to contest [is] radically impaired” (Fricker, 2012, p. 302). As such 
the “boss” is well aware that he “is more likely to get away with sacking you without due 
reason” (Fricker, 2012, p. 302) and to “infringements of political freedom” (Fricker, 2012, p. 
302).  
 
However, there are certain advantages to living in denial, denial of the fact that even from the 
very outset all is lost: you can pretend things are just as they used to be, only they are not; you 
can try to inure yourself to the pain that is to come, only you can not: this is a pain there is no 
getting used to. Even though you know that such attempts are futile, there seems to be no other 
option but to keep on trying. You must try to “regroup and salvage what is left” of your life 
(Conquergood, 1988, p. 180), to retain some “semblance of stability” (Conquergood, 1988, p. 
180), of sanity. 
 
By late November the principal had also relieved me of my position as Head of Department and 
was denying me the right to attend inset I had worked hard to arrange for the entire organisation. 
The tactic was simple: punish to control. Any agency I thought I might have possessed was gone. 
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This was life in the “subjunctive” (Good & Good, 1994). I was gradually being erased, rubbed 
out of all aspects of my teaching community. I could still just about make out the palimpsest of 
my teaching life: in the classroom teaching. If I just focused on the teaching, I could forget what 
had happened, what was happening. Concealment became a way of life. 
 
Zsebik (2000) argues that international education has a virtual inability, an almost unwillingness 
to recognise the existence of educational politics and conflicts of interest. This “culture of 
silence” (Zsebik, 2000, p. 64) surrounding issues of power and politics in international schools, 
however, Zsebik suggests, might have more to do with hermeneutics, “an inability to decipher 
the conflicting messages found within the school and its adjoining community”, rather than “an 
inability to read [them]” (Zsebik, 2000, p. 64). For international schools to a large extent work 
“very much in isolation” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71), neither a part of the “local” or “home” country 
educational establishments which may explain why power, who has it and who does not, is rarely 
if ever discussed in such schools (Caffyn, 2011). As such Caffyn argues: “There is no system to 
protect those who do not have power from the vagaries, micropolitical manoeuvring and power 
plays” (Caffyn, 2011, p. 71) of those who have. 
 
The supervision, control and correction (Foucault, 1977) of teachers has lead historically to the 
self-imposed limitations that allow those in power to dictate the reciprocal roles teachers are 
expected to assume: “the rhetoric of professionalism simply seduces teachers into consorting 
with their own exploitation” (Hargreaves, 1994, p. 15). Acting outside those borders is 
dangerous territory for as Ndebele (1995, p. 4) reminds us: “The namer isolates the named, 
explains them, contains them and controls them”. In this way an administrative “numerical 
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minority”, through a linguistic turn, assumes a “majoritarian character” (Ndebele, 1995, p. 4): 
only certain voices, certain narratives are empowered. The collective failure of an institution to 
recognise and address such discriminatory behaviours and practices results in the collective 
acceptance of institutional testimonial injustice with it becoming the norm, part and parcel of the 
practical identity of those who work in the institution (Fricker, 2012). As such “once that 
commitment is made, the group identification it helps define can make it costly to withdraw” 
(Fricker, 2012, p. 299). To challenge the group identity is tantamount to saying you are not a part 
of the group anymore which can have serious consequences; this can “passively” pressurise 
group members to remain silent (Fricker, 2012): to not rock the boat. Campbell (2003) would 
concur advocating as she does the need to overcome our tendency as teachers to remain silent 
when confronted with the unethical (and I would add unjust epistemological) conduct of either 
colleagues or superiors, displaying what Campbell (2003, p. 6) calls “suspended morality” rather 
than ethical action: “Virtue ethics and virtue epistemology” (Code, 2008b, para. 1) are indeed 
what is required with virtue working in tandem with power “in matters of knowing and doing” 
(Code, 2008b, para. 1) and being. 
 
In submitting to narratives that are “forced” on us (Richards, 2012, p. 16) rather than defying 
convention and promoting alternative narratives, teachers allow “[l]ocal cultural orientations (the 
patterned ways we have learned to think about and act in our life worlds and that replicate the 
social structure of those worlds) [to] organize our conventional common sense” (Kleinman, 
1988, p. 5) about what the teaching world considers normal, appropriate ways of behaviour. This 
precludes our own inquiry into alternative meanings, alternative narratives and alternative 
realities. Schools exist to maintain the status quo, replicate it (Kelly, 1995) and any move to 
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challenge it is dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly, often favouring efficacy over ethics (Caffyn, 
2011; Freire & Macedo, 1987; Pennycooke, 1989; Zsebik, 2000).  
 
What Kleinman (1988, p. 5) calls “our conventional common sense” and Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980) the “metaphors we live by” have evolved over time. However other newer metaphors are 
created and imposed upon us by people in positions of power. In an age where the “myth of 
objectivism is very much alive” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 160) and kicking, “and truth is 
always absolute truth, the people who get to impose their metaphors on the culture get to define 
what we consider to be true - absolutely and objectively true” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 160). 
Case in point: in 1991 McMurtry (1991, p. 211) stated that: “The language of educational 
purpose [in England and Wales] has undergone a sea-shift transformation into business 
terminology and the going discourse of corporate culture” making it “difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the educational process has been so persuasively subordinated to the aims and 
practices of business that its agents can no longer comprehend their vocation in any other terms.” 
As Kelly (2004, p. 42) so aptly puts it: “The metaphors of child-centredness have been replaced 
by the harsher imagery of the factory floor” and become the common everyday parlance of 
teachers not only in England and Wales but also at TISS courtesy of the principal and deputy. A 
teacher‟s work is now commonly viewed as one of product delivery with “product control”, 
quality control”, setting “targets” and “delivery” (Kelly, 2004, p. 42; see also Blenkin, Edwards 
& Kelly, 1992; McMurtry, 1991). This discourse brought with it its own rules as to who had the 
right to speak and who was consigned to listening only (Kelly, 2004). It was a teacher “speak” 
that privileged that “mode of the „already-said‟ through which the status quo attempts to control 
the threat of difference – of that which resists or exceeds meaning” (MacLure, 2010, p. 6). (I 
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have discussed these ideas more fully in Chapter 6.) It is in this way that “power intervenes” to 
grant certain narratives voice and to allow for others to be silenced, “marginalized” (Tamboukou, 
2008a, p. 104).  
 
8.2.3 Snapshot 5: A Message from the CEO 
We'll give you the e-mail address, but I suspect that she [the Chair of the TISS School 
Council] will not be willing to allow the teacher to speak to the School Council.  I'm 
afraid that it is not part of our process and there is no question of a 'right'.  I'm sorry, 
Tom [Chair of the TIS Teachers‟ Association], not welcome to you but it is so. 
 
However, it is the board/school council that not only appoints the principal but also approves 
new contracts and renewals of contracts for teachers. It is “legally responsible for the school . . . 
accountable for what the head of school does” (Hodgson, 2005, p. 9); as such it “should ensure 
that the school operates ethically in all its dealings and practices” (Stout, 2007, p. 318). So if not 
them, then who does a teacher turn to?  No-one it would seem. Tragically as pointed out by 
Hodgson (2005, p. 7): “international schools frequently lurch from Boards that micro-manage, to 
those that purely rubber stamp senior administrators‟ recommendations” as in this case and as 
such are explicitly implicated in the “hermeneutical epistemic injustice” of the institution. 
 
Fricker (2007) defines “hermeneutical epistemic injustice” as: “the injustice of having some 
significant area of one‟s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a 
structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource” (Fricker, 2007, p. 155). In 
my experience not only did my encounter with conflict cause me to doubt and in turn to question 
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my own ability to interpret my situation with regards the conflict but this loss of confidence, the 
perpetual self-doubting, spilled over into virtually every aspect of my life with my doubting even 
my ability to understand my own standing/relationships/relations with other people, to even 
execute simple everyday tasks such as making airline bookings or hotel reservations. For as 
Foucault (1980/2000, p. 275) explains for power to produce a subject requires “the destruction of 
what we are as well as the creation of a completely different thing, a total innovation.” What I 
once had been was no longer. As such this is a doubting that no passage of time can erase or 
even ease, having serious “ramifications” (Fricker, 2007, pp. 58, 162) for my current and future 
life as well as for the international teachers as a group and their “social trajectory” (Fricker, 
2007, p. 58). As Foucault (1980d, p. 98) states: “The individual is an effect of power, and at the 
same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation.” 
As such the individual “which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (Foucault, 
1980d, p. 98): my doubting ways impact others to become same.  
 
Within the TIS group of schools, teachers would appear to be sadly lacking in epistemic 
credibility as a group and as individuals with unequal power relations constraining a woman‟s 
and teacher‟s ability to understand their own experience (Fricker, 2007, pp. 147-150). As an 
educational institution whose knowledge of and beliefs on the value of teachers, their rights to 
add to the “collective understanding”, to express their concerns and emotions, are a “historically 
situated” (Fricker, 2007, p. 104) and constituted episteme, it was and is “in a position to know 
better” (Fricker, 2007, p. 100). The CEO was cognitively aware of the wrongness of her words 
and the harmful effects they would have (Fricker, 2007): the “epistemic insult” Fricker, 2007, pp. 
45, 49, 58; see also Fricker, 2008) they managed to deliver. This is an epistemic insult that is not 
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only epistemic and ethical but also ontological; it can harm the very foundations of one‟s social 
identity (Fricker, 2007, p. 49; see also Fricker, 2008) as a teacher and human being: it “can mean 
that someone is socially constituted as, and perhaps even caused to be, something they are not, 
and which it is against their best interests to be seen to be. . . . [as such] they are prevented from 
becoming who they really are” (Fricker, 2006, p. 107). As Foucault (cited in Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1983, p. 187) clearly states: “People know what they do; they frequently know why 
they do what they do; but what they don‟t know is what what they do does.” 
 
8.3 Viewing the Verbal Snapshots as One 
Seen individually each verbal snapshot paints a picture of unethical behaviour perpetrated by 
individuals on individuals. However with each ensuing snapshot, the edges of the picture 
portrayed are pushed further back to reveal by the final snapshot a sexist institution that 
condones discriminatory practices not only at the individual level of testimonial injustice but also 
at the institutional and structural level of hermeneutical injustice. It presents what Code (2008a, 
p. 40) would call an “entrenched reliance on stereotypes embedded in the instituted social 
imaginary39 . . .  through which administrators . . . purport to know local populations” – whether 
that local population be rural Tanzanians (as in the case of Code) or teachers, both local and non-
local, transient and permanent (as in the case of this study).  
 
The sexist/colonialist tenor of the CEO‟s message to the Teachers Association Chair in the last 
snapshot testifies to the highly resistant and resilient “conventional wisdom” currently held in the 
                                                        
39Code (2008a, p. 34) defines “a social imaginary” as the “ implicit but effective systems of images, meanings, 
metaphors, and interlocking explanations-expectations woven through a social-political order, within which people, 





international teaching world of TIS and that which the institution holds of the epistemic 
worthlessness of teachers, their knowledge. It epitomises the quasi imperialistic and insensitive 
efforts of an administration that seeks to establish a “policy” that conforms to pre-established 
notions of what female teacher behaviour, their words and actions, should be and treats them as 
sources of information to be viewed from afar rather than epistemic agents with valuable 
knowledge to share (Craig, 1990; Code, 2008a). It is a “systemic failure of uptake” (Code, 
2008a, p. 39), a structural failure to acknowledge the epistemic authority teachers possess, that 
exemplifies what Code (2008a, p. 39) would describe as the “firmly instituted social-epistemic 
imaginary through which hermeneutical injustice was subtly perpetuated.”  And as such it is I 












My mother died suddenly, unexpectedly yet despite the fact that I was half a world away, sitting  
in a theatre watching a Noh40 drama on life, death and the spirit world, I knew, not in any mental 
sense of the word but with every part of  my being, of my very body, the very instant she died; so 
intimately had we been entangled in life that “time” and “distance” had been constrained and we 
remained intra-twined in some inexplicable way until death, and as such open to each other‟s 
mattering. We are connected in unexpected ways, material and non material; our “intra-actions” 
(Barad, 2007), actions where we have come into such close proximity that our very properties 
have become forever linked, connect us through time and space for it is not time that passes but 
rather it is we who pass, with each intra-action marking or making determinate a particular point 
in time for us, on us. Existence to quote Barad (2007, p. ix) is “not an individual affair” and the 
“past is never finished” (Barad, 2007, p. 394). 
 
The above phenomenon41 I experienced can best be explained by the quantum mechanical state 
of entanglement. Two particles, for example electrons, become entangled if they come into close 
                                                        
40Noh theatre is “structured around song and dance. Movement is slow, language is poetic, tone is monotonous, and 
costumes are rich and heavy” (Traditional Theater, 2012, para. 4). However this modern version I was attending 
consisted of stylised masks with stark black and white costumes. Plots “are usually drawn from legend, history, 
literature and contemporary events” and themes “relate to dreams, supernatural worlds, ghosts and spirits” 
(Traditional Theater,, 2012, para. 5). Noh is performed “on a square stage with a roof that is supported at its four 
corners by pillars. All sides of the stage are open except for the back side which consists of a wall with a painted 
image of a pine tree. A bridge runs at an angle oblique off the stage for performers to enter” (Traditional Theater, 
2012, para. 6). 
41I use the term phenomenon in the Bohrian sense of the word to “signify the wholeness of an interaction between 
„objects of investigation‟ and „agencies of observations‟ [so] as” (Barad, 2007, p. 427) to form a “nondualistic 
whole” where there are no independently existing “things” (Barad, 2007, p. 205). 
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proximity in such a way that their properties become linked. Incredibly, quantum mechanics tells 
us that even if you separate the pair, sending them in opposite directions, they remain entangled, 
inextricably connected. To understand what this phenomenon means let us consider the concept 
of spin which for an electron remains indeterminate until the moment of measurement at which 
point it will be found to have either a clockwise or anticlockwise spin. However in the case of 
entangled electrons, measuring the spin of one of the pair ensures that the other will 
automatically and instantaneously have the opposite spin. This holds true even when the pair is 
distant (with one of the pair even as far away as Mars) with no means of communicating with 
each other. In other words the act of measuring makes determinate not only the spin of the 
electron involved in the measuring but also of its pair no matter where it might be. The pair 
remains entangled, inextricably connected throughout time, space and matter thereby displacing 
the Western epistemological and ontological notions of “space as container” (Barad, 2007, p. 
223), “time [as] divided into evenly spaced increments” (Barad, 2007, p. 223) signaling a 
progression, and matter, the material, as fixed  rather than emergent from a field of possibilities 
(Barad, 2014).  
 
It would appear that we do not just occupy the world; we are the world both in its resonance and 
dissonance with itself, in its never-ending and ever-changing patterning of differing, difference-
in-the-making, patterns of darkness and light, with any and every shade in between; patterns 
where darkness is not an absence of light but rather an excess of light (Barad, 2014), where the 
crest of one wave meets the trough of another to create a darkness within, with no absolute 
boundaries. We are not a superior “other” that lives apart from the world in all its “mattering” 
and never-ending “becoming” (Barad, 2007). We are not together apart but rather “together-
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apart” (Barad, 2014) as we emerge from entanglements past and future very much as electrons 
do remaining intimately connected though far apart. 
 
As such in the chapter that follows I discuss our diffracted intra-connections both human and non 
human, as well as material-discursive, as they relate to “the” world in general and “my” conflict 
in particular. I use the quotation marks with the terms “the” and “my” to indicate a non-
objectivist stance, to denote the fact that any phenomenon does not comprise individual elements 
or things interacting prior to producing an “outcome”. Rather a phenomenon is an entanglement 
of various apparatuses, apparatuses such as bodies, discourses and discursive practices such as 
those of gender, professional status, and power, as well as nature and many other material 
factors. It is in their entanglement that these apparatuses enact a particular phenomenon, a 
particular agential distribution within the limits of the phenomenon, that determines the “agential 
cut” (Barad, 2007), to produce object and subject. 
 
9.2 Posthumanism and the Phenomenon of Conflict 
The notion of the unbounded organism that is the posthumanist body, a posthumanist body that 
exists in “a complex network of human and nonhuman forces” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 734; see also 
Barad, 2007, p. 23) - an entanglement - is well captured by the Buddhist notion of reincarnation. 
In Buddhism it is this notion of reincarnation which intra-weaves the natural and non human 
with the human where: “a neglected elephant queen . . . is reborn as the Queen of Varanasi, yet 
remains the same soul” (Dalrymple, 2014, p. 8). As such nature and the animals at Ajanta, the 
ancient Buddhist cave paintings in central-southern India, are rendered with the same amount of 
detail, love, respect and individuality as are the humans (Dalrymple, 2014). These are images 
192 
 
where boundaries between palaces and the jungles beyond are vague, indistinct, where the 
“biological boundary between the human and the natural world is blurred as friezes unroll like 
ribbons . . . to tell the tales of Naga princes who are at once both royal personages and snakes, 
crowned with diadems of curved cobra hoods” (Dalrymple, 2014, p. 8) forever entangled in their 
never-ending becomings.  
 
The notion of “entanglement” posited by Barad (2007) explicates that reality and language, the 
world of nature and the world of discourse, cannot have meaning the one without the other, that 
“matter” and “meaning” (Barad, 2007, p. 3) are inextricably entwined. For entanglements, our 
“connections and responsibilities [our ability to respond] to one another” (Barad, 2007, p. xi), 
human and non human, material as well as discursive, are nature‟s “invitation” to act ethically, to 
“live justly” (Barad, 2007, p. xi) for within entanglements matter has the power to enact agential 
cuts in the ongoing distribution of agency within phenomena. Beings can propose certain 
outcomes, certain agential cuts but the world in its material-discursive becoming disposes. As 
Barad (2007, p.171) puts it: “human subjects are neither outside observers . . . nor independent 
subjects that intervene in the workings of an apparatus” stepping in centre-stage to both 
orchestrate the entanglement and configure its outcome. For as in the fairy-tale of The Princess 
and the Pea, it is the pea that in becoming entangled with the discursive, that a princess would 
display greater sensitivity than a woman who was not, enacts an agential cut which in so doing 
distributes agency within the phenomenon that is the story. As such, “matter matters” (Barad, 
2007, p. 210). It is from such entanglements that ontology, epistemology and ethics emanate as 
one rather than being imposed discretely prior to any “intra-action” – actions that subvert the 
commonsense notion of boundaries (Barad, 2007, 2011) with objects and apparatuses 
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ontologically inseparable within phenomena (Barad, 2007, p. 128). For as Deleuze (1981/1988b, 
p. 124) states: “if you define bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected”, 
as possibilities of becoming, then “many things change.” For bodies only seem ontologically 
separable and separate because of how we perceive them: through sight, our sense of touch. 
However the boundaries between us, human and non human, are in fact blurred: indeterminate 
“borderlands” (Anzaldúa, 1987). 
 
As such the ripples caused by the dipping of toes in the waves of the phenomenon called conflict 
intra-act in unpredictable ways with those of others, both human and non human, to form new 
patterns, patterns that expose nuances of difference (Barad, 2007), difference in being, knowing 
and doing with the reality of what we are and what we are becoming a product of the apparatuses 
of “history, discourse, bodies, nature and many other factors” (Hekman, 2010, p. 58). It thus 
exposes patterns of inclusion as well as patterns of exclusion – who and/or what is positioned as 
“Other”, excluded to the littoral, as was I in my own story of conflict. These waves of patterns, 
ripples in the sea of existence, rhizomatic causalities, formed by “our” intra-actions are by their 
very nature nomadic fated to continue their journey unchanged or to unfold as they intra-act with 
yet other waves with “different intra-actions produc[ing] different phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 
58). These are waves of patterns that in their intra-actions with other waves can reinforce our 
positioning as “Other” or liberate us from the “borderland” (Barad, 2014, p. 179), a “vague and 
undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary” (Anzaldúa, 
1987, p. 3). Anzaldúa (1987, p. 3) continues: “It [the borderland] is in a constant state of 
transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants.” For borderlands are always in a state 
of flux, indeterminate possibilities, like the borders of countries which although human, non 
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human, material-discursive marks made on the body physical of  land remain in a constant state 
of material-discursive flux, human and other: an unnatural boundary.  
 
In my own case the agential distribution and cut of this particular phenomenon of conflict 
positioned me as “Other”, persona non grata within the teaching profession, blacklisted within 
the international teaching domain. Further intra-actions within this domain produced patterns that 
reinforced this positioning for the same apparatuses enact the same phenomenon, the same 
patterns, “reproducible and unambiguously communicable” (Barad, 2007, p. 119) in that 
“permanent marks . . . [are] left on bodies which define the experimental conditions” (Bohr cited 
in Barad, 2007, p. 119). It reinforced my positioning as the outsider rather than the outsider-
within, with “difference premised on the binary thinking [that] has been instrumental to the 
workings of power” (Barad, 2014, p. 170). For with a geometric optics42 of reflection, an optics 
which unlike physical optics does not take into account the wave nature of light but relies on the 
notion of light as particles that bounce “off surfaces” (Barad, 2007, p. 81), it is impossible to see 
behind the mirror beyond one‟s own reflection to “Others” that are relegated to the shadows. As 
Haraway (1992) posits: diffraction, also a physical phenomenon, might be an apt “counterpoint” 
to the use of reflection as thinking for reflection is about “mirroring and sameness” (Barad, 2007, 
p, 29) and “invites the illusion of essential, fixed position” (Haraway, 1992, p, 300).  For 
diffraction involves “the processing of small but consequential differences” (Haraway, 1992, p. 
318), differences that make a difference, yet which are enacted by the superposition of sameness. 
For when waves overlap their crests and troughs combine to produce a pattern that shows the 
effects of difference within sameness: whether the waves are in phase, out of phase or all phases 
                                                        
42 The “geometric optics” of reflection is “an approximation” of  “physical optics” for it fails to take into account the 
“wave nature of light” and sees light “as a particle . . .  bounc]ing] off surfaces” (Barad, 2007, p. 81)..  
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in between as well as of differing relative amplitudes or not. As such Trinh‟s (1988, para. 14) 
notion of “the inappropriate other within every I”, a diffracted quantum mechanical way of 
seeing difference as within sameness, allows for the agential cut to be marked in such a way as to 
understand the “Other” as included within the diffraction/difference pattern , a superpositioning 
rather than an extraction. 
 
9.3 The Outsider-Within  
My own intra-actions within the academic domain in working on this study positioned me as the 
outsider-within, re(con)figured the agential cut inclusive of me as part of the observational tools 
within the new phenomenon formed. As such this autoethnographic study is an agential cut and 
makes apparent that “[a]gential cuts never sit still . . . Inside/outside is undone. . . . Differences 
percolate through every „thing‟, reworking and being reworked through reiterative 
reconfigurings of spacetimematterings . . . each being (re)threaded through the other” (Barad, 
2010, p. 268). For intra-actions do not occur between “things” rather they are “ghostly” 
possibilities that make certain properties, certain beings determinate (Barad, 2010, p. 268) within 
a specific phenomenon. As such the phenomenon produced is thus dependent on the apparatuses 
used: a fixed part apparatus can make determinate that which was not there a priori: position for 
example. While an apparatus of moving parts renders momentum determinate and position 
indeterminate. The apparatuses involved as such determine in their entanglement the agential cut 
produced and an entanglement of the same apparatuses produces the same agential cut and marks 
on bodies. Likewise changes in the apparatuses of “bodily production matter for ontological as 
well as epistemological and ethical reasons” for “different material-discursive practices produce 
different material configurings of the world, different difference/diffraction patterns; they do not 
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merely produce different descriptions” (Barad, 2007, p. 184). Different apparatus produce 
materially different ontologies. As such in the system of entanglement apparatus and 
phenomenon are one, knower and known are one, observer and observed are one for one cannot 
observe the entanglement as though from afar without being involved: one is always an intimate 
part of the phenomenon, ontologically inseparable from it (Bohr as explicated in Barad, 2007, 
pp. 127-128) until the “agential cut” (Barad, 2007): that which determines what pertains to the 
observational tools and what pertains to the object. 
 
Schrödinger (cited in Barad, 2007, p. 281) states that “in the realism point of view observation is 
a natural process.” That is: “a world external to cognition and discourse is the baseline against 
which the truth of our sentences about the world must be measured” (Merlingen, 2013, para. 9). 
However reality in fact according to Schrödinger and Bohr “does not determine the measured 
value” rather the “measured value must determine reality” (Schrödinger cited in Barad, 2007, p. 
281). For as quantum mechanics has shown it is the “diffraction apparatuses” (Barad, 2007, p. 
73) those boundary-producing practices that make determinate the properties being measured, 
the properties that did not exist prior to the measuring. Yet if this is so how can we ensure that 
“[a]ny old playing around with an indicating instrument in the vicinity of another body, whereby 
at any old time one takes a reading” is not called “a measurement of this body” (Schrödinger 
cited in Barad, 2007, p. 281)? Bohr (cited in Barad, 2007, p. 119) makes clear that patterns that 
are “reproducible and unambiguously communicable” in that “permanent marks . . . [are] left on 
bodies which define the experimental conditions” is what determines that what is produced is not 
just any old playing around. As such for Bohr cognition and discourse, our words and thoughts 
both spoken and unspoken, written and unwritten, as well as the totality of our social practices, 
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are of the material world as are we rather than just in it which in their entanglement with one 
another become something new. For all is a part of the “physical world” (Barad, 2007, p. 32), 
that which is constituted by matter, for our social practices have very material affects on bodies, 
leave their marks on bodies as do thoughts and words. Which is not to say that the social can be 
reduced solely to the material; it is however to say that the discursive has very material 
materialisations in the physical world. 
 
Foucault (1981, p. 67) makes the point well when he states: “we must not imagine that the world 
turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher; the world is not the 
accomplice of our knowledge”. Rather the world in being entangled with us in acts of 
knowledge-making, acts of being and doing, co-constructs reality, embodying our intra-actions 
as do we. Yet it is in the realm of human ontology that the discursive “enables” the material, for 
without the discursive recognition of one‟s society “one cannot, quite literally, be at all” 
(Hekman, 2010, p. 57), constituted as an object rather than as part of the observational tools and 
thus subject (Althusser as explicated in Hekman, 2010, p. 116-118). This is not to say that we do 
not bring our own ontologies into play when intra-acting with the social practices that play a part 
in constituting our “subject43” identities in their becoming. It does however mean that “subject” 
identity formation is governed by the material practices of a society (Althusser as explicated in 
Hekman, 2010, p. 116-118) in the intimate intra-action of apparatuses and that we “emerge 
through and as a part of their entangled intra-relating” (Barad, 2007, p. ix), reconfigured in our 
entanglements with social relations of power. For the “social scripts” (Hekman, 2010, p. 100) of 
a community are a “key aspect” (Hekman, 2010, p. 100), powerful forces of desire in the 
                                                        
43The notion of subject is “not singular or plural, not self or other, not fixed or mobile, but all of these” (Davies, 
2014, p. 44). However it “yet remains locked in a series of binaries, and hierarchies within those binaries, that need 
to be pulled undone” (Davies, 2014, p. 44). 
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entanglement that also enfolds a body already marked by previous intra-actions. As such the „I‟ 
produced in the entanglement might be found more or less within the social scripts that exist, 
part of the tools of observation, or in resisting them become the object of the agential cut as 
constituted by the intra-action (Barad, 2007; Hekman, 2010). Yet the “material-discursive nature 
of boundary-drawing practices” (Barad, 2007, p. 93), in our intra-actions with others, 
“produce[s] „objects‟ and „subjects‟ and other differences out of, and in terms of, a changing 
relationality” (Barad, 2007, p. 93) and as such identities that are always becoming. As Latour 
(2005, pp. 89-90) points out social constructions are as material as any building we might 
construct for without society‟s discursive enablement one simply dys-appears as did I. For in my 
own case the fact that I as a woman teacher displayed the “inappropriate/d” (Trinh, 1986-87) 
emotion of anger to a principal and deputy principal, my “superiors”, an anger that “flowed in-
between” through bodies present “affecting us all” (Davies, 2014. p. 45) with concerned frowns 
all around, this anger produced me as “Other”; it produced me as together apart, emergent from 
what was the intra-play of what was/is “inappropriate” behaviour for a woman teacher within the 
teaching world and what is considered fitting, what can be/is appropriated and what cannot. As 
such I dys-appeared with the principal and deputy directing subsequent comments to the other 
teacher present who, wary of being excluded himself, ignored me as well: fear also flows with 
“power relations materializ[ing] in the intra-action between/with the material and the discursive” 
(Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 265). As such the entanglement produced an “I” as alien, a type 
rather than an individual, viewed through the ethical distance and condemnation of 
administrators and teachers alike within this international teaching community. Had we 
understood my anger as an inappropriate/d behaviour within, a diffracted reading of ourselves 
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and each other, the agential cut would have included us all in the tools of observation with a 
different phenomenon produced. 
 
9.4 A Posthumanist Interpretation of “My” Story 
John Muir (cited in Fox, 1981, p. 291) observed in his journal entry of July 27, 1869: “When we 
try to pick out anything by itself we find that it is bound fast by a thousand invisible cords that 
cannot be broken to everything in the universe.” As such when I returned to my story and 
analysis, positioned as they are as partial and incomplete – “always being re-told”, always being 
“re-membered” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 3) - and viewed them as a diffraction pattern of 
multiple apparatuses, human and non human, material and discursive, I realised that the voice 
evoked had “not emanate[d] from a singular subject” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 733), me, as I had 
believed. Rather it had emanated from the entanglement of material-discursive practices, 
conditions both social and material: discourses of gender and professional status, political and 
economic forces, the details of the personal as well as the professional life, struggles and failures, 
theories that provided more questions than answers, more diffraction than resolution as well as 
narratives of international school life. All these voices and forces that acted on the machine of 
teacher control and correction within an international school had “plugged in” (Jackson & 
Mazzei, 2013, p. 262) to produce what Jackson and Mazzei (2013, p. 262) would call an 
“assemblage”: a “process of making and unmaking” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 262; see also 
Mazzei, 2013, p. 735), a “Voice without Organs” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 732), a voice that cannot be 
traced to one particular subject but emanates from the entanglement itself. The voice without 
organs makes material Bakhtin‟s notion that we speak with the voices of others, that although 
nothing new can be uttered it becomes something different, something new when entangled in 
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other intra-actions with apparatuses both material and discursive to produce new phenomena: 
“matter and meaning meet in a very literal sense” (Barad, 2007, p. 67). 
 
The story as such has become a phenomenon of “differential patterns of mattering” (Barad, 
2007, p. 140), a phenomenon where the “apparatuses” far from being “mere observing 
instruments” are “boundary-drawing practices” (Barad, 2007, p.140), practices that determine 
what gets included and what gets excluded; practices that mark and constitute the “differential 
boundaries between humans and nonhumans, culture and nature, science and the social” (Barad, 
2007, p. 140). It has become a story of plots that stretch backwards and forwards, of bodies “full 
of sentences and moments” (Ondaatje, 2004, p. 13), of multiple voices both human and non 
human, dead, alive or as yet to be born, involved directly and indirectly in the phenomenon, in 
the process of creating and recreating reality (Barad, 2007). It is a story where voice is not 
bounded “by speech, but can be found in inhabited silence” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 733). 
.   
As such by decentering voice, by adopting the posthumanist stance on agency where 
“intentionality” is not attributable to humans but “is understood as attributable to a complex 
network of human and nonhuman agents, including historically specific sets of material 
conditions that exceed the traditional notion of the individual” (Barad, 2007, p. 23), the story is 
freed from the “representational trap” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 262) of assigning meaning to 
others. It allows us to focus on the “forces of desire” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 738), their intensities, 
which work through and with that which is engaged in the phenomenon; it allows us to focus on 
what results from such intra-actions. These are the forces of desire that act on us to enact an 
entanglement that leads to appearance and dys-appearance. They are the forces of desire that 
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make and unmake us; as such we “make and unmake each other” (Mazzei, 2013, p. 735). Voice 
thus becomes the enactment of an entanglement of those desires (Mazzei, 2013): a voice without 
organs that is made and unmade throughout the process of control and correction, of re-telling 
and re-membering, of re-searching and re-analysing. As such intra-actions “enact agential 
separability – the condition of exteriority-within-phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 140) with our 
agency to change the world and be changed by it immanent from within the phenomenon. Such a 
stance begs the question: how are we becoming as well as what are we becoming (Mazzei, 
2013). It also begs the question: how are we diffracting ourselves and each other? Indeed, 
following Haraway (1997, pp. 75, 104), it begs the question: “what counts”, “for whom, and at 
what cost” to Others?  
 
Barad‟s (2007, p. 185) notion of “knowing in being”, the notion that practices of knowing cannot 
be fully understood as solely a human practice given that “we are of the world. . . .  part of the 
world in its differential becoming” (Barad, 2007, p. 185; my emphases), posits that our ability to 
understand, to know the physical world “hinges on . . . recognizing that our knowledge-making 
practices, including the use and testing of scientific concepts, are material enactments that 
contribute to, and are a part of, the phenomena we describe” (Barad,  2007, p. 32). You cannot 
know the world by observing it from the outside: “Practices of knowing and being are not 
isolable; they are mutually implicated” (Barad, 2007, p. 185). This notion decenters the 
discursive of the linguistic turn without privileging the material. It “brings the material back in 
without rejecting the legitimate insights of the linguistic turn” (Hekman, 2010, p. 7). As such 
entanglements require an analysis that “enables us to theorize the social and the natural together” 
(Barad, 2007, 25). For in our intra-actions with the material of our world we change each other, 
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transforming both ourselves and the material world: “How our environment moulds and shapes 
us; how what is without becomes within” (Shots of Awe, 2014b; see also Willis, 2006). As such 
I describe the material-discursive world of my office in Chapter 8 as: 
a small, dark room . . . in a part of the building where teachers and students rarely 
ventured; it could accommodate two small desks and a filing cabinet. There was no 
discussion. According to the deputy‟s note the other three members of the ESOL team 
had requested and been allocated permanent desks in either the large English Faculty 
Office or the even larger and light-infused Humanities Office with the now-defunct 
ESOL Office being given over to the Modern Foreign Languages Faculty to be 
transformed into a classroom. As such I was the only teacher from a teaching staff of 
over a hundred that was so accommodated: alone and with no formal or informal 
interactions possible with other teaching staff over the course of the school day. With that 
one move the deputy effectively marginalised, silenced and segregated me from the rest 
of the teaching staff and department; she might as well have given me a bell and hung a 
sign saying „Unclean‟ on the office door: teachers would stay away afraid of contagion. 
 
My office space acts as a force to prevent the materialisation of bodies as it acts to repulse 
teachers, to discourage them from visiting. I experience the material force of the office as one 
producing a social environment of exclusion and segregation: a prison, an apartheid environment 
which most of the teachers avoid. There is no sign on my office door - no name: mine or the 
department I represent – despite my having requested a sign several times; this lack of a material 
presence helps constitute me as dys-appeared. The teachers experience the space as exclusive 
and exclusionary, experiencing my identity as one that is becoming not only different from theirs 
but dangerous. However for the two teachers who had already resigned their positions and had 
successfully gained employment elsewhere for the coming year, my office space has become a 
sanctuary, a physical space where they are free to talk about the school, the principal and deputy 
without fear of being overheard and reported on: it has taken on the intimacy of the confessional 
box and I the identity of the confessor. Despite the fact that it is a school with over 1000 students 
and 100 teachers, the immanent sound is one of silence, the hallways are ghostly possibilities in 
the making. As such the material and non material, the human and non human, have intra-acted 
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to produce “different becomings” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 269) of identity, both human and 
non human, mine and others. Understanding the phenomenon as an entangled state of “social and 
natural, material and discursive” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2013, p. 269) agencies (Barad, 2007) thus 
allows for different ways of knowing and ways of knowing differently. It allows the material of 
the office space to be diffracted through the discursive practices of power, fear, discipline, and 
control that act as apparatuses within the school. 
 
9.4.1 Diffraction and Reflection 
Diffraction, unlike reflection, is not a “self-referential glance back at oneself” (Barad, 2007, p. 
88). It instead allows for a critical glance backwards and forwards in time, space and matter, for 
space, time, and matter are “integral aspect[s]” (Barad, 2007, p. 316) of the phenomena and as 
such are “intra-actively produced in the making of  phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 315); it allows 
for a critical glance beyond the mirror of reflexivity. For it is impossible to see what lies beyond 
the mirror by solely staring into it; we must look to the edges where diffraction occurs to see 
difference-in-the-making. Diffraction “maps where the effects of difference appear” (Haraway, 
1992, p. 300); diffraction patterns trace the “history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, 
difference” (Haraway, 1997, p. 273) and thus allows us to see gender-in-the-making, race-in-the-
making, class-in-the-making; in fact it allows us to see any “boundary-making practices that 
produce „objects‟ and „subjects‟ and other differences out of, and in terms of, a changing 
relationality” (Barad, 2007, p. 93), with the concept(s) constituted and embodied by a particular 
apparatus to the exclusion of all others. As such the physical and conceptual come together in the 
apparatus to form a “nondualistic whole” with concepts obtaining their meaning “in relation to a 
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particular apparatus” (Barad, 2007, p. 120) used marking as it does a particular subject-object 
boundary. 
 
As Foucault44 claims, it is the Panopticon, its material arrangement, which constitutes the 
discursive practice of punishment and allows something new and material to come into being, 
the prison, which in turn constitutes the regulation of self by self. Yet the extent to which the 
regulation of self by self is constituted by the Panopticon is dependent on marks already on the 
body self and the apparatuses involved in the entanglement with the Panopticon itself. As Barad 
(2007, p. 65) points out, Foucault fails in this analysis to offer an account and thus to take into 
account “the body‟s historicity in which its very materiality plays an active role in the workings 
of power.” In other words, the question remains: how does the very material of the body, both 
human and non human, physiologically and anatomically, matter in the “processes of 
materialization” (Barad, 2007, p. 65). Despite these omissions, Foucault‟s later work enlivens the 
notion of bodies (prisons for example) showing how they and the words (such as “delinquency”) 
within which they are enfolded “act only in entanglement with one another, and that the human 
being acts within the actualization and realization of these discursive forces” (Dolphijn & van 
der Tuin, 2012, p. 88). 
 
  
                                                        
44Barad (2014, p. 187) also determines that Foucault‟s critique analysis is a “mode of disclosure, exposure, and 
demystification” of a phenomenon rather than an “affirmative engagement” with it as  is diffraction analysis; yet she 
acknowledges (2014, p. 187) that diffraction analysis is “indebted” to Foucault‟s critique analysis (as well as those 
of Marx and Nietzsche) in taking into account at a core level “the (material-discursive) conditions of possibility in 
their social-historical-political-(naturalcultural) contingency”. Barad (2007, pp. 191-192) also points to a lack in 
Butler‟s (1993, 1997a, 1997b) notion of  “performativity” limited at it is to the “production “of “certain 
aspects”(Barad, 2007, p. 145) of “human bodies” (Barad, 2007, p. 145) while also not taking into account the non 
human and material in linking both to the discursive. 
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9. 5 Posthumanism and the Notion of Truth 
Yet if different apparatuses and different entanglements of those apparatuses produce different 
phenomena and agential cuts, what does this mean in terms of the truth posited by any particular 
phenomenon? Truth understood in this way can not depend on a correspondence between 
description and nature, a representational account of truth. Rather truth emanates from the causal 
intra-actions within the phenomenon that leaves marks on the bodies (Barad, 2007), “permanent 
marks . . . left on bodies which define the experimental conditions” (Bohr cited in Barad, 2007, 
p. 119), bodies that “differentially materialize” (Barad, 2007, p. 176) as the particular diffraction 
pattern of a particular material-discursive practice. Truth understood in this way contests those 
“unexamined habits of mind” that endow language and other representational systems with far 
“more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve” (Barad, 2007, p. 133). (Yet these 
habits of mind are difficult to break ingrained as they are into our psyche: “written into” the very 
marrow of “our bones” (Barad, 2007, p. 233) with the human constantly nudging nature to one 
side in its quest for centre stage.) 
 
Truth understood in this way points to the marks left on a body by apparatuses material-
discursive, human and non human, marks that make determinate difference as “Other” as well as 
difference understood as differing, as constituted by and in sameness. They are the material 
enactments on a body of the discursive: marks such as loss of vision, loss of face, loss of self 
enacted by voice, thoughts, language and emotions, observations and documents, both virtual 
(electronic) and paper. These are marks made by letters of accusation and letters of rejection that 
cause one to question one‟s sanity, leaving yet other marks on the “bodymind45” (Merrell, 2003, 
                                                        
45Merrell (2003) uses the term “bodymind” to describe how “sensing corporeally” (Merrell, 2003, p. xiii) occurs 
with “mind and body act[ing] in concert . . . [with] really no Cartesian distinction between the two” (Merrell, 2003, 
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p. 16; see also Lenz Taguchi, 2012, p. 267), and it is these marks that tell the truth of a particular 
phenomenon, mine. As such truth is a material entanglement, a direct material engagement with 
the world that extends both backwards and forwards across time and space and cannot be located 
in time or space (Barad, 2007) except within the framework of a particular phenomenon. It 
cannot be understood as truth as correspondence theory for what precedes the phenomenon is 
unknown, indeterminate and does not rely upon dualisms such as “subject-object, culture-nature, 
and word-world” (Barad, 2007, p. 129) within which the notion of truth as correspondence 
theory is entrenched. As such this account of truth allows us “not merely to welcome females, 
slaves, children, animals, and other dispossessed Others (exiled from the land of knowers by 
Aristotle more than two millennia ago) into the fold of knowers but to better account for the 
ontology of knowing” (Barad, 2007, p. 378) in an ethical way. For knowing, being, and doing 
cannot be differentiated in any entanglement, entangled as they are within each other, made 
determinate only with the agential cut.  
 
Bohr‟s and Barad‟s (2007) philosophy of ontology, epistemology and ethics as inextricably intra-
connected resists the Cartesian dualisms which would see us separate them out. For there is no 
“observation-independent reality” according to Bohr (as explicated in Barad, 2007, p. 129) only 
a much richer “correspondence” between “theories and phenomena” (Barad, 2007, p. 129) from 
which truth emerges. As such the truth that emerges from the letter of non-renewal I received, 
maps not only the geopolitical terrain but also the economic and historical factors. The warning 
is clear: “gender interpellation must be understood in terms of the relevant relations of 
production” (Barad, 2007, p. 194) as must other hegemonic ideologies. Truth becomes “painfully 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
p. 6). It is “non-conscious mind and body” (Merrell, 2003, p. 12) acting in tandem. It is a notion that harkens to 
Spinoza (1677/1992) and his monist beleif that body and mind are one. 
207 
 
clear if we move beyond the privileged boundaries of the upper-middle class in the industrialized 
West” (Ebert cited in Barad, 2007, p. 194). 
 
In returning to my description (a material fact) of the principal‟s office (Background to the Story, 
Chapter 1) on “a hot and humid August afternoon at the start of the academic year at the 
Tepapawai International Secondary School” as “chilly bordering on cold” I describe the material 
forces on me that discourage familiarity. I continue my description: 
The sound of the air conditioner whirrs in the background. The room is clinical: there are 
no plants, no personal photos or pictures and the sea view from the sole window has been 
blocked out with a heavy blind. At a coffee table sits the principal who motions to the 
head of department as she enters to close the door and take a seat opposite him. 
(Background to the Story, Chapter 1) 
 
The office appears before me a black box of control and correction, a concept made “meaningful, 
that is, semantically determinate . . .  by virtue of [its] embodiment in the physical arrangement 
of the apparatus” (Barad, 2007, p. 117), in this case the principal‟s office. It is a space in which I 
am becoming less than what I was. There are no personal belongings in the room, with even the 
external view excluded; I experience its sterility as a block to discussion, meaningful 
engagement. I experience the principal as banal, intent on saving his own skin at the cost of 
mine, as constituted by the office space, by his voice, the words he utters and how he utters them. 
This is a place, a spacetimematter, I do not want to be in for long or even at all for fear that I will 
dys-appear. I experience my own identity as one of victim, anxious for what the space might 
make material in me. The material thus intra-acts in extraordinary ways with the discursive to 




Truth like “[m]emory does not reside in the folds of individual brains” (Barad, 2007, p. ix). 
Rather, it is enfolded in the spacetimematter of mattering (Barad, 2007). It is constituted with the 
enactment of particular phenomena, the entanglement of material-discursive practices that the 
world materialises and experiences, and is revealed in the agential cut made which distinguishes 
the tools of observation from the object within the framework of each particular phenomenon 
(Barad, 2007). For truth like memory is dynamic, not static in its meaning and our understanding 
of it.  It cannot be possessed but is re(con)figured with each new entanglement, each new 
phenomenon, each new re-membering and re-telling. It is a “complementary” truth made 
determinate by particular apparatuses, particular phenomena, particular agential cuts, and is 
“mutually exclusive” yet mutually necessary (Barad, 2011, p. 9) very much as in making 
position determinate for an electron renders momentum indeterminate. As such I experience the 
TISS staff room as “drab and dingy” (Background to the Story, Chapter 1) and the Vice Chair of 
the Teachers Association and myself as “seated having a cup of tea”, our cups untouched. 
Teachers at TISS experience the staff room as unwelcoming: a place best avoided.  It is empty of 
teachers for most of the school day. The material - all that is matter and includes voice, thought, 
language, and emotion as well as letters, documents, memoranda posted on the walls of the staff 
room - discourages the familial, acts as a force to keep staff away. I experience the Vice Chair as 
weak and fearful, her desperation to leave clear and palpable in her voice, her manner, her body 
language. Even the material forces of weather intra-act with the discursive in a way such that I 
experience the day at the Labour Tribunal court hearing not only as cold but also “miserable” 
(Background to the Story, Chapter 1) and the last case of the morning session as being heard in a 
court room that is “empty” despite those present. I experience the court room and its inhabitants 
as empty on many levels, an apparatus that makes determinant with this particular agential cut 
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the power of the school and its officers and excludes me. For it bears repeating that the notion of 
bodies (law courts, schools for example) and how they and the words (such as dismissed, 
blacklisted) within which they are enfolded “act only in entanglement with one another, and that 
the human being acts within the actualization and realization of these discursive forces” 
(Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 88). 
 
Truth is intertwined with memory and memory as Barad (2007, p. ix) states is: 
the enfolded articulations of the universe in its mattering. Memory is not a record of a 
fixed past that can ever be fully or simply erased, written over, or recovered (that is, 
taken away or taken back into one‟s possession, as if it were a thing that can be owned). 
And re-membering is not a replay of a string of moments but an enlivening and 
reconfiguring of past and future that is larger than any individual. Re-membering and re-
cognizing do not take care of, or satisfy, or in any other way reduce one‟s 
responsibilities; rather, like all intra-actions, they extend the entanglements and 
responsibilities of which one is a part. The past is never finished. It cannot be wrapped up 
like a package, or a scrapbook, or an acknowledgment; we never leave it and it never 
leaves us behind. (Barad, 2007, p. ix) 
 
The truth like the past is always with us, always a part of us, marks on our bodies. As such truth 
requires that we be mindful of Others as well as ourselves and for who and what we are 
becoming, that we acknowledge and recognise our ability to respond to Others as well as our 
responsibility towards Others. For one cannot simply ignore that which is excluded “without 
taking responsibility and being accountable for the constitutive effects of these exclusions” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 58) for exclusions matter; indeed Barad (2007, p. 136) makes clear that 
difference “is what matters.” It requires the “ongoing practice of being open and alive to each 
meeting, each intra-action” so that we too may be attentive to “ever new possibilities of living 
justly” (Barad, 2007, p. x). For as Barad (2007, p. 396) makes abundantly clear: “There is no 
getting away from ethics – mattering is an integral part of the ontology of the world in its 
dynamic presencing.” As such diffraction is an “ethico-onto-epistemological matter” (Barad, 
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2007, p. 381) – a doing and being way of knowing which helps “break open” (Jackson &Mazzei, 
2013, p. 263) particular identities with the apparatus imparting “conditions of possibility” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 230) for determinate meaning, “for contesting and iteratively remaking 
apparatuses” (Barad, 2007, p. 230). This is in stark contrast to the geometrical optics of 
reflection where the binary notion of difference asserts a clear cut boundary between the 
included and the excluded, between the “I and not-I, he and she; between depth and surface, or 
vertical and horizontal identity; between us here and them over there” (Trinh, 1988, para. 1), 
between those that stand in front of the mirror and see only themselves and those “Others” that 
stand in the shadows behind the mirror itself. 
 
As such our ethics determines our experiences, it “grounds” (Barad, 2007, p. 391) them. It holds 
you accountable (to account for yourself) for those entanglements we help weave as well as our 
part in them. The entanglements we are a part of reconstitute our identities, material and other; 
they reconfigure “our beings, our psyches, our imaginations, our institutions, our societies” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 383) as this study has reconfigured me. As such: the “smallest cut matters” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 384). And so if as Levinas (as cited in Barad, 2007, p. 391) posits “[p]roximity, 
difference which is non-indifference, is responsibility” then, in departing from Levinas‟ notion as 
it pertains to the human to a posthumanist inclusivity of all that is non human, material and 
other, it behooves us to be non-indifferent in our intra-actions with that excluded in the cut; for 
despite how different and hence distant the excluded may seem, the reality is that they are always 
a part of our becoming, a part of us and hence the world in its becoming. The “tie with the Other 
is knotted only as responsibility” (Levinas, 1982/1985, p. 97) whether we know the Other or not, 
accept the responsibility or not, whether we know how to fulfill our responsibility or not, able or 
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not, the responsibility is there (Levinas, 1982/1985, p. 97). Ethics is responsibility: responsibility 
for the Other, where we are responsible for that which we have not done, even if it is of no 
consequence to us (Levinas, 1982/1985). For each of us is responsible for the Other‟s “very 
responsibility” (Levinas, 1982/1985, p. 97) irrespective of whether the Other is responsible for us 
(Levinas, 1985). Ethics as such does not precede us or our intra-actions rather it is immanent 
from our intra-actions with Others, human and non human, material-discursive. It is a very part 
of matter and mattering itself. 
 
9.6 A Re-turn46 to the Research Questions 
The overarching question to the study looked to render visible the cluster of ethico-political and 
epistemic practices that were enacted at one particular international school, in one particular case 
of conflict, on one particular teacher, me, and asked: 
1. How can conflict in an international school be understood as a case of epistemic 
injustice? 
 
This led to three subordinate questions that focused on the ethical aspects of the school, its 
culture and staff with respect to conflict and read as follows: 
2. How do emotions express the moral dimensions of a school‟s culture? 
3. What does it mean to be an ethical educator and what is an ethical school? 
4. What are the changes necessary for international schools to become more ethical? 
 
                                                        
46Barad (2014, p. 168) uses the term “re-turning” as opposed to returning – “a reflecting on or going back to the past 
that was” – to mean “a turning over  and over again – iteratively intra-acting, re-diffracting, diffracting anew, in the 
making of new temporalities (spacetimematterings), new diffraction patterns. . . . opening it up and breathing new 
life into it.” 
212 
 
I believe that these four questions are inextricably entangled, for epistemology, ontology and 
ethics are “threaded” (Barad, 2007) the one through the other, rethreaded with each new 
reconfiguring. I believe that a commitment to knowing how to be as well as being what we 
know, being responsible (able to respond) and demonstrating a willingness to doing so, is what 
constitutes an ethical teacher and ethical institution, apparatuses (Foucault, 1977, p. 224) that in 
their entanglements and intra-actions produce certain configurations and reconfigurations of the 
material world of school and teacher. For ultimately response-ability and account-ability require 
“knowing in being” (Barad, 2007, p. 185): knowing in being open to the other within, willing to 
listen, to enter into dialogue, and thus communicate between “simultaneous differences” (Clark 
& Holquist, 1984, p. 9), knowing in being immanently polysemic, multivocal within intra-
actions. It is being that other in all her guises, allowing the other to disrupt, to destabilise the 
“self” so that life becomes the creation of ongoing meaning (Frank, 2000).  As such can conflict 
be understood as a case of epistemic injustice? Undoubtedly yes. However it is so much more 
than this for as an unresolved profound and protracted disagreement, conflict can cause one to be 
denied not only epistemically by being wrongfully mistrusted, but also ethically by being 
wrongfully excluded and ontologically by being wrongfully positioned as a lesser being. Conflict 
not only challenges what we know but who and how we are becoming.  
 
This in turn leads me to questions that rather than reinforce the binary notions of conflict (for 
example: us/them; cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) explore and expose the darkness 
within the light of conflict, questions such as: 
How can conflict be understood as emergent from intra-actions between apparatuses of 
material-discursive practices, conditions both social and material: discourses of gender 
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and professional status, political and economic forces, the details of the personal as well 
as the professional life, struggles and failures, and the emotions?  
 
How can conflict be understood as a product of all the above apparatuses with the 
agential cut dependent on the intra-play of these forces rather than the interplay of 
individual entities, with these intra-plays producing causes and effects by all on all? 
 
In other words, how are we diffracting ourselves and how are we diffracting each other within 
the phenomenon of conflict? For conflicts are collisions: “head on, to the accompaniment of 
squealing brakes and breaking glass” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x). They are messy affairs with “[b]oth 
sides wounded” but with neither side seeming “to know what had hit it or how to avoid another 
crash” (Fadiman, 1997, p. x). We inhabit a tangled yet dynamic web of material-discursive 
power relationships upon which the production and outcome of any conflict depends. And it is 
important to understand not why but how such collisions occur if we are to avoid, prevent, or 
resolve them ethically. 
 
Rather than relying on old binaries with their narrow range of possibilities for theorising about 
conflict, the posthumanist stance affords us the opportunity to accept that the difference 
produced by an entanglement, in this case conflict, lies within us all with the many possibilities 
this presents for transforming ourselves and each other to create something new. However it is 
our “reluctance to cross over” to poke “a hole out of the old boundaries of the self” (Anzaldúa, 
1987, p. 49), that prevents us from exploring such possibilities that are at once all inclusive and 




The littoral, where waves colliding meet the shore, is an interesting place of incongruities and 
discontinuities. It is where the action most worth watching takes place. For the diffraction 
patterns produced there are complex yet intimate, embodied as they are by us all forever caught 
up as we are in the roil and tumble of the waves. It is a place where past/present/future 
“continually converge, [ merge,] collapse and co-invent each other” (Pastpresents: Playing cat‟s 
cradle with Donna Haraway, n.d., para. 2). It is where what we have done, are doing, and will do 
matter; for we are always responsible and accountable for what we are, who we are, and what we 
know through our never-ending becoming. It is where, as Deleuze and Parnet (1977/1987, p. 
127) put it: “It might be thought that nothing has changed, and nevertheless everything has 
changed.” 
 
9.7 Has the Study made a Substantial Contribution to the Study of Conflict? 
Whether or not my research has made a substantial contribution to research into understanding 
the lived experience of conflict is I would suggest up to other researchers and others living with 
conflict to determine. However it has made a substantial contribution to my own understanding 
of how conflict emerges from an intra-play of material conditions, discourses, affective and 
power flows, and the effects (the marks left on bodies) of such immanence. 
 
In research as in life it is difficult to know where the writing and the reading will take you in 
your journey of discovery. In my own case however it was not until I started to write the final 
chapter (Chapter 9) of this study and came upon the writings of the philosopher and quantum 
physicist Karen Barad that a true “movement in thought” occurred, affecting me profoundly, 
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deeply, and effecting a dramatic conceptual shift in the way I thought that took me from 
questions of essence that focused on a Cartesian understanding of difference and conflict 
(us/them; cause/effect; guilt/innocence; darkness/light) to a posthumanist stance on both and 
questions of how conflict can be understood as emergent from “intra-actions” (Barad, 2007) 
between apparatuses of material-discursive practices, conditions both social and material: 
discourses of gender and professional status, political and economic forces, the details of the 
personal as well as the professional life, struggles and failures, and the emotions  That movement 
of thought changed how I read what I had previously written and therefore how this end-to-
account-for-the-beginning would be written. For to read my study through Barad (2007) was to 
see it not with new eyes, but with no eyes at all for Barad uses and develops Haraway‟s 
methodology of diffraction47 to explain the world in all its (re)configurations. This is a 
methodology (Haraway, 1992) that suggests that diffraction might be a fitting “counterpoint” to 
the use of reflection as thinking for reflection is about “mirroring and sameness” (Barad, 2007, p, 
29) and “invites the illusion of essential, fixed position” (Haraway, 1992, p, 300) while 
diffraction involves “the processing of small but consequential differences” (Haraway, 1992, p. 
318), differences that make a difference, yet which are enacted by the superposition of sameness. 
Rereading the study in such a way was to recognise that implicit to the study is the notion that 
the only ethical stance to take is that of recognising that one‟s life takes place not only among 
many different kinds of other but also that this entails responsibilities towards the other. That this 
notion needed to be made explicit lead to a final chapter that opens up the study, provides a 
border crossing, to a cacophony of voices, organic and inorganic, human and non human, the 
material in all its many (re)configurations, the alive, the dead, the not yet materialised, that come 
                                                        
47Diffraction is the physical optics of “seeing” which takes into account the wave-particle nature of light rather than 
the geometric optics of “seeing” which relies on the notion of light as a ray which in turn gives rise to the notion of 
reflection, an approximation of what actually occurs. 
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together as one in problematising and theorising the phenomenon of conflict within the space, 
time and matter of one particular international school, mine.  
 
As such it is to hold myself accountable and responsible for what I have done, and failed to do; 
for what I do and do not do now and in the future. And it is to understand that to every truth there 
are many equal and opposite truths, what Clatk and Holquist (1994, p. 9) call “simultaneous 
differences”, that act to disrupt and destabilise; yet it is only by superimposing these truths that 
critical differences are made determinate and real. That realisation, that consciousness has 
“denatured” (Haraway, 1991) my notion of the Other as out there, allowed me as Other to come 
in out of the cold, to be anOther within, different but with voice (Deleuze, 1986/1988a, p. 98). 
 
Yet as Haraway (1991) makes abundantly clear, writing from the “borderlands” (Anzaldúa, 
1987) is a “power[ful] way to survive” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175). It is to seize “the tools to mark 
the world that marked [us] as other” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175) and includes tools such as 
“stories”, blasphemous (Haraway, 1991) stories retold to “reverse and displace the hierarchical 
dualisms of naturalized identities” (Haraway, 1991, p.175), subverting both “structure and modes 
of reproduction of „Western‟ identity, of nature and culture, of mirror and eye, slave and master, 
body and mind” (Haraway, 1991, p. 176), male and female, civilised and primitive. And it is in 
this way that we Others subvert those “myths of origin of Western culture” which have 
“colonized” (Haraway, 1991, p. 175; see also Marquard, 1957; Said 1978, 1983) us and continue 




As such the writing of this study and the writing of this study have marked my body, affirmed it 
as the body of a woman teacher, inured it to the likelihood of “passing into the unmarked” 
territory of “Anglo” white male principal (Haraway, 1991, p. 176). For we that live in the 
educational borderlands are people of the book and as such can strike fear in the heart of 
patriarchal authority and its power to name and shame us for we have the ability to exploit the 
language of our colonisers to expose the light within the darkness. As such this study seeks to 
fulfill Haraway‟s function of a “modest witness” which rather than be “oppositional” is 
“suspicious, implicated, knowing, ignorant, worried, and hopeful” (Haraway, 1997, p. 3). For 
nature cannot continue to be resource for culture (Haraway, 1991) nor can all those constituted as 
other continue to “mirror the self . . . the One who is not dominated” (Haraway, 1991, p. 177), 
for it is the other that “gives the lie to the autonomy of the self” (Haraway, 1991, p. 177). As 
such “[i]nside and outside are inseparable. The world is wholly inside and I am wholly outside 
myself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2005, p. 474). That is we are not only both a part of the world but 
also “coextensive with” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2005, p. 430) it, constituting but also 
“constituted” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2005, p. 527). We might occupy a certain space, a certain 
time, certain matter, what Barad calls a “spacetimemattering” (Barad, 2007, 2014), but that 
“spacetimemattering” will occupy “you” back. We might build the tools but the tools build us 
back (Willis, 2006). As such our choices matter; the choices we make today matter for 
everything we “design” today – our schools, our educational institutions, our relationships – and 
the relations of power that emerge as recurring patterns from what we “design”, whether 
“emergent and self-organizing” or “deliberately crafted” (Johnson, 2010, p. 17), is in turn 




I therefore present this study, my ideas as “candidates for others to entertain, not necessarily as 
truth, let alone Truth” (Peshkin, 1985, p. 280), but as ever changing possibilities about the nature 
of a phenomenon called conflict that may shape “our” thinking about enquiries into like 
phenomena.  
 
9.8 Implications for Policy, Practices, and Further Research 
9.8.1 Policy and Practices 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 8, international schools work very much in isolation neither a 
part of the “local” or “home” country educational establishments. As such policies, procedures 
and practices at such schools are developed independently, dependent for their fairness on the 
individual administrators that produce them within the context of a particular school. In 
institutions such as these teachers are reliant on the integrity of the administrator in charge, 
having no higher authority to turn to that is not part of the administration or governing body and 
no independently run teachers‟ union to appeal to when conflict occurs. There are no systems of 
accountability in place in international schools to protect the powerless from the caprices and 
manipulations of the powerful: “where power [is] articulated on bodies” (Rabinow & Rose, 
2003, p. ix), and the material and the discursive come together as one. 
 
So how to affect and effect change is problematic in a school terrain such as this. It will I believe 
require “intricate epistemic negotiations and advocacy” (Code, 2008a, p. 36) to reverse 
entrenched ways of knowing. It will require a willingness by the school to let go of all previous 
understandings as to pre-existing essentialised individuals and rely on emerging relational 
ontologies (Barad, 2007) that proceed from intra-actions rather than interactions. It will require a 
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profound philosophical shift and a willingness to acknowledge that we emerge from the 
intertwining of the material, the discursive and the affective and that these are mutually 
constitutive and constituting. It will require epistemic modesty of all involved, a sensitivity by all 
to those stray residual prejudices that lurk in the shared social imaginary, prejudices that arise in 
our entanglements with “others”. It will require a willingness to live with the ambiguity that this 
implies, to accept the disruptions and destabilisations (Frank, 2000) by others-within that allows 
for a more response-able and account-able distribution of agency within the agential cut. For it is 
these moments of discomfort that MacLure (2010, p. 14) affirms as moments of “productive 
disconcertion”, moments that point to the material and embodied nature of our connections with 
others that are “far more complex” than we imagine them to be. Above all it will require 
listening that remains attentive to what it is that we do not want to know (Boler, 1999, p. 200), 
open to flows of affect (Davies, 2014, p. 45). For as Barad (in interview with Dolphijn& van der 
Tuin, 2012, p. 69) makes abundantly clear: ethics entails: “[l]istening for the response of the 
other and [having] an obligation to be responsive to the other”. This requires being open “to 
imagining beyond instituted possibilities” (Code, 2008a, pp. 46-47), first seeking to understand 
before seeking to be understood. It also requires a “critical reflexivity” so that the apparatus of 
identity prejudice does not intervene to diminish another‟s capacity as a knower and giver of 
knowledge (Fricker, 2007, 2012) within any intra-action and allows all to share and participate in 
the creation that is knowledge, institutional and other. For although the “tyranny of the group” 
(Malcolm, 1973; Fricker, 2007) can weaken our commitment, our resolve and determination to 
do what we know is right (Boss, 1998; Fricker, 2007), anything less falls short of what it means 
to be an ethical educator and ethical person within an ethical institution where voice is not 




9.8.2 Further Research 
My research has made only a small inroad into the lived experience of a conflict participant, that 
of the teacher, and life thereafter. The few verbal snapshots I presented gave only an indication 
of what remains to be studied: the lived experience of other conflict participants as embodied in 
and by the school, its physical location in all its material-discursive becoming, the 
administrators, children, parents, governing body and other international school community 
members. 
 
Another area worthy of exploration is the role of the taboo story in the lives of those involved in 
professional conflicts. What kind of taboo stories exist? What can the taboo story do for those 
whose lives have become entangled in professional conflict personally or by association (here I 
have in mind the families, both close and distant, of those personally involved)? What does 
conflict do to such family ties? 
 
Another area worthy of further research would be exploring the lived experiences of men 
teachers entangled in professional conflict; and the affects and effects that flow from, in and 
through those entangled in the conflict. 
 
Finally I believe that what constitutes and is constituted by an ethical international school is 





9. 9 Two “Final” Stories 
 
Story 1 
The neurologist pointed me to an office chair to the left side of his desk which when I sat in it 
left me a good eight inches below his line of vision; the agential cut made allowed him to 
experience me as distanced Other: difference as indifference. As he peered down at me from on 
high, the other in this vertical/horizontal binary of difference (Trinh, 1988), he glanced at the 
MRI scans I had brought with me and diagnosed MS. I jacked up my chair to eye level with him 
and requested a series of tests to eliminate other possible causes for the brain lesions. “I suggest 
you see your local doctor to arrange for those sorts of tests.” He handed me the scans and looked 
down at his notes: I was dismissed. He had learnt to see what he knows rather knowing what he 
sees. What was excluded from mattering - the patient - by the cut made constituted him as much 
if not more than what had been included. The stick held by the wo/man walking down the street 
can be “cut” to become a part of the tools of observation or a part of the object, the wo/man. For 
those that walk in darkness the cut matters: it is a mattering that matters to all. For “[t]here is 
darkness and there is darkness” (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 49); there is the darkness constituted by light 
where the crest of a wave meets the trough of another wave and there is the darkness constituted 
by the darkness/light binary. Both produce darkness of an equal depth yet the diffracted darkness 
occurs when the waves are 180˚ out of phase with each wave alone displaying a maximum 
intensity of light; darkness is emergent from an “abundance” of light not from an absence, an 
expulsion: “it haunts its own interior” (Barad, 2014, p. 171). This darkness “queers the binary 
darkness/light story” (Barad, 2014, p. 171). As such darkness cannot be the binary opposite of 
light, where darkness figures as “absence, lack, negativity” (Barad, 2014, p. 171) for light 
inhabits darkness and darkness light. As such diffraction opposes the diametric positioning of 
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difference to sameness (Barad, 2014); rather it reveals the “Other”, the other that stands in the 
shadows behind the mirror. 
 
Story 2 
I was leaving Hong Kong. I had packed everything to do with the conflict in a suitcase, a large 
suitcase. This was one piece of “baggage” I did not want to take with me but neither was I 
willing to let it go just yet. So I padlocked the case, wheeled it to a local left luggage office and 
left it there. Two years later and I was back in Hong Kong. I was writing a legislative narrative 
this time, for LegCo (the Legislative Council of Hong Kong), and needed some of the notarised 
documents that were in the case. The attendant took one look at the stub and said: “We throw 
everything out after 6 months you know,” a wave of panic and then relief swept over me, “but 
give me a few minutes and I‟ll go check for you.” Ten minutes later and he was back, a huge 
smile on his face and the case in tow. The past never leaves us and we never leave it behind. 
 
9. 10 “Final” Words 
This story and study has traced my iterative journey to becoming, to being in the here and now 
and the then and there, to becoming of the world in all its dynamic possibilities rather than being 
in a world of static certainties. In the beginning as in the end we are all becoming. We are the 
sum total of our entanglements, the marks on our bodies, human and non human, material and 
discursive - some of us less layered than others, some more inscribed, but all scarred. Eventually 
all scars fade, even the most livid, to become a familiar part of who we are becoming; they are 
the scars that bind us to the world in its “open-ended articulation” (Barad, 2007, p. 379). They 
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are there to remind us of our ongoing responsibility and accountability, our ability to respond and 
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